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~ucnanan

In 1958 Stephen E. Toulmin wrote of inadequacies of
formal logic and proposed a new field-dependent approach to
the analysis of arguments.

Despite a generally negative

response to his proposal from formal logicians, Toulmin's
model for the laying out of arguments for analysis was
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subsequently appropriated by several speech communication
textbook writers.

In some textbooks, the Toulmin model has

become successor to the syllogism as the paradigm of logical argument.

Yet, perhaps due to their seemingly uncriti-

cal acceptance of Toulmin's approach there appears to be
serious disagreement and confusion among speech communication
professionals about the nature and applications of the Toulmin model.

Towards a resolution of this problem, this study

provides a descriptive analysis and assessment of the
history of the Toulmin model and its proposed applications
to speech communication.
Data were collected from two sources:

(1) articles

about the Toulmin approach from professional journals of
philosophy and speech communication, and (2) selected
speech communication textbook presentations of the Toulmin
model or some variation of it.

In order to determine the

degree to which speech communication professionals appear
to apprehend the limitations and strengths of the Toulmin
approach relative to formal logic, major themes of criticism
·found in professional journals were used as points of
departure for observations made of textbook presentations
of the model.

Various interpretations and applications of

the Toulmin model presented in textbooks were compared, and
critically assessed in order that specific issues suitable
for subsequent investigation could be identified.

3
Formal logicians' general criticisms of Toulmin's
approach were judged to be inconsequential to potential
applications of his model to speech communication.

How-

ever, their criticisms specific to the model itself were
judged to be salient and may be summarized as follows:
(1) many of the elements are difficult if not impossible to
distinguish, (2) the backing element is inadequate to provide
the kind of justification for arguments which Toulmin expects
of it, (3) the data element is unclearly defined and is
therefore questionable, and (4) the nature of warrantestablishing arguments is not clearly explained.

The sub-

stance of these criticisms is that formal logicians object
to nearly every innovative feature of the Toulmin model.
It is hypothesized that this conflict between formal logicians and Toulmin may be explained as a difference of theoretical perspectives--linear vs. systems.
Apparently with little regard for crucial/differences
between formal logic and Toulmin's approach, speech communication textbook writers have introduced diverse modifications of the model.

Theoretical bases of Toulmin's

approach such as "field-dependence" are seldom even tacitly
acknowledged.
altered.

Diagrammatic models have been severely

Modified definitions and poor exemplification

have resulted in reduced clarity and consistency.

There

is also disagreement as to whether the model is usefully
applied to field-invariant categories of argument, specific
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fields relevant to speech communication or rhetorical discourse in general.
Further research should be aimed towards a clarification of the epistemological implications of alternative
theoretical perspectives, the nature of argument fields,
and the nature of the elements and uses of the Toulmin
model.

Investigation of these issues should facilitate the

judicious appraisal of the relative values of alternative
approaches to argument analysis, the usefulness of proposed
modifications of the Toulmin model, and the limits of its
potential applications.
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CH.APTER I

INTRODUCTION
Stephen Toulmin's controversial attack on traditional
approaches to logic was first published over twenty years
ago in The Uses of Argument. 1 Immediate response to his
concepts came from formal logicians and philosophers and
was largely negative. 2 Some years later, some speech
communication professionals discovered Toulmin's work and
enthusiastically embraced his pattern for laying out an
argument according to the functions of its parts.3

Most

speech communication students have since been exposed to
this pattern, otherwise known as the "Toulmin model." 4 In
some speech communication textbooks the syllogism has been
replaced by the Toulmin model as a paradigm of valid
argument.5

It is true that these textbook discussions of

Toulmin's concepts vary in depth and significance, but that
they are fairly common is evidence of the influence these
concepts have had upon speech communication. 6
It is ironic that textbook writers in speech communication have found so much of immediate value in Toulmin's
book, while the audience to whom it was addressed, scholars
and students of philosophy, has remained largely unmoved by
it.

Indeed, unless he meant only to be modest, even Toulmin
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seemed to have reservations about the specific and immediate applicability of his ideas, for he introduces his book
in part with these words:
The purpose of these studies is to raise problems
not to solve them; to draw attention to a field of
inquiry, rather than survey it fully; and to provoke discussion rather than to serve as a systematic treatise.7 [Emphasis added.]
He goes on to typify his essays as "experimental incursions" and "trial balloons designed to draw fire. 118

From

the outset, Toulmin appears to have hoped that exposure to
the fire would help forge his broadly sketched themes of
The Uses of Argument into a more applicable systematic
treatise.

This is one of the ways theories are developed

and made more useful; they are subjected to the scrutiny
of experts in the field and, when appropriate, empirically
probed until they are subsequently rejected or refined.9
In light of its dissemination in textbooks throughout
our field, surprisingly few reports of research are found
which aim at verifying Toulmin's claims or developing his
concepts.

As widely referenced as it is in speech communi-

cation textbooks, the Toulmin model has been the primary
subject of only a dozen or so discussions in our profes1
sional journals.
Fewer than half of these acknowledge

°

the attention Toulmin's ideas have attracted in philosophical literature. 11 The recent publication of an introductory reasoning textbook by Stephen Toulmin, Richard
Rieke, and Allan Janik may represent a refinement and more
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thorough presentation of the Toulmin model than is available elsewhere, yet it too fails to address many issues
raised by critics or to suggest modifications which might
improve the applicability of the Toulmin model. 12 At best,
this reconfirmation of the Toulmin approach to argument
provides some clarification and exemplification absent from
The Uses of Argument while it ignores many fundamental
questions. 1 3
Thus, the Toulmin model has advanced from its supportive role in exploratory essays to weather the severe
and as yet unanswered criticism of formal logicians and
has finally become the modern day successor to the syllogism in many speech communication textbooks.

In the process

the Toulmin model has undergone a diversity of diagrammatic
and conceptual transformations which have for the most
part gone unexplained.

Considering Toulmin's apparent

intent in proposing a new approach, it is ironic that the
Toulmin model has infiltrated speech communication textbooks with relatively few published critical appraisals and
a near absence of published empirical evaluations.

Perhaps

as a consequence of this apparent adoption on the basis of
intuition rather than investigation, the state of the art
of the Toulmin model in speech communication is diverse,
diffuse, and somewhat diluted.

In short, it is unclear to

what extent and in what ways the Toulmin model has been
developed by those who have interpreted it in speech
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communication.

Further, it is unclear what effect such

development may have had upon the potential applicability

of the Toulmin model in our discipline.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It appears to this writer that the time is ripe to
reassess Toulmin's contributions to speech communication;
to examine some of the interpretations, modifications, and
applications of the Toulmin model suggested in speech communication textbooks in light of the relevant criticisms
of formal logicians; and to identify specific issues
towards which further investigation of the Toulmin model
may usefully be directed.

It is the purpose of this study

to provide such an assessment in the form of a descriptive
analysis of the history of the Toulmin model and its
applications to speech communication.

To this end it

would appear that several questions need to be addressed.
First, in what ways may the Toulmin approach be
viewed as an innovation in the field of logic?

Specifi-

cally, what assumptions, aims, and model represent the
field of formal logic prior to the introduction of Toulmin's
approach to the analysis of argument and how do these differ
from formal logic?

What problems or limitations of formal

logic is the Toulmin approach intended to resolve or circumvent?

These questions are the foci of chapter II.
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Second, on what basis do formal logicians criticize
Toulmin's concepts?

Specifically, which of these criti-

cisms of the Toulmin approach in general and the Toulmin
model in particular have implications for the application
of Toulmin's concepts in speech communication?

To what

extent are differences in the approaches of Toulmin and
formal logicians attributable to a conflict in their theoretical perspectives?

These questions are the foci of

chapter III.
Third, how is the Toulmin model represented in speech
communication textbooks?

Specifically, to what extent are

innovative features of the Toulmin approach represented in
speech communication textbooks?

What variations or modifi-

cations are presented of the Toulmin model in its diagrammatic features, terminology, and elemental concepts?
is it exemplified in illustrations?

How

How is the syllogism

presented in relation to the Toulmin model?

These questions

are the foci of chapter IV.
What applications have been suggested in textbooks
for the Toulmin model and what may be their implications?
Specifically, how has it been utilized by some authors in
the analysis and exemplification of general categories and
what questions does this development raise?

What applica-

tions have been suggested regarding specific fields
relevant to communication?

How do speech communication

textbook writers suggest the Toulmin model be applied
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to rhetorical discourse in general?

These questions are

the foci of chapter V.
This study involves description, analysis, and evaluation pertaining to the above questions.

Conclusions are

intended to function heuristically, giving form to issues
which may provide useful directions for further research.
In sum, the problem which this study addresses is an
apparent lack of critical evaluation in the process of
adoption, adaptation, and development of the Toulmin model
by speech communication professionals.

By examining the

history of the Toulmin model in its various stages of
development and application to speech communication, issues
critical to the applicability of the Toulmin model in our
discipline may be identified with the intention of bringing
them into clearer focus.

With this study as a point of

departure, subsequent research may proceed to clearly define
the boundaries of applicability of the Toulmin model to
speech communication theories and practices.

METHODS OF RESEARCH
According to Abraham Kaplan in The Conduct of Inquiry,
"the aim of methodology is to help us to understand, in the
broadest possible terms, not the products of scientific
inquiry but the process itself. 1114

The product of the

present research is the survey of a particular literature
with analysis and commentary aimed to draw attention to
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inadequately explored issues which may require further
investigation.

This has resulted from a process involving

a variety of interrelated activities all directed toward
answering the questions which guided this research.

This

included the examination of a variety of print resources,
the selection of primary sources for study, the discovery
of relevant concepts within these primary sources, and the
analysis, classification, organization, comparison, and
contrasting of these concepts in a manner intended to best
reveal feasible answers to the research questions.
Many of the procedures involved in this study are no
different from those of any other research project:

reading

to collect data, analysis, and organization to provide clear
explanation and support for a hypothesis. 1 5 Two special
problems were encountered, however, which merit discussion
here because the methods of attacking them involved several
techniques less typical than those already mentioned.
These problems were:

first, how to arrive at a clear and

comprehensive analysis of the major criticisms which have
been directed at the Toulmin model and are potentially
pertinent to its applicability to speech communication; and
second, how to select and evaluate discussions of the
Toulmin model from the literature of speech communication.
The solution developed for dealing with the first problem
turned out to have direct bearing on the solution for
dealing with the second.

8

Work towards a comprehensive treatment of criticisms
of the Toulmin model was needed because none was available
in the literature at the time of writing.

It is a sup-

portable assumption that a deeper understanding of strengths
and weaknesses of the Toulmin model would be promoted by
the development of such an analysis.

There may be hundreds

of various references to the Toulmin model, some of them
critical evaluations, in books, articles, and research
reports written over the past twenty years.

The location,

collection, and analysis of these publications would be a
supremely difficult task.

Therefore, only articles devoted

entirely to the evaluation of Toulmin's approach to argument were considered for study.

References to such articles

are found in several speech communication discussions of
Toulmin. 16
By checking each reference as well as several indexes
in communication, the social sciences, and philosophy,
thirteen major articles devoted to an assessment of Toulmin's
approach were located. 1 7 Nine of these were written by
scholars whose expertise is in philosophy, especially formal
18
logic.
Four others were authored by speech communication
professionals, all but one of whom relied heavily upon some
of the previously published philosophical criticisms representative of the perspective of formal logicians. 1 9
These articles, then, served as data which provided the
basis for the presentation in chapter III.
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The analysis of the articles was performed in the
following manner.

First, all articles were examined care-

fully with an eye toward identifying contentions regarding
the Toulmin model.

Second, identified claims were orga-

nized into groups according to their content, while
allowing for the membership of a single claim in more than
one category when appropriate.

Third, the resulting cate-

gories were themselves organized into a pattern representative of their relatedness or opposition to one another. ·
The number of claims grouped in each category were taken to
be indicative of force of the criticisms represented.
Fourth, some categories of claim were excluded because they
had more to do with the nature of Toulmin's character or
his proficiency as a philosopher than with the qualities of
his approach to argument.

Finally, the resulting pattern

of evolved categories was restructured to improve the overall
comprehensibility of the presentation in chapter III.

This

provided a systematic method for handling the analysis of a
variety of complexly related materials.
The categories derived from this analysis proved to
be useful also in providing the criteria for treating the
contents of the textbook survey materials obtained in the
present study.

In other words, identified areas of critical

concern within Toulmin's approach were viewed here as significant points of presentation which may or may not be
present in speech communication textbooks.

The assumption
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is that those speech communication professionals who have
traditionally used the syllogism in the analysis and evaluation of arguments are likely to have many of the same
concerns as formal logicians who criticize the Toulmin
approach.

Consequently the degree to which speech communi-

cation professionals appear to apprehend the relative
limitations as well as strengths of the Toulmin approach to
argument may help to explain their various interpretations
and suggested applications for the Toulmin model.
Textbooks were singled out for study here.
two reasons.

There are

First, some limitation had to be placed on

the materials for study for the project to be feasible.

In

the past twenty years numerous references to Toulmin have
appeared in speech communication doctoral dissertations,
masters theses, scholarly journal articles, and textbooks.
Any and all of these sources might provide information
relevant to the goals of this study.

However, to survey

them all would be inefficient if not impossible.

Therefore,

some limitation on the scope of materials to be considered
had to be imposed.
Dissertations and theses, while they can provide
valuable in-depth discussions, were ruled out because they
often involve specialized concerns not representative of
the field as a whole.

On the other hand, articles in

scholarly journals can be taken to be better representative
of ideas widely known within the field because they have

11

competed with other articles for publication and are circulated among members of professional organizations and
university libraries.

The difficulty is that surprisingly

few journal articles in speech communication have been
devoted to the Toulmin model since it was first introduced
20
to our discipline in 1960.
In the process of setting
these criteria for the selection of source materials,
incidental references to Toulmin in other articles on subjects of related interest were sampled and found to include
few concepts salient to the research questions of this study.
Thus, while there are references to several doctoral dissertations, masters theses, and a number of articles from
professional journals of speech communication, none of
these provide a primary data base for this study.
Speech communication textbooks were selected for
study because textbooks represent what Toulmin himself,
incidently, calls the "transmit" of a field of knowledge,
that is, the collectively validated concepts which are
thought to make up a discipline and are passed on from
scholar to student. 21

Often included in textbooks along-

side of more established ideas, innovations become part of
an integrated exposition of publicly acknowledged concepts.
The manner in which an innovation like the Toulmin model
is incorporated into textbook presentations of a growing
field like speech communication may indicate professional
attitudes as to the purposes and practical values of the
model.
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In addition, and perhaps more importantly, textbook
presentations provide a clue as to how the next generation

of speech communication theorists is likely to view the
Toulmin model and its role or roles within our discipline.
Thus, it is appropriate that textbook presentations of the
Toulmin approach were selected for examination and analysis.
The selection problem was to obtain a sample with
high content validity.

It was judged that the sample

should include textbooks with different foci, from general
surveys of the discipline to works devoted to specialized
interest areas.

Further, it was judged that selections

should also represent changes over time in the treatment
of the Toulmin model and therefore must include some
older, out-of-print books as well as some of those currently available for use.

Several criteria were used to

ensure that the limited number of textbooks selected are
appropriate to the goals of this study.
First, and most importantly, only textbooks designed
for use in speech communication classrooms which present
an identifiable Toulmin model were selected for study.
With one exception to be discussed later, this ruled out
textbooks in English, philosophy, and other fields external
to speech communication.
Second, to limit the overall number of textbooks to
be examined by focusing on those most likely to have
influenced the greatest number of students over time,

13
textbooks which had been in print at least seven years, had
included the Toulmin model in at least two editions, or
whose author or co-author had been associated with at least
two textbooks which treat the Toulmin approach were selected
for study.

For example, Ehninger and Brockriede's Decision

by Debate qualified for inclusion in this study on three
different grounds:

it remained in print well over seven

years in its first edition, a second edition is currently
in publication, and Ehninger is the author of another textbook in which the Toulmin model is presented. 22
Third, to allow for the inclusion of textbooks which
represent special areas of interest within speech communication, five other textbooks were selected for limited
analysis whether or not they met the second selection criterion.

These books represent areas of interest less

commonly associated with the Toulmin model:

rhetorical

theory, persuasion theory, rhetorical criticism, small
group communication, and intercultural communication. 2 3
These three selection criteria provided a rational
basis for limiting study to certain textbooks representing
various interests within speech communication as well as
changes over time.

Twenty-seven textbooks discovered

which met these criteria were included for study (see
chapter IV).
One textbook selected for inclusion in this study
meets the first criterion less directly than the others
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and its inclusion requires some explanation.

The textbook

is An Introduction to Reasoning by Stephen Toulmin, Richard
Rieke, and Allan Janik.

Because of the limited scope of

the work, having to do with practical reasoning only, and
perhaps because of Toulmin's association with it, this book
might be mistaken for a philosophy textbook which offers an
alternative to formal logic texts.

Toulmin is, after all,

a philosopher and courses in reasoning at many universities
are taught through philosophy departments.

While it is

used in philosophy courses, the authors of this textbook
have explicitly named several fields other than philosophy
for which their book is applicable; first on their list is
"departments of communication." 24

Perhaps following this

lead, Macmillan company has marketed the text to departments of speech communication. 2 5

In addition, Introduction

to Reasoning has been reviewed in professional journals of
speech communication and the reviewers consider the textbook
well suited to undergraduate students in speech communication. 26

Finally, one of Toulmin's co-authors, Richard

Rieke, is a recognized speech communication scholar with
expertise in argumentation. 2 7

Therefore, this work is

appropriately included in the sample.
The following procedures were used in the analysis of
the selections.

First, the textbooks were classified for

purposes of comparison according to their pedagogical aims
as stated in prefaces and introductions or as implied in
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their content, organization, and suggested activities or
exercises.

As mentioned above, five textbooks were

admitted for study under the third criterion as a result of
their special foci.

These were temporarily set aside and

not used for comparisons and contrasts developed from this
part of the analysis.

Of the remaining twenty-two texts,

twelve were found to have as a pedagogical objective the
improvement of students' oral communication skills; ten
others aim instead at increasing students' understanding
of and ability to engage effectively in the argumentation
process.

In other words, the selected textbooks are

divided roughly by half into those which purport to improve
a student's ability to deliver some kind of speech and
those which purport to help a student cope with arguments
either in debates or discourse in general.

While this

classification is not absolute or final in any sense, it
was a useful aid in organizing materials for analysis. 28
Second, each textbook was examined, its references
to formal logic and the Toulmin model located and these
sections analyzed in terms of several categories derived
from the initial analysis of criticisms of the Toulmin
approach.

This latter analysis resulted in the comparison

and contrasting of critical features of the selected textbook presentations.
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Finally, patterns of similarity, difference, or
change over time were noted and organized for presentation

in chapters IV and V.
In summary, the methodology for this study involved
description, analysis, and evaluation with respect to
questions about how the Toulmin model has been and may
potentially be further developed and applied in speech
communication.

Particular techniques used include:

(1) the categorization of critical claims representing
issues regarding the theoretical usefulness and applicability of the Toulmin model; (2) the selection according
to criteria of a limited number of textbooks which present
the Toulmin model for study; and (3) the classification
according to pedagogical intent and analysis in terms of
predefined categories of the selected textbooks.

Each of

these specialized techniques was developed to suit the
purposes of the present study.
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Chapter 1--Notes
1 stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958), hereafter referred to as
Uses.
2 The following philosophic discussions of Toulmin's
concepts are listed chronologically by publication dates:
J. Ch. Simopoulos, review of Uses, Hibbert Journal, 57
(1958), 9E-98; L. C. Cooley, "On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution
in Logic," Journal of Philosophy, 55 (March 26, 1959),
297-319; C. L. Hardin, review of~' Philosophy of Science,
26 (April, 1959), 160-163; S. Korner, review of~' ~'
68 (July, 1959), 425-427; H. N. Casteneda, "On a Proposed
Revolution in Logic," Philosophy of Science, 27 (July, 1960),
279-292; F. Will, review of Uses, The Philosophical Review,
69 (1960), 399-403; 0. Bird, "The Re-discovery of the
Topics: Professor Toulmin's Inference-Warrants," Mind, 70
(October, 1961), 534-539; and J. L. Cowan, "The Uses of
Argument--An Apology for Logic," Mind, 73 (January, J.-964),
27-54.
3The first authors to exploit the potential applications of Toulmin's concepts to speech communication were
Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede. Beginning with
"Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46. (March, 1960), 44-53, and a
subsequent textbook, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company, 1963), these authors may be credited with
having introduced the Toulmin model to speech communication
professionals. Hereafter, Decision by Debate is cited as
Decision (1963) for the first edition.
4 Toulmin does not refer to his "pattern for analyzing
arguments" as the Toulmin model (Uses, 99). However, some
authors of speech communication textbooks use the phrase
"Toulmin model," among them Eb.ninger and Brockriede,
Decision (1963), and James C. McCroskey, An Introduction to
Rhetorical Communication, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972). Throughout this study the
pattern for the laying out of arguments for analysis will
be referred to as the Toulmin model.
5Four notable examples are Ehninger and Brockriede,
Decision (1963); Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Message Preparation:
The Nature of Proof (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.
1966); McCroskey, An Introduction to Rhetorical CommunicaiiQ.n; and John Wilson and Carroll Arnold, Public Speaking
as a Liberal Art (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964).
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6 This writer has observed a "streamlining" of some
discussions of the Toulmin model in speech communication
textbooks over the past fifteen years. For instance,
Ehninger and Brockriede in Decision (1963) discuss all of
the elements introduced by Toulmin in ~· However, in a
more recent edition of Decision (1978), these authors
delete "backing for the warrant" entirely. Similar alterations in other textbooks are noted in chapter IV of this
study.
7Toulmin, p. 1.

8Ibid.

9For a brief discussion of Toulmin's view of this
process of theory development, see Stephen E. Toulmin,
Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1950), 91-95.
10Many more citations might be listed of articles
relating to or referring to the Toulmin model. These ten
are explicitly devoted to the subject of the Toulmin model
or some aspect of it: (listed alphabetically by author)
Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 46 (February, 1960), 46-55; Gary D'Angelo,
"A Schema for the Utilization of Attitude Theory within the
Toulmin Model of Argument," Central States Speech Journal,
22 (Summer, 1971), 100-109; Jerry Feezel, "A Qualified
Certainty: Verbal Probability in Arguments," Communication
Monographs, 41 (November, 1974), 348-356; Dale Hample, "The
Toulmin Model and the Syllogism," Journal of the American
Forensic Association, 14 (Summer, 1977), 1-9; Al Lewis,
"Stephen Toulmin: A Re-a~praisal," Central States Speech
Journal, 23 (Spring, 1972), 48-55; Peter Manicas, "On
Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argumentation,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 3 (September,
1966), 83-94; Pat Marsh, "A Model for Arguing Directive
Propositions," JAFA, 6 (Winter, 1969), 1-11; James Mccroskey,
"Toulmin and the Basic Course," Speech Teacher, 14 (March,
1965), 91-100; Jerie Pratt, "The Appropriateness of a
Toulmin Analysis of Legal Argumentation," Speaker and Gavel,
7, No. 4 (May, 1970), 133-137; and James Trent, "Toulmin's
Model of Argument: An Examination and Extension," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 54 (October, 1968), 252-259.
11
see Hample, p. l; Lewis, pp. 48-55; Manicas, p. 83,
91 et passim; Pratt, p. 134; and Trent, p. 252. Except for
Lewis and Manicas, these authors merely cite the philosophical criticism without any amplification or detail.
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12 stephen E. Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik,
An Introduction to Reasoni~ (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 197~, hereafter referred to as
Reasoning.
1 3Gerald Cox, review of Reasoning, by Toulin et al.,
Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45, No. 1 (Fall,
1979), 104-106; and Donn Parson, review of Reasoning,
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 (Fall,
1979), 145-147.
14Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), 23-24.
l5A reference which provided useful insight into the
mechanics of research is Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff,
The Modern Researcher (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc., 1957).
16of those previously cited in note 11, Hample's
references are the most complete and up-to-date.
l7The thirteen articles are these: Simopoulos;
Cooley; Hardin; Korner; Casteneda; Will; Bird; Cowan;
Manicas; Hample; Lewis; Trent; and Winston Brembeck, review
of Uses, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (April, 1958),
325-326.
18 This includes the eight referred to in note 2 as
well as Peter Manicas who, while published in Journal of
the American Forensic Association, is a philosopher and
formal logician.
l9The exception is Brembeck whose review preceded
most of the criticism published in philosophical journals.
20 Brockriede and Ehninger.
21 stephen E. Toulmin, Human Understanding: The
Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 158-161.
22
Douglas Ehninger, Influence, Belief and Argument
(Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974).
2 3Respectively: James Golden, Goodwin Berquist,
and William Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought
(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976); Gary
Cronkhite, Persuasion: Speech and Behavioral Change
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969);
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Carroll Arnold, Criticism of Oral Rhetoric (Columbus:
Charles E. Merrill Pub. Inc., 1974); H. E. Gulley,
Discussion, Conference and Group Process, 2nd ed.
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968);
John Condon and Fathi Yousef, An Introduction to Intercultural Communication (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company
Inc., 1975).
24 Toulmin et al., Reasoning, p. v. Indeed, this text
is apparently popular in some college philosophy courses.
A recent college survey lists it among the most popular
textbooks currently in use in courses in practical or
informal logic. Informal Logic Newsletter, 2 (June, 1980),
19.
2 5Personal interview with Stephen Kosokoff, Portland
State University, Portland, Oregon, 11 June 1980.
26 cox, review of Reasoning, by Toulmin et al.,
Southern Speech Communication Journal, 45, No. 1 (Fall,
1979), 104-106; Daniel O'Keefe, review of Reasoni~,
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 ~all,
1979), 143-145~ Donn Parson, review of Reasoning, JAFA,
16 (Fall, 1979J, 145-147.
2 7 11 Editor's Note," JAFA, 16 (Fall, 1979), 143.
28 No attempt was made to distinguish textbooks
devoted to persuasion or rhetoric from those concerned
with speech generally. Such distinctions are difficult to
maintain as both persuasion and rhetoric are broadly
defined by some theorists to include effective informative
speaking. Regardless of the implications of titles, the
books in this study were found to be clearly divided in
their pedagogical objectives.

CHAPTER II
FORMAL LOGIC AND THE TOULMIN MODEL:
ORIGINS OF A NEW APPROACH
To understand how Toulmin's model represents an
innovation in the field of logic, examination must be made
of the problems Toulmin addresses in The Uses of Argument.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain Toulmin's concepts of reasoning in the context of a theory of formal
logic based upon the classical syllogism.

Specifically,

attention will be focused on three topics:

first, basic

principles of formal logic and its paradigm, the categorical syllogism; second, the structure of the model
proposed by Toulmin as a more candid tool for the laying
out of arguments for analysis; and third, the chief
criticisms aimed at the syllogism and formal logic which
led to the development of Toulmin's approach.

It should

be stressed here that the following discussion is limited
to main features and lines of thought which are prerequisite to the understanding of any rational criticism or
practical applications of the Toulmin model.

No attempt

will be made to fully explain the theory of formal logic
because such discussions are widely available and not
germane to the current discussion.

1
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Even critics of the Toulmin approach consider his
proposals "revolutionary" in their intent if not in their
force.

2

Toulmin admits that much of what he presents in

The Uses of Argument does not originate with him but has
been discussed by various logicians for some time.3

Drawing

freely from others, Toulmin synthesizes some criticisms and
suggestions in the hope that it will lead formal logicians
into more fruitful, practicable areas of research and
debate. 4 Conceptual development in the field of logic is
Toulmin's stated objective.5

He summarizes his general

thesis as follows:
In science and philosophy alike, an exclusive preoccupation with logical systematicity has been
destructive of both historical understanding and
rational criticism. Men demonstrate their rationality, not by ordering their concepts and beliefs
in tidy formal structures, but by their preparedness
to respond to novel situations with open minds-acknowledging the shortcomings of their formal
procedures and moving beyond them.6

To understand the "movement beyond" which Toulmin's
approach to argument is taken to be, we must determine what
the term "logic" has meant historically, how it is related
to "formal validity" and finally how the "syllogism" is
constructed to test or illustrate the properties of formal
validity.

These concepts are the basic components of

prevailing thought in the field of logic prior to Toulmin.
While logic has a rich history, our comments are limited
to these fundamental concepts without which any discussion
of logic cannot proceed.7
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FORl"IAL LOGIC AND THE SYLLOGISM
The term "logic" is drawn from the Greek root-word

logos for which there is no English equivalent, although it
has been roughly translated to mean everything from "order,"
in the universal sense, to "discourse," "imagination," and
"humane nature of man. 118

The element of logos which sur-

vives in the modern concept of logic is that of order or
organization, referring to the connections or relationships
which can be understood to exist among things or ideas.9
Logic is a branch of philosophy concerned with the study
of rational thought or reasoning.

It is sometimes called

an art, other times a science; with either interpretation,
its chief concern is the development of principles of valid
. f erence. 10
in

In other words, logicians have been devoted

to devising formal standards for the assessment of the
soundness, truth-value, correctness, or acceptability of
the conclusions in argument.
"Logic, as I conceive it," writes John Stuart Mill,
"is the entire theory of the ascertainment of reasoned or
inferred truth.

Formal logic, therefore, • • • is really

a very subordinate part of it. 1111

This distinction between

logic and formal logic has never reached wide currency
among philosophers, perhaps because it complicates the
notion of formal validity which has been central to the
concept of formal logic since it was first conceived.
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Principles and procedures have varied widely through the
centuries, and yet the general dimensions of formal

validity and its relation to truth have been maintained. 12
Validity refers to "the consistency with which we use whatever language we have, and such consistency means that our
words must faithfully follow the order and connections
denoted by them." 1 3

In other words, validity has to do with

the kinds of statements that can be properly inferred from
related statements without need for any further information.
The chief application of logic is in the determination of
the truth-value of conclusions which are the product of
inference.

However, truth itself is not the province of

formal logic; formal validity and specific standards by
which it can be determined are the subject of formal logic.
As Mill states, "the end aimed at by formal logic • • • is
not truth, but consistency. 1114
The systematic search for logical consistency began
with the invention of the syllogism.

Introduced by

Aristotle in the six treatises of his Organon, the syllogism provided a firm basis for the development of a science
of formal logic and served as the centerpiece to his concepts of scientific, dialectical, and rhetorical proof. 1 5
Later, the Megarian and Stoic philosophers added new forms
and figures to the categorical premises of Aristotle, but
it remained for more recent philosophers to diverge significantly from Aristotle's methods. 16

It is appropriate,
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then, to focus attention on the syllogism--its function,
components, and principles of application.
Aristotle developed the syllogism as a tool of scientific demonstration and dialectic. 1 7

It was his opinion

that "all instruction given or received by way of argument
proceeds from pre-existent knowledge." 18

To correctly draw

less familiar conclusions from more familiar ones was the
problem Aristotle faced which led to the development of the
syllogism. 1 9

By analyzing the way in which people name

things and then classify them under more general terms
according to their shared attributes, Aristotle made
explicit the habits of consistency of thought which characterized the work of philosophers of his day. 20

The advent

of the syllogism, then, was only tangentially related to
the problem of truth and the source of knowledge; it was
directly concerned with the "clarification of exposition
and thought. 1121

Through the recasting of an argument in

syllogistic form, the validity of a conclusion drawn from
the stated evidence becomes discoverable.
A syllogism consists of three related statements
termed "propositions."

These are examples of syllogistic

propositions:
(1)

All life is animated.
No rock is animated.
Therefore, no rock is life (alive).

2E
(2)

All logicians are philosophers.
Stephen Toulmin is a logician.
Therefore, Stephen Toulmin is a philosopher.

-;z, 1
( ./
J

All y is z •
Some x is y.
So, some x is z.

The final proposition in each of the above examples is the
"conclusion," or statement to be affirmed.

The other two

propositions in each triad are termed "premises" which,
when taken together as true, amount to proof of the conclusion.

It is unavoidable in example three that if all of y,

including some x, can be taken to be part of z, then some
x is also part of z.

This relationship can be graphically

demonstrated through the use of geometric diagrams as shown
in Figure 1. 22 This abstract sort of demonstration of the
relationship between arbitrary symbols x and z is unsurprising.
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All y is z.
Some x is y.

z

x

y

So, some x is z.
y

x

Figure 1. Use of Venn diagrams to illustrate
the relationships among the elements of the
syllogism in example 3.
However, in example two the value of a syllogistic
demonstration is more apparent; a person who is well aware
of Toulmin the logician might express surprise at the
assertion of his status as a philosopher, at least until it
is pointed out that a logician is by definition a philosopher.

It is this sort of demonstration which Aristotle

had in mind for his syllogism to perform:

to clarify

thought and avoid confusion of terminology, especially in
cases where several related terms are involved in the
analysis of a scientific question.
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Not every three statements will qualify as a syllogism.

More significantly, not every syllogistic form will

qualify as "perfect" or formally valid.

Medieval philos-

ophers analyzed and summarized Aristotle's doctrine of the
syllogism and developed it into a set of rules or principles
that have since come into general use due to their comparative simplicity. 2 3 These rules are used to test a
syllogism to see if it meets the requirements for formal
va l i"d"t
i y. 24
The rules of the syllogism which represent standards
of formal validity may be stated as follows: 2 5 (1) a
valid syllogism must contain exactly three terms, each is
used in the same sense throughout an argument; (2) in a
valid syllogism, the middle term must be distributed at
least once in the premises; (3) in a valid syllogism,
either term which is distributed in the conclusion must
also be distributed in the premise of the same name; (4) no
valid conclusion can be drawn from two negative premises;
(5) in a valid syllogism, if one of the premises is nega-

tive, so must the conclusion be negative; (6) in a valid
syllogism, if one of the premises is particular, so also
must the conclusion be particular--in other words, no
valid particular conclusion may be drawn from two universal
premises.

The term "universal" refers to premises which

have as their subject all of the members of a class;
"particular," some determinate portion of a class.
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"Affirmative" refers to premises asserting the inclusion of
one class in another, "negative" the exclusion of the same.
Examples and explanations as to how these rules in combination may be used to certify the validity of any argument
presented in syllogistic form follow.

The syllogistic form

itself is illustrated in Figure 2.
Major Premise:

(middle term) is/are MAJOR TERM.

Minor Premise:

minor term is/are (middle term).

Conclusion:

so, minor term is/are MAJOR TERM.

Figure 2. Schema of a syllogism showing valid
distribution of terms.
Rule 1.

In a valid syllogism, the conclusion is

necessarily true if its terms hold a particular relationship
to the terms of the premises.

In other words, a valid syl-

logism is characterized by consistency in the relative
inclusiveness and exclusiveness of its terms to each other
as expressed in the premises and asserted in the conclusion.
The first aspect of that valid relationship is that the
entire syllogism may contain only three terms.

By "term"

is meant each noun or noun-phrase in the subject and predicate of a proposition.

These terms are definable according

to the formal role each plays in the syllogism.

The predi-

cate term of the conclusion is referred to as the "major
term" and the premise in which it appears is a "major
premise."

Similarly, the subject term of the conclusion is
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referred to as the "minor term" and the premise in which it
appears is a "minor premise."

The third term appearing in

both premises but not in the conclusion is referred to as
the "middle term."

So the syllogism is defined by the two

terms of its conclusion and a third term shared by its
premises.

When these structural requirements are not met,

a collection of three premises is judged to be just that
and not a syllogism.

Thus, equivocation in the use of

terms will result in an unsound argument.
To illustrate the first rule of the syllogism, the
following example is presented.

While these three proposi-

tions may appear to constitute a syllogism, they may not
because of ambiguity in the meaning and the number of
terms:

(1) physical conditioning is helpful in reducing

the chances of heart attack; (2) running is good exercise;
and (3) jogging is helpful in reducing the chances of
heart attack.

In these three propositions there are a

total of five terms.

While it may be argued that two of

these terms refer to the same kind of activity, there is
still one more term in the propositions than is permissible
in a valid syllogism.

"Good exercise" cannot be equated

with "physical conditioning" which is sometimes its result.
By this test, many syllogism-candidates may be eliminated
by inserting abstract symbols in place of verbal terms as
in "bis c, a is d; so, a is c."

The particular referents

of the terms are irrelevant to the formal validity of a
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syllogism; truth or the meaning of the terms is not at
issue, just the number and relationship of terms.

Rules 2 and 3.

The second and third rules of the

syllogism have to do with the distribution of the terms.
"Distribution" refers to the specification of the quantity
of a term through the use of a quantifier, generally one of
the following:

"

"all," "some," "no," and "some

not

A syllogism will not be judged valid if the terms

are not properly distributed, that is, if the conclusion
goes beyond the information contained in the premises. 26
Consider the following examples of syllogism which are
judged invalid because of faulty distribution of terms:
(1)

All politicians are liars.
All criminals are liars.
Therefore, all politicians are criminals.

(2)

All medical doctors are greedy.
No chiropractors are medical doctors.
Therefore, no chiropractors are greedy.

(3)

All feminists support the Equal Rights Amendment.
All feminists are well-educated women.

(4)

So, all well-educated women support E.R.A.

The difficulty with example one is that there is no quantifier for the middle term; it is undistributed and so there
is no information on the size of the class of "liars"
relative to its subordinate classes, "politicians" and
"criminals."

While the conclusion cannot be excluded from
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among the logical possibilities, the premises do not assert
that any overlap exists between the major and minor terms.
Even if the premises are true, the conclusion goes further

than is valid given the form of the premises.

The second

and third examples have the same problem except that they
involve faulty distribution not of the middle term but the
major and minor terms respectively.

The major term "greedy"

is distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise of the second example; the minor term "well-educated
woman" refers to a quantifiable class in the conclusion but
an unspecified class in the minor premise.

Clearly in each

of the above examples it could never be certain that a
distributed term refers precisely to the same thing when it
is not distributed, a problem tantamount to having a fourth
term in the syllogism.
invalid.

Such syllogisms are, therefore,

It is worth emphasizing here that the meaning of

the terms cannot affect the invalidity of a syllogism even
if the conclusion can be taken as generally true in practice.

The form makes all of the difference.
Rules 4 and 5.

All of the rules of validity are the

result of experimentation and analysis by Aristotle and his
followers.

They combined various forms of proposition to

see which would result in valid conclusions and which would
2
not. 7 In this way it was discovered that two negative
premises result in an invalid conclusion, and that if either
premise is negative then only a negative conclusion can be
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valid.

To demonstrate this, consider this set of related

propositions from which syllogisms may be constructed.
(1)

All smoking is a bad habit (universal-affirmative).

(2)

All smoking is a pleasant thing (universal-affirmative).

(3)

Some pleasant things are bad habits (particular-

affirmative).

(4)

Some bad habits are not dangerous

(particular-negative).

(5)

Nothing dangerous is a pleas-

ant thing (universal-negative).

The combination of propo-

sitions four and five as premises in a syllogism can produce
no valid or even meaningful conclusion.

One might conclude

either that bad habits are or are not pleasant, but there
is no way to tell which conclusion is more consistent with
the premises because of the ungrammatical double-negative
they produce in combination.

On the other hand, combining

the affirmative propositions one and two as premises
produces a valid affirmative conclusion with no confusion
of terms:

either "some pleasant things are bad habits" or

"some bad habits are pleasant things."

Only one combina-

tion remains to be tested, that of propositions three and
five.

When the negative proposition, five, serves as

major premise to the affirmative proposition, three, a
meaningful negative conclusion results, to the effect that
"some bad habits are not dangerous."

No affirmative prop-

osition makes sense as a conclusion in this case.

With

regard to whether a conclusion is appropriately affirmative
or negative, the invalid answer is generally an implausible

34
sounding one.

However, it is not the plain-sense, truth-

value, or practical consequence of a conclusion which are
at issue; formal validity is, and it depends upon the
abstract relationship of terms.
Rule 6.

The rule regarding whether the propositions

of a syllogism are properly universal or particular applies
only in a few special cases and again involves the conclusion going beyond what is contained in the premises, albeit
in a somewhat underhanded way.

Even though the distribu-

tion requirements are met, a conclusion which implies or
assumes the existence of entities which are only hypothetical in the premises cannot be accepted as valid.

Consider

this case-in-point:
All Transylvanians are kindly people.
No vampires are kindly people.
So, some vampires are not Transylvanian.
Because a "weaker" particular conclusion is used where a
"stronger" universal one is proper, the implication is made
that there are vampires somewhere in existence.

Syllogisms

of this form are judged invalid by modern logicians. 28
Any categorical syllogism found to violate one of the
rules of formal validity is disregarded by formal logicians
as inconsequential or meaningless because its conclusion is
not completely "entailed by" or contained within the
premises.

The value of these rules, according to formal

logicians, is their universal applicability; any argument
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which can be put into syllogistic form can be judged valid
or invalid according to these rules.

If valid, the truth

of the conclusion rests only on the truth of the premises;
the inference is certified by the rules of validity.
Toulmin's criticisms of this system of argument analysis is
the topic of the final section of this chapter.
While formal validity of syllogisms is of primary
interest in formal logic, there are other, related concepts
which are a significant part of the field.

Some of these

are considered in the following discussion.
Deduction and Induction
Since Aristotle, the field of logic has been divided
along the lines of inductive and deductive reasoning procedures.

Induction and deduction were viewed by Aristotle
as the two sources of belief by syllogistic reasoning. 2 9

A deductive argument is one "in which certain things being
laid down, something other than these things necessarily
comes through them."30

Induction is different, less

scientific according to Aristotle, but not without its
advantages.
Induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled
pilot is the most effective, and likewise the
skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled
man is the best at his particular task. Induction
is the more convincing and clear: it is more
readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is
applicable generally to the mass of men, though
Reasoning is more forcible and effective against
contradictious people.31
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He explains elsewhere the syllogistic mechanisms of inductive reasoning which involve establishing the connectedness
of a doubtful middle term to the major or minor terms when
the conclusion is known from experience.3 2

The key dis-

tinction, however, involves the source of implication.

In

deduction "it is inferred that what is true for all members
of a class is true of some members of that class"; in
induction, "it is inferred that what is true of some members of a class is true for all, or some determinate portion of all, members of that class."33
Another important distinction between induction and
deduction is discussed by logicians.

Whereas the truth of

the conclusion of a syllogism necessarily follows if its
premises are themselves true, inductive generalizations are
always subject to later revision and can never be necessary. 34
Enthymeme and Epicheireme
The enthymeme and epicheireme are two forms used in
practical argumentation and related to the syllogism.

Of

the enthymeme, much has been written by scholars in rhetoric who have puzzled over Aristotle's various references to
a "rhetorical syllogism."35

Drawing from these scattered

references to the enthymeme, several definitions have been
proposed.

Most features of this one are representative:

The enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and examples, whose function is
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rhetorical persuasion. Its successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts
of a speaker and audience.36
Unlike the syllogism, the enthymeme is not used in the
demonstration of scientific truths.

Instead it is con-

cerned with probable truths, conclusions inferred from the
possible premises believed by a particular audience.

The

involvement of an audience in supplying or inferring some
of the propositions appears to be one of the basic distinctions between argument by syllogism and argument by enthymeme.

"In the Aristotilian system, the apodeictic syllo-

gism is used to demonstrate the necessary truths of certain
knowledge; the rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is used to
demonstrate the dialectical truth of opinions in the areas
of uncertain knowledge such as ethics and politics."37
However, both the enthymeme and the syllogism must conform
to the usual requirements of formal validity; their diff erences lie in the degree of confidence one can place in
their conclusions and in the fields of argument in which
each is appropriately used.

The enthymeme applies in

fields where certainty is not easily attainable; its conclusions, while they may be universal, are generally less
absolute than those of the syllogism.
About the epicheireme there is even more mystery and
controversy than in the theory of the enthymeme.3 8 In the
Roman rhetorics of Psuedo-Cicero, Cicero, and Quintilian,
the epicheireme appears to have replaced the enthymeme in
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its application as a "rhetorical syllogism."39

An epi-

cheireme resembles an expanded syllogism and, according to
Quintilian, has been characterized as having anywhere from
three to six parts. 40 Generally, five parts are mentioned,
"the major premise and its reason, the minor premise and
its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. 1141 The elements of
support for the major and minor premises are included
because of what the epicheireme holds in common with the
enthymeme:
There is no difference between the epicheireme and
the syllogism, except that the latter has a number
of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the
epicheireme is more frequently concerned with
arguments that are no more than credible. For if
it were always possible to prove controversial
points from admitted premises, the or~tor would
have little to do in this connexion.42
What the epicheireme and the enthymeme have in common,
then, is one of the qualities which differentiates them
both from the syllogism: probability in the premises and
conclusion. 4 3 Whatever their differences, it is significant that all three are syllogistic forms subject to the
same principles of formal validity.
Before moving to a consideration of the defects which
Toulmin finds in formal logic, the model which Toulmin
proposes as an alternative to the syllogism is examined.

THE TOULMIN MODEL
In chapter III of The Uses of Argument, Toulmin
introduces a schema of argument which he believes to be
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more candid and practicable than the categorical syllogism. 44

Here the Toulmin model will be described, its

functional elements distinguished, their roles defined, and
other salient concepts discussed.

Comparative practical

advantages of the Toulmin model to the syllogistic approach
of formal logic as asserted in The Uses of Argument are
discussed later in this chapter. 4 5
"Argument," "Logic," and
the Toulmin Model
The Toulmin model is "a pattern for analysing arguments" which, according to Toulmin, may be taken to reflect
the form or micro-structure of arguments in various fields. 46
In order to comprehend what Toulmin means by "a logically
candid layout of arguments" or "logical form of a valid
argument" it is important to understand the special senses
in which Toulmin uses the terms "argument" and "logic. 114 7
The term "argument" is used by Toulmin in two senses:
generically, to refer to the process by which justifications
for statements of assertion are made explicit, and specifically, to refer to the products of reasoning, that is,
statements produced in support of assertions.

Thus,

Toulmin implies a general distinction between argument,
conceived as a public, linguistic, justificatory "business
of making good claims," and reasoning, conceived as a
private, psychological, cognitive activity involving
"people's actual habits of inference." 48 Further, Toulmin
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draws no conclusions about reasoning in The Uses of Argument because he believes that "one can discuss arguments

..

• without having to refer in any way to
4
the particular men doing the asserting and adducing." 9

and inferences

Toulmin's subject is strictly argument as both process and
product.
To Toulmin, logic refers to a procedure according to
which the rationality or soundness of arguments may be
assessed.50

While Toulmin's interest in the justificatory

potential of arguments diverges from the interests of
formal logicians, his characterization of logic as representative of standards for use in the rational criticism of
arguments is in general consistent with formal logic.5 1
However, Toulmin claims to deliberately avoid terms like
"logic" and "logical" which might confuse his approach with
that of formal logicians.5 2 Thus, by "validity" Toulmin
clearly means the soundness of an argument and not its
formal validity; by the "form" of an argument, Toulmin
means to ref er to his model of argument and not the syllogism.

Toulmin's unique conception of logic as a sort of

generalized jurisprudence is one subject of discussion in
the final section of this chapter.
In short, Toulmin's approach to the process of

rationality involves the logic of arguments or, in other
words, the assessment of justificatory statements offered
in support of assertions according to appropriate standards
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of criticism.

The tool of analysis with which such an

assessment may be performed is the Toulmin model.
Functionally-Defined Elements
of the Toulmin Model
Toulmin distinguishes six functional elements of argument:

"claim" ( C), "data" (D), "warrant" (W) , "qualifier"

(Q), "rebuttal" (R), and "backing" (B).

These elements and

their relationships are symbolized in Figure 3.53
D

--------=-------->

So, Q, C

Since

Unless,

w

I

R

On account of
B

Figure

3.

The Toulmin diagrammatic model.

The direction of the arrow between D and C is meant to sym-bolize the direction of movement of inference from the
familiar, as in known, accepted, assumed or certain, to the
less familiar, as in unknown, controversial or uncertain.
In other words, to Toulmin argument is an epistemic process
aimed at the establishment, d"isestablishment, or evaluation
of claims of knowledge.5 4 The Toulmin model is intended to
provide a candid layout of the elements of practical argument as recognizable at the level of individual sentences.55
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Claim.

The statement of assertion or conclusion in

an argument, because it represents a claim upon the attention and belief of others, is termed a "claim" in the
Toulmin model.5 6

In a developing argument, it is the estab-

lishment of a claim which is aimed at.

In a completed

argument, a claim is viewed as the product of inference
founded upon data.

The claim-statement answers such ques-

tions as "What are you getting at?," "What is your contention?," or, simply, "What is it you are saying?"

Arguments

are constructed around claims; without an explicit claim,
a rational argument cannot be inferred.

Therefore, Toulmin

considers this element a necessary component of argument.
A claim specifies what an argument is about as well as providing a starting point for rational considerations.57
Data.

Categorical statements of fact which specify

the information on which a particular claim is founded are
referred to as "data."

Data answer such questions as "What

have you got to go on?," "On what grounds can you make this
assertion?," "What makes you think so?," or "How do you
know?"5B

For an argument to proceed, the data produced in

defense of a claim cannot be controversial.

Data represent

established concepts assumed to be acceptable to and shared
by all parties to the claim.59

Data are taken to represent

a second necessary component of argument since rational discussion of the merits of a claim can only proceed with an
explicit reference to potentially relevant established facts.

43
These shared facts function as the foundation for the claim
in question.
Warrant.

The term "warrant" refers to the inference-

licences, legitimizing rules or principles which authorize
60
the movement from data to claim in an argument.
To
rationally connect data to claim, an act of inference is
required.

The acceptability of an act of inference depends

upon the warrant which may certify or endorse such a move.
Warrants may answer such questions as "How did you get
there?," "What is the connection?," or "On what authority
are you permitted to infer such a claim from this kind of
data? 1161

According to Toulmin, warrants are general

"hypothetical bridge-like statements" appealed to as justification for the types of inferences made in arguments. 62
No particular inference is defensible without reference to
some warrant of broader applicability than the inference
itself. 6 3 Therefore, the warrant represents Toulmin's
third necessary component of argument because it supplies
justification for the act of inference required to move
from data to claim.
A warrant is used to justify the movement from data
to claim in an argument.

For a warrant to serve this

function effectively, it must at some point become ''established.''

This means that each warrant goes through a

period in which it is only tentatively applied, in much the
same way as an experimental hypothesis is entertained until
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and unless it becomes untenable.

If a warrant can be sue-

cessively applied with effectiveness and without contra-

dieting other useful and well-established warrants, then
the novel warrant becomes established within its field of
application. 64 While such warrants are becoming established, the arguments in which they are used are classified as "warrant-establishing arguments. 1165

Once they have

become established, then they may be used in the justification of arguments.

Such arguments are termed "warrant-

using arguments" by Toulmin. 66
For instance, until recently the following warrant
was not known to be reliable and was therefore not established:

"If harmonic seismic tremors occur together with

certain gas emissions in an active volcano, then an eruption is imminent.

11

This hypothesis could not be estab-

lished as a warrant because volcanic eruptions were
unpredictable and difficult to study.

However, careful

monitoring of Mt. St. Helens in Washington state

~uring

its recent activity has allowed scientists to successively
measure the changes in seismic activity and gas emissions
which occurred prior to each eruption.

The data (measure-

ments of changes) and claim (subsequent eruptions) were
found to occur together with such regularity that the
scientific community is now more confident about predicting
volcanic eruptions where the circumstances are similar to
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Mt. St. Helens.

To use Toulmin's terms, the warrant has
become established in the field of volcanology. 6 7
Claim, data, and warrant represent the minimum essentials of argument.

A collection of statements may be

classified as meaningless, irrational, intuitive, precognitive, divine, dogmatic, etc. but it will not qualify as
argument unless the functions of claim, data, and warrant
are clearly distinguishable amongst its parts.

Qualifier,

rebuttal, and backing are other elements which, though not
considered by Toulmin to be always essential to the analysis of an argument, are frequently present and significant
in their functions.
Qualifier.

Modal terms are frequently used to modify

the force of a claim, that is, to specify the power of a
warrant in light of exceptions, completeness of the data,
strength of the warrant in general, and its applicability
in the particular case.

Such modal modifiers are termed
"qualifiers" by Toulmin. 68 Some warrants may be taken to

be conclusive, others only tentative.

Sometimes a warrant

is only partially suited to the available data or may be
subject to special conditions in which its force will be
altered.

When any of these is the case, the claim should

be modified with a modal qualifier, for example, "necessarily" or "certainly," "probably" or "presumably," or
any number of other such adjectives.

In some fields of

argument a qualifier is appropriately expressed as a
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mathematical quantity; however, according to Toulmin, the
qualifier is usually a general adjective indicating the
degree of confidence or tentativeness with which the claim
is asserted. 6 9
Rebuttal.

This element refers to the specification

of conditions under which the applicability of the warrant
to the particular claim and data may be questioned.

Rebut-

tals consist of hypothetical statements regarding specific
data which, if discovered, would either modify the force of
a warrant or negate its applicability entirely.70

The

potential for exceptions to or modifications of the force
of a warrant is indicated by the qualifier and specifically
described in the rebuttal.

The function of rebuttals,

then, according to Toulmin, is to comment on the justificatory potential of warrants in light of possible data.7 1
In other words, conditions in which a qualifier must be

adjusted if the warrant is to succeed as justification for
the movement from data to claim may be specified in a
rebuttal.
Backing.

While the rebuttal represents an answer to

questions about the specific applicability of a warrant to
a particular situation, "backing" represents answers to
questions about the general applicability of a warrant.
Backing refers to the specification of assurances of the
established general applicability of a warrant within its
field of argument.

Backing may consist of statements of
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fact offered in support of a warrant without regard to the
particular argument to which the warrant is appealed.7 2
Backing, therefore, amounts to one or more subordinate
arguments consisting of established facts offered in support of a warrant.

An example may be helpful here to illustrate the
functional roles played by the various elements and how
they interrelate in an argument.

A warehouseman who is

smoking in an area where gasoline containers are stored
might defend his actions with the following argument:
"It's O.K. to smoke here now; I saw these containers emptied this morning."
explicit as well:

If pressed, he might make his warrant
"If there's no gas in the cans, then

there is no cause for caution near them."

This simple

argument is diagrammed in Figure 4.
Because (D) there ,~ So, (C) it is safe
is no gasoline
to smoke here now.
left in these
containers.
Since (W), if there is
no gasoline in the cans
then there is no cause
for caution near them.
Figure 4. An example of a simple argument diagrammed with the Toulmin model.
Of course, someone might object to the warehouseman that he
must not smoke because "It'll ruin your health!" or "The
sign says 'no smoking in this area.'"

But such objections

48

present no challenge to the warehouseman's argument;
because their warrants are completely different, these
counter-arguments are not germane to the warehouseman's
justification for smoking.

Still, the warehouseman must be

prepared to defend his claim against reasonable objections
having to do with how confident he is of his conclusion,
whether his warrant is entirely applicable in this case or
if it is subject to some exceptions or modifications, and
whether his warrant is generally reliable or not.

A con-

sideration of these issues complicates the warehouseman's
argument, yet by supplying the elements necessary to meet
such challenges the candidness of the argument is increased,
as shown in Figure 5.

•

Because (D) there
is no gasoline
left in these
containers.

---------->

So, (Q) presumably,
(C) it is
safe to smoke
here now.

Since (W) if there is
no gasoline in the cans
then there is no cause
for caution near them.

I

On account of (B) the
fact that nothing comes
out of nothing, (principle of energy conservation and its converse)
and the warehouseman's
'experiences of smoking
near empty containers, etc.

(R) Unless vapor
from the gasoline
that was once in
the cans remains,
or the cans have
since been refilled
with a volatile
substance without
the warehouseman's
knowledge.

Figure 5. An example of an argument diagrammed
with the Toulmin model, showing all elements.
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The warrant-using argument illustrated in Figure 4 is considered valid in Toulmin's terms first, because its warrant
authorizes exactly the sort of inference which connects
this kind of datum to that kind of claim, and second,
because the warrant is explicit.73

The soundness of the

argument, however, depends not solely upon the explicitness
and suitability of the warrant, because there may be weaknesses and faults contained within the warrant, or it may
be completely wrong.

The simple argument in Figure 4,

though it has an explicit and appropriate warrant, is less
sound than the more candid argument in Figure 5 which
features the backing, rebuttal, and qualifier missing in
Figure 4.

Thus, the Toulmin model draws attention to the

various functions of statements given in arguments and the
ways they interrelate to provide some degree of justification and soundness for the claims they support.
Distinctions Salient to
the Toulmin Model
Three distinctions presented by Toulmin are germane
to his model and its differences from the categorical syllogism.
Force vs. Criteria.

In considering the modal terms

used in logic, Toulmin distinguishes two kinds of meaning
they have in an argument.

The "force" of a modal term

refers to the practical impact it has on that which it
modifies; "criteria," on the other hand, represent
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standards or reasons for the use of the modal term.

In

other words, force has to do with effect, criteria with
appropriateness of a particular modal term.

For example,

according to Toulmin, the force of these modal terms may be
defined as follows:

"must" limits consideration to one;

"possibly" includes something within consideration; and
4
"cannot" excludes something from consideration.7
However, the criteria for the application of these
terms in an argument cannot be generalized in the same way
because of differences in the situations which give rise to
their appropriate use.

For instance, in the case of the

term "cannot," the reasons why a finite number for the
quantity "pi" cannot be computed are nothing like those
which explain why little Jimmy cannot stay up past midnight, or why I cannot fly an airplane.

While the force of

the term "cannot" is the same in each of the above cases,
the specific criteria for using it meaningfully in an argument are in Toulmin's view unlimited.75

Thus, while the

force of an argument may be denoted by a modal qualifier
which has the same meaning regardless of the field in which
it is used, the criteria for its use, as indicated by
backing and rebuttal, may vary from field to field.
Through its candid display of various functional elements of argument, the Toulmin model is intended to draw
attention to the differences between those aspects of argument which, like force, are the same regardless of the field
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in which they are applied and those aspects of argument
which, like criteria, vary according to the field of application.
Field-invariant vs. Field-dependent Aspects of Argu-

!l!fil1i.

Toulmin observes that justificatory argument is

practiced in any number of different "fields," for instance,
ethics, aesthetics, law, religion, each of the social and
physical sciences as well as philosophy.7 6 In terms of the
Toulmin model, fields are operationally defined as follows:
Two arguments will be said to belong to the same
field when the data and conclusions in each of the
two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type: they will be said to come from different
fields when the backing or the conclusions in each
of the two arguments are not of the same logical
type.77
Some aspects of an argument are "field-invariant" according
to Toulmin; that is, they are the same regardless of the
field in which the argument is made.

Others are "field-

dependent," specific to a particular school of thought and
not necessarily meaningful anywhere else.7 8 In addition to
the force of an argument, as indicated by the combination
of claim, data, warrant, and qualifier, the overall form or
structure of an argument is field-invariant.79

These fea-

tures do not change from field to field but are the same
for all arguments.

The criteria which are represented by

the backing offered in general justification of a warrant
as well as rebuttals which limit the applicability of a
warrant are field-dependent features of an argument. 80
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Different logical types are represented by the backings
used in different fields of argument. 81 It is significant
that formal logicians define validity in field-invariant
terms, Toulmin, in field-dependent terms.
Toulmin stresses the role of field-dependence in the
rational assessment of argument. 82 He contends that "the
standards for judging the soundness, validity, cogency or
strength of arguments are in practice field-dependent" and
therefore that attempts to analyze arguments in fieldinvariant terms are doomed to irrelevance. 8 3 Other than
critiquing the procedures used by logicians to determine
formal validity, Toulmin does not present an analysis of
field-invariance in The Uses of Argument.

However, in a

more recent book, Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik present a classif ication of warrants based upon their field-invariant
features. 84 Several classifications are discussed,
including reasoning from analogy, generalization, sign,
and cause. 8 5 While this list is not intended to be taken
as "an exhaustive or formal account of all the possible
types of argument," certain features of this explanation
are of interest because of their implications for the
applicability of the Toulmin model in speech communication. 86

First, the concept of field-invariant assumptions

which underlie warrants is introduced:
All warrants share certain common functions, and
over the years, students of reasoning have discovered that regardless of the field in which they
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occur, many of our warrants tend to share certain
other features also. So specific warrants may be
alike in resting on certain deeper assumptions or
rules.87 [Emphasis added.]
Thus, a warrant in an argument classified as reasoning from
analogy is based on the assumption that "there are enough
similarities between two things to support the claim that
what is true of one is also true of the other. 1188 Similar
assumptions provide arguments of each general classification with a field-invariant basis for their warrants.
Second, according to Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, while
such basic assumptions may be useful in the classification
of warrants, they are not important enough to be considered
a seventh diagrammatic element of the Toulmin model of
argument.

This is because, as field-invariant aspects of

argument, they are considered largely irrelevant to the
assessment of arguments. 8 9 As Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik
state:
• [A] classification of general types of argument • • • must be used with caution. Nothing said
here will undermine our earlier conclusion that
arguments need to be examined with an eye to the
context and field in which they occur. Nor shall
we be suggesting that there are any fixed rules
for determining the Qorrectness of arguments of
one type or another.~O
Thus, the "familiar general assumptions in terms of which
claims can be justified" are not particularly useful because
they are field-invariant; attention to assumptions is not
advised because it may distract from the more important
field-dependent features of argument.9 1
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Analytic vs. Substantial Arguments.

According to

Toulmin, when the backing for a warrant is included implicitly or explicitly in the claim, that argument is termed
"analytic. 11 9 2 For example, the exemplary classical syllogism "Socrates is a man, all men are mortal, therefore
Socrates is mortal'' is analytic because to back the warrant
implicit in the major premise one would have to check the
man named Socrates for mortality.

To do this would be to

confirm the conclusion while circumventing the movement
from data to claim.
When the backing of an argument contains information
other than that which is asserted in the claim, the argument is termed "substantial."

More often than not,

according to Toulmin, practical arguments will be substantial, not analytic.93

While acknowledging the mathematical

applications of analytic arguments, Toulmin emphasizes
their "peculiarities":94
If the purpose of argument is to establish conclusions about which we are not entirely confident by
relating them back to other information about which
we have greater assurance, it begins to be a little
doubtful whether any genuine, practical argument
could ever be analytic.95
Clearly Toulmin is interested in argument as it is usefully
practiced in the various fields of human understanding.
His model is presented as a structure which candidly displays the functions of elements of argument as it is
practiced.

He contends that such a model is sorely needed
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because of the limitations inherent in formal logic and the
syllogism which make the traditional approach to argument
inadequate at best.

Toulmin's criticisms of formal logic

are the topic of the remainder of this chapter.

TOUL1'1IN'S CRITICISMS OF FORMAL LOGIC
In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin suggests that a dif-

ferent, more flexible, and broader logic is needed if our
understanding of how concepts develop, compete, change, and
become established through argument is ever to reflect the
practices of concept-users in the diverse fields of human
thought.9 6 Says Toulmin of his objectives:
If all were well (and clearly well) in philosophic
logic, there would be no point in embarking on
these investigations: our excuse lies in the conviction that a radical re-ordering of logical
theory is needed to bring it more nearly into line
with critical practice, and our justification will
come only if the distinctions and objections
insisted on here bring such a re-ordering nearer.97
The Toulmin model incorporates the distinctions that may
bring about such a re-ordering.

The objections to formal

logic discussed by Toulmin may be summarized as follows:
(1) the mathematical-geometric assumptions adopted by formal
logicians reflect the misdirectedness of their aims;
(2) formal logic is far too limited in its scope to be of
much practical significance or applicability; and (3) the
distinctions to which formal logicians adhere are overly
simplistic, tending to obscure the functional elements
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involved in practical argument.

Toulmin's rationale for

each of these objections is explained in the discussion
which follows.
Mathematical-Geometric Assumptions
of Formal Logicians Reflect
Misdirected Aims
It is a matter of history that the development of a
theory of logic followed closely the advent by the ancient
Greeks of the science of geometry.

Formal logic, like

geometry, is founded on a priori assumptions:

that ''per-

fect truths" or universals exist but are perceptible only
to the intellect and not the senses; that propositions are
derivable from these truths and not vice versa; and most
importantly, only propositions that can be related through
geometric demonstration to a primitive proposition or
universal can be taken to be valid or true.

In other words,

in terms of logic, only those assertions that are convertible to a proper form derived from a universal are recognized as logically meaningfu1.98
Like a system of mathematical axioms and propositions,
the proof of which depends upon the internal relationships
of elements and not any application to a particular time,
place, or purpose, formal logic developed out of the
analysis of "tenseless" terms combined in propositions in a
search for absolute principles of thought.99

The mathe-

matical concept of logical relations has influenced
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developments in formal logic to the point that, in the past
century, a school of thought has emerged called "symbolic
logic" in which propositions are systematically stripped of
all linguistic-referential qualities until what remains is
a special language of semantic relations resembling a
system of algebraic formulae. 100 Toulmin concedes that
this mathematical approach has some uses in certain fields
of argument (for example, in generating hypotheses or
quantifying the force of a claim); however, such approaches
are irrelevant to the criteria, and therefore to the practical implications of argument. 101 As Toulmin states,
"Unfortunately an idealized logic, such as the mathematical
model leads us to, cannot keep in serious contact with its
practical application. 11102
The significance of the mathematical nature of formal
logic is in the way formal validity is determined.

To say

that an argument is in proper form is to assert something
"quasi-geometrical" about its structure, according to
10
Toulmin. 3 Indeed, the formal logician determines validity simply by applying the rules of the syllogism to a
likely candidate to see if it has the correct number of
terms properly placed in related propositions.

There need

be no comprehension of what the terms refer to or what
consequences the argument will have within its field of
application; such matters are considered extraneous or even
potentially problematic to good logical criticism of
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argument.

Toulmin asserts that this kind of validity is

nothing more than a "shuffling [of] the parts of the premises and rearranging them in a new pattern," something
which can be done with nearly any argument. 104 He insists
that the field-dependent criteria of argument must be a
consideration in any practical analysis.
Toulmin contends that an analogy with jurisprudence
provides a more useful basis for a consideration of practical argument than does a mathematical-geometric
approach. 105

He asserts that:

Logic is concerned with the soundness of the claims
we make--with the solidity of the grounds we produce to support them, the firmenss of the backing
we provide for them--or, to change the metaphor,
with the sort of case we present in defence of our
claims • • • • Logic (we may say) is generalized
jurisprudence. A main task of jurisprudence is to
characterise the essentials of the legal process:
the procedures by which claims-at-law are put forward, disputed and determined, and the categories
in terms of which this is done • • • • We shall aim,
in a similar way, to characterize what may be
called "the rational process," the procedures and
categories by using whirB claims-in-general can be
argued for and settled. 6
Unlike formal logic which asks how nearly an argument carresponds to an ideal form, a jurisprudential logic asks
how conclusions are justified through the production of
10
arguments. 7 The formal logician compares every argument
to a universal absolute standard; the Toulmin model is
designed to organize arguments within a field to determine
the relative soundness of claims and warrants. 108 Formal
logic presumes the superiority of a particular field of
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argument, mathematics, while the Toulmin model is intended
to facilitate the comparison and contrasting of argumentative structures within and among conceptual fields.

10

9

In short, formal logic aims at an ideal for proper
reasoning, in a sense, the purification of rational procedures.

The Toulmin model, on the other hand, aims at

practical procedures for establishing the soundness of conclusions in various fields of human understanding as well
as providing a language for the explanation of conceptual
diversification and change--how concepts are introduced,
110
developed, changed, extended, or rejected over time.
Formal Logic is Too Limited in
Scope to be of Much Practical
Significance or
Applicability
In formal logic the analytic syllogism has been
elevated to paradigmatic status. 111

Because they have,

according to Toulmin, preoccupied themselves with analytic
arguments, formal logicians' attentions have been diverted
from practical considerations having to do with the criteria
by which substantial arguments are justified.

Formal logic

has failed to recognize field-dependence as relevant to the
consideration of the validity of an argument, while Toulmin
believes field-dependence to be an unavoidable consideration.
What is accomplished by applying analytic criteria to arguments of all fields is nothing more than an assessment of
the comprehensibility of the argument; nothing of substance
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is learned at this stage of analysis.

Says Toulmin, "Logi-

cal considerations are nothing more than formal considerations, that is, they are considerations having to do with
the preliminary formalities of argument-stating, and not
with the actual merits of any argument or proposition." 112
Only in the limited field of a closed mathematical system
is consistency alone the criterion for determining the
soundness of a principle; "there is not justification for
applying analytic criteria in all fields of argument indiscriminately. "ll3
In short, according to Toulmin, most of the arguments
used in practice are substantial, not analytic.

While

analytic arguments are perhaps simpler and more elegant
than most, to Toulmin they are largely irrelevant. 114
Formal logicians' preoccupation with analytic arguments has
resulted in a limited applicability for formal logic.
Toulmin contends that a jurisprudential approach, as represented by the Toulmin model, can provide a stronger paradigm
for a practical logic.
Formal Logicians' Distinctions are
Overly Simplistic, Tending to
Obscure the Functions of
Elements Involved in
Practical Argument
Toulmin claims that formal logicians' overreliance,
bordering on dogmatic dependence, on the simplistic dichotomy between inductive and deductive reasoning has resulted
in ambiguity about the functions of statements given in

61
argument.

His model is intended to clear up this ambiguity

which he believes to be especially apparent in the syllogism.115

Toulmin distinguishes four components to the dis-

tinction between induction and deduction and he discusses
the consequences of overlooking these components. 116
According to Toulmin, unless one is solely concerned
with analytic arguments, the distinction between inductive
and deductive argument is inadequate.

Analytic argument is

well described by the principles of deduction.

But to

lump together all other arguments under the term induction
is to gloss over a number of important distinctions among
substantial arguments. 11 7 Thus, Toulmin argues that the
clsssical distinction between deduction and induction
ought not be upheld if we are to understand how argument is
practiced in various fields.

Instead, Toulmin contends

that attention is due four variables by which arguments are
distinguishable:

(1) whether or not an argument is a can-

didate for validity; (2) whether an argument is warrantusing or warrant-establishing; (3) whether the conclusion
of an argument is taken to be necessary or probable; and
(4) whether the propositions rely on standard logical
quantifiers or other sorts of connectives. 118
According to Toulmin, deductive or analytic arguments
are, as a class, unique in a number of ways.

First,

deductive arguments alone are candidates for formal validity; their conclusions are the only ones which may be
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entailed by the premises.

Second, because deductive con-

clusions cannot go beyond what is contained in their
premises, they are always warrant-using--relying on previously established principles.
establishing.

They cannot be warrant-

Third, conclusions of valid deductive argu-

ments can only be necessary, never probable.

Fourth,

related to the absolute certainty of deductive valid conclusions is the lexical limitation of their premises.

In

a categorical syllogism, there are but four standard terms
of logical quantification:
"some • • • not •

"all," "no," "some," and

" Analytic arguments alone meet

tfilese criteria of valid deductive argument.

Other argu-

ments are classified inductive, substantial, or incon1

•

C...1...USlVe.

The Toulmin model is intended to make explicit the
previously discussed distinctions overlooked by formal
logicians.

First, regarding validity, Toulmin presumes

that matters of formal validity are prerequisite to comprehending an argument and are therefore not represented
by any particular element of the layout; a critic must
first understand what an argument means before any determination can begin to be made of its justificatory
qualities. 11 9 Second, once the meaning of an argument is
recognized, the laying out of parts, that is, the distinguishing of claim, data, warrant, and backing, allows
the critic to determine whether the argument is aimed at
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the justification of a claim or the establishment of a new
warrant. 120 Third, the modal qualifier in conjunction with
any explicit rebuttal statements will define the degree of
probability conferred upon the claim by the warrant.
Fourth, regarding standard terms of quantification, the
Toulmin model is not limited by any specific linguistic
classifiers; on the contrary, the model is adaptable to any
meaningful expression language can provide. 121 In addition,
the Toulmin model goes beyond the syllogism in providing a
critic with a means of assessing the justificatory potential of an argument, first by checking the degree to which
the warrant fits the inference in question, and second,
by

examining the backing to discover the credentials of

the warrant within the field of argument in which it is
operating.
Because the syllogism fails to distinguish the variables of argument with which the Toulmin model is designed
to cope, Toulmin considers it inherently inadequate to deal
with practical argument.
according to Toulmin.

The syllogism has two defects

First, it fails to clearly distin-

guish the functions of the major premise which may serve
as warrant, backing, rebuttal, qualifier, or data.

Second,

it obscures differences in various fields of argument and
the varieties of warrant-backings required to justify
claims in these fields.
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The propositions of a syllogism may serve any of the
functions of argument identified by Toulmin.

In most

cases, the minor premise can be taken as a statement of
data and the conclusion, as a claim.

The major premise,

however, is marked by a "hidden complexity" in which may be
combined the functions of warrant, backing, rebuttal, qualifier, or data. 122 Unless an argument turns out to be analytic, in which case the distinction between backing and
warrant is by definition of no practical consequence, the
syllogism is inherently ambiguous in differentiating force
from criteria.

The syllogism cannot provide a critic with

a candid analysis of argument because, according to Toulmin,
the major premise is subject to interpretation as serving
any or several of four functions.
To demonstrate the ambiguity of the major premise,
the following syllogism is offered as an instance:

"All

Harvard Business School graduates are successful in their
careers within two years of graduation (major premise);
Smitty is a graduate of Harvard Business School (minor
premise); so, Smitty will be successful within two years of
her graduation (conclusion)."

In this syllogism, the func-

tions of the minor premise as data and conclusion as claim
are clear enough.

But whether the major premise functions

here as backing or warrant cannot be determined.

It seems

equally plausible taken as a statement of fact meant as
backing, as in "All Harvard Business School graduates have
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been found to be successful after two years in surveys x,
y, and z " or as warrant for an inference, as in "If a

'

person graduates from Harvard Business School, then success
is certain within two years."

Notice also that a restate-

ment of the major premise as warrant for an inference
specifies the degree of confidence it confers upon the
claim, in this case, certainty.

So, the modal qualifier

may also be taken to be part of what may be packaged in a
major premise.

As Toulmin concludes, "when they are stated

in the form 'all A's are B's' it will often be entirely
obscure just which function [universal premises] are to be
understood as performing. 1112 3
If a major premise is particular instead of universal,
it may be mistaken for another statement of data.

Some

logicians claim that the principle of the syllogism may
serve as "the ultimate foundation for the validity of all
syllogistic arguments. 11124

In this sense every syllogism

is seen as an argument from data contained in two premises
to a conclusion.

Toulmin objects to this interpretation on

the grounds that it ignores all field-dependent aspects of
argument.

Either premise, if particular and interpreted as

data, may also include an element of rebuttal.

For example,

the minor premise in a quasi-syllogism based on the previous
illustration might be stated as "Smitty is a typical graduate of Harvard Business School." 12 5 The word "typical" is
not, in itself, data; it is according to Toulmin a second-
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order comment on the data. 126

It addresses the issue of

rebuttal, commenting as it does on the degree to which the
warrant-backing are applicable to the particular data and
claim.

In short, the premises of the syllogism fail to

distinguish the six functional elements of argument identified by Toulmin.
Toulmin claims that the most candid layout of practical argument cannot be performed with the syllogism
because its rigidly simple format does not allow for all
necessary and useful distinctions.

The consequences of

this inadequacy are, for Toulmin, reflected in the general
faults of the logic constructed upon the syllogism:

by

limiting the concerns of formal logic to those fieldinvariant aspects which can be simple and elegantly displayed in the syllogism, formal logicians overlook the rich
differences among ways conclusions are justified in the
various fields of argument.

The syllogism, and the ideal-

ized logic it serves, simplifies argument at the expense
of practicality. 12 7
Formal logicians generally look upon differences
between substantial and analytic arguments as "deficiencies
to be remedied, gulfs to be bridged." 128 Toulmin believes
that logicians have focused upon field-invariant standards
for argument because of their wariness of transitions of
logical type, "type-jumps" as Toulmin refers to them,
between propositions asserted and the data and warrant-
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backing offered in justification of them. 12 9

Where type-

jumps are involved in inferring a conclusion, analytic form
is impossible.
Toulmin claims that logicians who find justification
only in those arguments whose conclusions are entailed by
their premises can make no logically acceptable assertion
about the future based on past experience, about the
distant past based on current trends, about life in general
based on limited observations and controlled experiments,
or about the minds of others based on personal artifacts,
discourse, or the observations and opinions of friends and
relatives.l30

Formal logic systematically excludes these

kinds of assertions from its province on the grounds that
each involves a type-jump and therefore cannot be a candidate for formal validity.

According to Toulmin, then,

formal logic is neither equipped nor intended to deal
directly with arguments used to justify or attack concepts
typical of natural sciences like physics and biology,
social sciences like history and psychology, or the discourse of everyday life.
Toulmin believes that the type-jumps of which formal
logicians are so suspicious are the very stuff of practical
argument.

He claims "type-jumps and field differences are

what we start with, and we can never properly get away from
them • • • [they] are not gulfs or deficiencies, but characteristic features of our very fields of argument. 111 31
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Rather than attempt to change this fact, apologize for it,
or ignore it entirely, Toulmin believes logicians should be
working towards an applied logic which promotes the study
of differences in criteria for justification specific to
each field of thought.

It is with this end in mind that he

proposes his new approach to logic:

that logicians should

broaden their scope and recognize, that in argument as
practiced, "validity is an intra-field, not an inter-field
notion." 1 32

SUMMARY
Three topics have been examined in this chapter:
(1) formal logic and its primary tool, the categorical syllogism; (2) Toulmin's jurisprudential approach and functional model; and (3) Toulmin's criticisms of formal logic
and the syllogism.

Logic, rooted in the ancient Greek

assumptions of a universal order, has to do with principles
of formally valid inference.

Its essential aim is the

determination of consistency in the relationship of terms
and its primary tool is the analytic syllogism.

In a valid

syllogism, consisting of a major premise, minor premise,
and conclusion, the terms of the conclusion are inferred to
be related because each of them is related to the same
middle term according to the assertions made in the premises.

There are rules for the positioning or "distribution"

of terms in the propositions of a syllogism by which
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validity is determined.

The rules of formal validity are

concerned with consistency in the form in which an argument
is stated:

that is, a lack of equivocation in the use of

terms, a lack of inconsistency among the premises, and the
clear involvement of a contradiction in the negation of the
asserted conclusion.

They have nothing to do with the

meaning of terms, consequence of a conclusion, soundness,
or truth-value of an argument in practice.

Enthymemes and

epicheiremes, argument forms related to the syllogism, are
subject to the same rules of formal validity.

Only induc-

tive arguments escape the requirements of formal validity.
Toulmin proposes a model for the layout and analysis
of arguments which he claims is more sophisticated and
candid, and therefore more practical than the syllogism.
His approach is drawn from an analogy with jurisprudence
which seeks to establish the soundness or justifiability
of argumentative claims.

Toulmin distinguishes six func-

tional elements in argument:

"claim" or assertion; "data"

or factual support; "warrant" or inference-license;
"qualifier" or modal modifier specifying the degree of
certainty associated with a claim; "rebuttal" or comment
upon the particular suitability of the warrant to the data
and claim; and "backing" or factual support for the warrant
in general.
Further, Toulmin notes that some arguments are used
to establish novel warrants, bthers to establish novel
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claims; within this latter group there is a limited class
of arguments in which both the claim and the warrant are
acceptable dependent upon the same facts found in the
backing.

Such arguments are termed "analytic" and are

thought to be unusual in most fields of argument; all
others, the most common kinds of argument, are termed "substantial."

It is these substantial arguments with which

the model is intended to deal.

Another distinction central

to Toulmin's approach is that between the "force" of a
claim, a field-invariant aspect of argument, and the "criteria" represented by warrant-backing, a field-dependent
aspect of argument.

Both aspects are incorporated in the

model.
Toulmin contends that his model would solve some
problems or inadequacies he believes are inherent in formal
logic and the syllogism.

Specifically:

first, he claims

that the mathematical-geometric assumptions on which formal
logic has been historically constructed are out of touch
with the applications to which practical argument is put.
To abstract one aspect of argument, namely the form of its
expression, for analysis is to focus only on matters of
force and to deny criteria.

The formal consistency of

argumentative statements is only a prerequisite, according
to Toulmin, to any determination of the validity of an
argument in a particular field.

Second, he criticizes the

limited scope of formal logic.

Logicians have concentrated
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too much on the ideal form, the analytic syllogism, and
viewed all other arguments as, being by degrees substandard.
Toulmin believes that other arguments are not substandard,
but they rely on other, field-dependent standards.

Finally,

he attacks logicians for adhering to the overly-simple
distinctions of the syllogism without recognizing the other
functions served by parts of argument.

For instance, the

major premise in a syllogism may serve most any or all of
the functions defined by Toulmin; but without distinguishing these functions, the field-dependent sources of
validity become obscured.
Toulmin proposes his jurisprudential model to deal
with substantial arguments, to draw attention to the different ways arguments function in different fields of
thought, and to provide a tool for the determination of
validity according to the field-dependent criteria which
typify practical argument.

By expanding the aims and scope

of logic, and providing a critical tool more sophisticated
than the classical syllogism, Toulmin believes he has laid
the foundation for the development of an approach to argument which is at once consistent with epistemology and also
relevant to the sciences, history, philosophy in general,
and everyday discourse.
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CHAPTER III
CRITICISM OF THE TOULMIN MODEL FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF FORMAL LOGIC:
A CONFLICT OF THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
Since the initial publication of Toulmin's concept of
logic as "generalized jurisprudence," several expressions
of the scholarly skepticism of formal logicians about the
Toulmin approach have reached expression in journals of
philosophy and speech communication. 1 These largely negative criticisms of the Toulmin approach are the focus of
this chapter.

Major themes of criticism are discussed and

their significance to the question of the potential usefulness of the Toulmin model to the area of speech communication are evaluated.

The presentation which follows is

divided into three sections.

First, general criticisms of

the Toulmin approach are examined.

Second, specific crit-

icisms of the Toulmin model are examined.

Third, the crit-

icisms of Toulmin's concepts from the perspective of formal
logic are compared to Toulmin's perspective on the limitations and defects of formal logic, and a hypothesis is
suggested which may explain the divergence of the two perspectives.

The criticisms presented in this section are
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not meant to represent a complete survey of all the philosophical objections to the Toulmin approach which have
been mentioned in articles; only the major, most frequently
discussed themes of criticism are examined here in order
that issues for subsequent investigation may be identified.
GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE TOULMIN APPROACH
Among the criticisms from formal logicians of the
Toulmin approach four major themes have been identified.
Critics charge that Toulmin's approach (1) is unoriginal,
(2) is grounded in obsolete ideas, (3) does not represent
an innovation in the field of logic, and (4) is unnecessarily broad in its implications for the field of logic.
Toulmin's Approach is
Unoriginal
If Toulmin's approach is unoriginal as critics have
charged, then it must directly parallel or resemble the
previously published work of other authorities.

Several

critics, notably Hardin, Korner, Casteneda, and Bird,
point out that Toulmin is not unique among logicians
seeking to develop a logic more applicable to practical
argument, and that he appears to have derived many of his
concepts from other philosophers. 2 Toulmin draws much
from the works of Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, R. M. Hare,

J. T. Wisdom, H. L. A. Hart, and less directly from Ludwig
Wittgenstein and David Hume.3

These and many other sources
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are cited by Toulmin.

4

Thus, there can be no denial that

some parts of Toulmin's discussion are derivative of other
ordinary language philosophers.

Since none of these

critics have charged Toulmin with plagiarism, it is difficult to understand what difference to Toulmin's scholarship or the applicability of his approach the derivative
nature of some of his ideas makes.

Unless there is some-

thing wrong with the ideas which Toulmin has drawn from
others (a position none of these critics take), the charge
of unoriginality may be disregarded as of little consequence.
A more serious objection to Toulmin's ideas on the
basis of their lack of originality is put forth by some
critics to the effect that Toulmin accomplishes nothing
more with his work than a relabelling or rediscovery of
long established concepts from formal logic.

Trent, for

instance, compared the Toulmin model to the Ciceronian
epicheireme which he describes as a supported enthymeme or
an argument based on probability.5

On this interpretation,

the Toulmin model would be subject to the rules of formal
validity just as the epicheireme is. 6

Along the same line,

Hample contends that there exists little distinction between
syllogistic logic and the Toulmin model if one "consider[s]
backing and rebuttal as stock issues of stases which are
applicable to the premises of any argument.rr7

It may be

significant that both Trent and Hample present these
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comparisons as part of arguments in favor of a reconsideration of the traditional procedures of formal logic.

In

the case of Trent, a unique interpretation of the epicheireme is proposed which combines some of Toulmin's termin8
ology with syllogistic procedures and classifications.
Hample, on the other hand, defends the syllogism for its
simplicity and structural superiority to the Toulmin
model.9

Neither critic, in comparing the Toulmin model to

a syllogistic form, attempts to reconcile Toulmin's concern with variations among field-dependent justification
procedures with the field-invariant standards of formal
10
validity.
In other words, these critics apparently
disregard Toulmin's epistemic concerns for relativism in
arguments.

For this reason, their comparisons appear to

be poorly drawn.
Perhaps the best documented and most intriguing case
made for Toulmin as a rediscoverer rather than an innovator
is presented by Otto Bird.

Bird details several resem-

blances between the functionally-defined elements of the
Toulmin model, particularly warrant and backing, and the
"topical maxim and difference" of medieval logic. 11

The

topics, which Bird says represent the field-dependent sources
of proof in traditional formal logic, were in medieval times
the object of extensive scholarly investigation.

In mod-

ern textbooks of logic, they receive little attention.
Bird concludes that at least some medieval logicians shared
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Toulmin's concern for field-dependent aspects of logic, and
that "more has been done in the analysis of warrants and
backings than Toulmin seems to realize.

1112

Bird does not

discuss what has become of the medieval notions which he
believes are echoed by Toulmin.
Comparisons such as those suggested by Trent, Hample,
and Bird are interesting and suggest some directions
future research might take.

For example, the epicheireme

apparently had great popularity among ancient Roman rhetoricians and yet was subsequently lost and since disregarded
by logicians. 1 3

One wonders if the epicheireme was found

by logicians to be too complex, or if some other inherent
defect led to its eventual disuse.

Similarly, assuming

the relationship between the topics and Toulmin's model is
more than just a resemblance, the history of topical maxim
and difference may indicate something about potential
strengths and limitations of the Toulmin model.

Such his-

torical research may shed light upon the current practices
of logicians as well as implying revisions in those practices which may lead to the development of a more practical
approach to logic.
With regard to the applicability of the Toulmin model
to speech communication, charges that Toulmin's approach
is unoriginal seem largely beside the point.

Ancient and

modern philosophers may have contributed directly and
indirectly to Toulmin's concepts, and the extent of their
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influence is a matter which may be of interest to some current philosophers and historically-minded students of argumentation theory.

However, what is central to the present

study is the question of how useful a tool the Toulmin
model provides to the critics and creators of arguments in
comparison to the syllogism.

In this light, any lack of

originality of Toulmin's approach appears to be inconsequential.
Toulmin's Approach is Grounded
in Obsolete Ideas
Some critics charge that the categorical syllogism,
the only logical form selected by Toulmin for discussion
throughout The Uses of Argument, is not sufficiently
representative of current practices of formal logicians. 14
Casteneda remarks that Toulmin's syllogistic focus indicates
his disregard for "the progress of logic in the last
120 years." 1 5 Hardin calls it "a regrettable oversimplification."16

Manicas suggests that this one aspect of

Toulmin's discussion brings into doubt the overall value
of Toulmin's hypothesis. 1 7 It may be significant that,
among all of Toulmin's commentators, only these three rely
upon the conventional notations of symbolic logic in their
rebuttals to Toulmin's criticisms of the syllogism. 18
Toulmin may have limited his discussion to the categorical syllogism because it is traditionally offered in
introductory logic textbooks as the simplest, most basic
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form of argument, and due to its singular premise and conclusion it has an obvious practical applicability which
some more sophisticated forms have not. 1 9 Moreover, other
forms of syllogisms are developed from or otherwise related
to the basic form illustrated by the example "Socrates is a
man, all men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal."
Since Toulmin represents his approach as being fundamentally
different from the traditional approach, his selection of
the most basic kind of syllogism as a foil seems appropriate.

Nevertheless, if the more current, sophisticated

forms of logical analysis can be shown to eliminate the
ambiguities of the syllogism, focus attention upon fielddependent sources of validity and provide practical procedures for demonstrating logical candidness, then the value
of Toulmin's alternative approach would indeed come into
doubt.

However, it should be noted that none of the critics

accusing obsolescence provide full support for their claims,
that is, by showing the categorical syllogism to be obsolete and largely unrelated to current practices.

A perusal

of basic logic textbooks as well as textbooks in argumentation, debate, and rhetoric reveals that the categorical
syllogism is still treated as fundamental; indeed, it is
often the only form considered in speech communication
texts in which formal logic is a subsidiary topic. 20
Whereas speech communication textbooks, if they mention logic at all, are likely to include discussion of
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categorical syllogisms primarily, what Toulmin says about
this "obsolete" form may be of interest.

Therefore, the

charge that Toulmin's approach is founded on obsolete
ideas, even if true, does not bear directly on its potential usefulness in the area of speech communication. 21
The Toulmin Approach Does Not
Represent an Innovation in
the Field of Logic
Those critics who charge that Toulmin's approach is
not innovative include some who believe that formal logic
is superior to Toulmin's approach and others who fail to
see much difference between them.

Both these critics

insist that the syllogism is not so limited and ambiguous
as Toulmin contends.

For example, to Toulmin's claim that

ambiguities in the major premise prevent the explication
of matters of backing, Cooley responds by asking for "the
identity of the individuals who restrict themselves in this
way" implying that such logicians cannot be found. 22
Casteneda repeats this charge, stating emphatically that
"no logician ever even hinted that major premises cannot
have different supports or backings. 112 3
.
24
.
1 os express s1m1
. · 1 ar cri. t.icisms.
S imopou

1'1anicas and
In other words,

according to these critics, the traditional approach is at
least as good as, if not better than, the Toulmin approach.
This is made clear in the final conclusions drawn by
Cooley, Casteneda, and Simopoulos who agree that the Toulmin
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model may not in and of itself be faulty but it is not
without problems and, even if those are solved, it does not

change the ways in which arguments are criticized. 2 5
Whether the Toulmin model is inferior or superior to
the syllogism as a tool of analysis is a matter of controversy. 26

It has already been shown that, while both share

the same subject matter of argumentative discourse, the
approaches of Toulmin and formal logicians vary in a number
of significant ways.

The critics who maintain that no

important differences exist between them seem to presume
that human reasoning itself operates syllogistically. 2 7
For a model of argument to be adequate, it must, therefore,
do all that a syllogism does.

28

Because the Toulmin model

is not designed to test or illustrate the structural consistency of parts of an argument (as discussed in chapter
II), formal logicians feel it falls short of what is
needed.

For example, Cooley, Hardin, and Manicas each

attribute Toulmin's sense of ambiguity in the major premise
to his reliance on a peculiar terminology which fails to
reflect traditional categories. 2 9

When compared to the

parts of a syllogism which are as straightforward as the
grammatical elements of the sentences they represent,
Toulmin's functionally-defined elements seem ambiguous and
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish.

Specific

criticisms which follow from this view are discussed later
in this chapter.
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If one presumes the usefulness and candidness of the
syllogism as a tool for the analysis of arguments, no advantage can be realized by adopting distinctions which fail to
reflect the "ideal" syllogistic elements.

As Manicas rhe-

torically asks in reference to the categorical syllogism,
"could the structure of this argument be any more candid
than it now is?"30

According to this point of view, then,

logic has reached a pinnacle of development; while it may
be made more exacting through extension, no alteration of
the basic assumptions and aims could improve it.

In

essence, the position of these formal logicians precludes
the possibility of significant innovation in the field of
logic; certainly they cannot accept Toulmin's approach
which rejects much of the traditional view.3 1

This posture

taken by formal logicians may strike empirically-minded
speech communication professionals as repugnant simply
because it avoids what might be theoretical problems by
considering them to be problems in the proper application
of theory.

In other words, the theory is maintained as

acceptable while the process of application becomes
increasingly complex as problems are encountered.

Toulmin's

effort is to simplify issues involving application by transforming the theory.

This difference of approach to theory

and application is part of a larger pattern of differences
between Toulmin and formal logicians for which an explanation will be hypothesized in the final section of this
chapter.

91
Toulmin's Approach is Unnecessarily
Broad in its Implications for
the Field of Logic
As we have seen, the revolutionary tone of Toulmin's
book disturbs some formal logicians who might otherwise
find some of what he says worthy of consideration.

Formal

logicians do not believe the problems of formal logic to be
so serious that a whole new approach needs to be pursued.3 2
Further, they fail to see how Toulmin's model provides such
a unique new approach.
At best, critics argue, some of the distinctions
Toulmin makes may be usefully incorporated within the practices of formal logicians.

However, there seems to be

little agreement as to what these distinctions may be.

For

example, first, to Toulmin's division of probability into
matters of force represented by modal qualifiers and criteria represented in warrant-backings, and second, to his
discussion of the significance of field-dependent aspects
of argument, Cooley contends that the conventional approach
can be accommodated.33

In contrast, Manicas argues that

there are easier available solutions to the problems posed
by Toulmin which are superior to adopting his questionable
4
terminology.3
Another reviewer, F. Will, is less skeptical
than Manicas and finds many of Toulmin's discussions
"interesting and illuminating."35

Hardin, on the other

hand, praises Toulmin's treatment of the relationship of
logic and epistemology as well as his discussion of
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probability, while Korner calls the latter discussion "the
least convincing in the book."3 6

Simopoulos and Casteneda

prefer to dismiss Toulmin's approach entirely, agreeing
that his distinctions, while interesting, are inconsequential and therefore deserving of no attention.37

Cowan is

more extreme, contending that Toulmin's approach is wrong
in nearly every respect, but that the current thinking of
formal logicians is equally misdirected--in a way almost
antithetical to Toulmin's hypothesis.3 8 Cowan's view
represents a minority opinion, however, as most critics
suggest that at least some aspects of what Toulmin proposes
are worth further consideration, but not at the cost of
sacrificing a 2300-year-old tradition.39
Formal logicians, as previously noted, feel that
formal logic provides an adequate tool for the analysis of
arguments, and that major innovations are unnecessary if
not impossible.

Whatever ideas of Toulmin's seem promising

can, in their view, be made a part of the practice of logicians within the conceptual framework which already exists.
Moreover, much of what Toulmin offers as new and unique
does not seem so to logicians who perceive resemblances to
the parts of the syllogism or archiac forms related to it.
Thus, to formal logicians who have published criticisms of
The Uses of Argument, Toulmin's approach in general represents far less an advance in logic than Toulmin seems to
believe.
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SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL
Perhaps the single most controversial aspect of
Toulmin's approach is his layout for the analysis of argument, the Toulmin model.

Composed of functionally-defined

rather than formal elements of argument, the Toulmin model
is criticized by some formal logicians for (1) indistinguishability among its elements, (2) backing which cannot
provide the justification which Toulmin believes is needed,
(3) a questionable conception of data, and (4) an unexplained

classification of some arguments as warrant-establishing.
These charges are detailed in the following discussion along
with their implications for the application of the Toulmin
model to speech communication.

Further issues about the

Toulmin model which the writer believes to be crucial are
discussed at the end of this section.
Elements of the Toulmin Model
Are Indistinguishable
Critics have charged that several crucial elements of
the Toulmin model cannot be distinguished from one another.
Specifically, the elements they find most difficult to
distinguish are:
data and rebuttal.

warrant and data, warrant and backing, and
On the basis of these alleged ambigu-

ities, formal logicians have challenged the applicability
of the model.
Warrant and Data.

If warrant and data cannot be

clearly distinguished, then not only does the useful
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applicability of the model come into doubt but its contrast
to the categorical syllogism becomes less distinct.

Sev-

eral of Toulmin's critics feel uncomfortable with a distinction which, according to Toulmin, is not always possible to
make on the basis of grammatical clues only.

Hample, for

example, states that "it seems odd that a distinction that
is only sometimes apparent should be an essential part of
a model designed to criticize all ordinary discourse. 1140
He contends that without obvious grammatical indicators
which are often absent in enthymemes, the distinction cannot be made.

1'1anicas also doubts the usefulness of "lin-

guistic clues 11 in distinguishing data from warrant since
"grammatical transformations" must be performed in some
cases to bring differences to light. 41 Even though such
transformations are also necessary with the syllogism,
1'1anicas doubts if the distinction can be applied to arguments which fail to fit the form of a syllogism with a
singular and universal premise. 42 Because some arguments
are formed with pairs of universal premises, 1'1anicas counts
the ambiguity between data and warrant among the limitations of the Toulmin model.
Other critics note that the functional differences
themselves are difficult to keep separate.

Casteneda finds

the disjunctive choice between warrant and data oppressive
especially because data seem limited to statements "about
closed classes of objects. 114 3

Casteneda contends thatthis
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rules out as data common everyday statements about open or
unlimited classes of objects as well as statements of prediction.

Toulmin would count such statements as warrants,

but Casteneda contends that they need not be "permissive"
to be used in an argument.

In other words, in Casteneda's

view, to look only at the permissive function of a major
premise is to restrict oneself to only a portion of the
possible premises which may be taken into account with the
syllogism.

Taking Toulmin's distinction between data and

warrant as a disjunctive limitation, Casteneda concludes
that the Toulmin model is more restrictive and less applicable than the syllogism to practical argument.
Cooley, Cowan, and Manicas are all troubled by Toulmin's characterization of data as "categorical statements
of fact 11 or "i terns of information. "44 They ask if warrants
are not information--if they cannot be factual.

Cooley

notes that it seems to be up to the critic of argument
whether statements of fact are to be classified as data
(in which case they may affect a claim) or backing (in which
case they affect the warrant). 4 5 Cowan asks if a person
unfamiliar with a particular warrant statement might not
take it as "information," and thus data. 46 In other words,
these critics are disturbed that Toulmin seems to imply
that whether a statement is to be taken as factual and
informative or authorizing and permissive depends upon the
judgment of the person to whom the argument is made.

Other
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distinguishing criteria noted by Toulmin--that data may be
appealed to explicitly and warrants, implicitly--are dismissed by Cowan because they depend too much upon what the
arguer thinks a respondent already knows or doesn't know
about the subject of an argument and not so much upon the
4
different functioning of the statements themselves. 7
In defense of Toulmin one might argue that he never
claimed that such distinctions would be easy to make; on
the contrary, he explicitly warns that functional differences are not always apparent in linguistic forms of statements given in argument. 48 Further, particular statements
are seldom absolutely one thing or the other in practice.
The same statement may be found to serve as data in one
situation and warrant in another. 4 9 For example, depending
upon the context, the statement "Abortion is immoral" may
serve as a datum or a warrant.
first argument:

It may be a datum in this

"('W) Immorality should be outlawed; there-

fore, (C) abortion should be illegal."

On the other hand,

it may be a warrant in this second argument:

"(D) Ellen

is pregnant but does not want the child; therefore, (C) she
must either decide to keep the child or else put it up for
adoption."

It is conceivable that these arguments in which

the same statement functions differently might occur
together as separate units of proof in an anti-abortion
message.

This and other examples offered by Manicas and

Casteneda may indeed be among the problematic cases Toulmin
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refers to in which the distinction is less than obvious.50
However, the characterization of data as statements about

"a closed class of objects" used by Casteneda to demonstrate the oppressive nature of Toulmin's distinction is
itself more restrictive than any offered by Toulmin.5 1 In
addition, the hypothetical form "if D then C" into which
warrant statements may normally be rewritten according to
Toulmin does not imply "information" in the sense used by
Cowan; rather it is their permissive function in connecting
data to claim which is the salient feature of Toulmin's
warrants.5 2
Claims of the indistinguishability of data and warrant may come as a surprise to some speech communication
professionals who have apparently found the Toulmin model
useful in a number of research studies.53

Considering the

complexity of arguments in discourse as compared to textbook examples which are often constructed to demonstrate
theoretical points, the potential effectiveness of the
Toulmin model as a critical tool should not be quickly
dismissed.
On the other hand, there is a casual quality to the
definitive explanations Toulmin offers, especially of
data.

Operational definitions which might promote stan-

dards of application for the Toulmin model have yet to be
developed.

Such definitions are desirable, however, con-

sidering the varying interpretations which may be placed
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upon terms such as "information," "factual," "permissive,"
and "principles."

To the extent that definitions of ele-

ments vary according to the different purposes and contexts
of arguments in specific fields, illustrative examples
which demonstrate such variations may help the analyst to
make the necessary distinctions.
Warrant and Backing.

Critics have claimed that war-

rant and backing cannot be clearly distinguished.

This

charge is largely a reiteration of that brought against the
indistinguishability of warrant and data, to the effect
that grammatical clues are not enough indication of differences.

Cooley, Hample, and Manicas each challenge the
distinction of backing from warrant on this basis.5 4
Casteneda takes a different tack, using one Toulmin concept
against another, suggesting "if we cannot get from any set
of data to a conclusion without some warrant one naively
wonders what sort of argument 'D, B; so C' can be."55

In

other words, according to Casteneda, either Toulmin is
being inconsistent or backing may function as warrant at
times, in which case the distinction between them seems a
muddy affair.
Of the first of these charges, that grammatical
indicators are an inadequate basis for distinguishing
these elements, enough has been said.

On the surface,

Casteneda's charge seems more serious, but on closer examination it appears to be the result of a peculiar
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interpretation of Toulmin's position.

As discussed in

essay III of The Uses of Argument, the form "D, B; so C"
is introduced in the context of analytic arguments and
their special features.5 6

One of these features which

makes analytic arguments unique is that there is no significant difference between their warrants and their backings.
In other words, while most practical arguments are substantial and require that their warrants be backed, only in
analytic arguments are these functions unambiguously combined in major premises.57

According to Toulmin, formal

logicians have mistakenly idealized this unique analytic
form, which is why formal logic has lost touch with its
intended applications.

Casteneda, in considering "D, B;

so C" out of context, misses the point and presumes Toulmin to be in error.

In short, just because a special

class of arguments exists in which distinguishing warrant
from backing is of no value does not mean that the same
holds for arguments in general.
The distinction between backing and warrant is crucial to Toulmin's model, first because it represents one
of the major innovations of the Toulmin approach, and
second because without it the field-dependent sources of
validity remain obscure.

Toulmin's suggestions of how to

distinguish backing from warrant are clearer than some of
his other distinctions, perhaps because he is careful to
explain them in terms of other more general distinctions
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on which they depend.

Backings are, after all, not merely

data-like statements offered in general support of a war-

rant.

They are, in addition, representative of the cri-

teria of an argument, one of its field-dependent aspects.5 8
Thus, the function of backing is different from the other
elements.

To say that the distinction between warrant and

backing is among Toulmin's clearest is not to suggest that
it is beyond improvement.

Toulmin has not helped critics

of argument with the process of applying his distinctions.
For instance, he fails to provide a set of clear procedures
for testing statements to determine their functions, illustrations of well-backed warrants from various fields for
comparison, or discussion of steps used in the criticism
of argumentative discourse with the Toulmin model.

Such

matters are of major interest to argumentation students
and scholars in speech communication who have had to
develop their own interpretations.

In subsequent chapters

of this study, these various approaches to the Toulmin
model are examined, along with a recent textbook coauthored
by Toulmin.59
Data and Rebuttal.

Critics claim that data and

rebuttal cannot be clearly distinguished.

There is no

element in the syllogism which corresponds to Toulmin's
rebuttal.

Apparently formal logicians believe that there

is no need for any consideration of data which refutes to
some degree a conclusion asserted in argument if the
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argument is presented in the unassailable form of an analytic syllogism.

Formal logicians appear to find rebuttals

difficult to make sense of and some argue that such an
element is unnecessary and meaningless in a model of argument.
As has been shown, the element of rebuttal is concerned with the specification of possible exceptions to the
applicability of the warrant to the particular case at
hand.

The probability which is represented by an abstract

modal term as qualifier of a claim is exemplified and made
concrete by what may be included as rebutta1. 60 To Toulmin,
rebuttal is a way of acknowledging that no truth or principle is absolute and that all arguments compete within a
field with alternative explanations.

In other words, the

rebuttal guides the critic's search for inconsistent data
which are not part of the initial argument.

Unknown fac-

tors which could affect the force or soundness of a claim
are what the rebuttal is meant to specify.
Formal logicians appear to find the idea of rebuttal
confusing.

Hample, after long discussion, concludes that

"the omission [on Toulmin's part] of a procedure for
testing rebuttals leaves vague [sic] how the rebuttals work
and how they generate qualifiers. 1161

Cooley similarly

argues that more explanation is needed to establish how
rebuttals serve to enlarge the area of support for a conclusion. 62

He also suggests that it would be simpler if
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rebuttals could be "manuevered out of the picture" by
treating them as additional items of data which comment on
or qualify other data. 6 3 Manicas thinks that there is no
need to pay any attention to rebuttals at all since a warrant may itself imply exceptions, and the overall force of
a claim will be the same whether or not a rebuttal is
specified. 64 Further, he rejects rebuttals as matters of
material validity which are more appropriately considered
as separate arguments having to do with the truth of one
of the premises of a syllogism. 6 5
At issue in the formal logicians criticism of rebuttal and its distinctiveness from data is the question of
how complete one's data must be before a claim may properly
be advanced.

A syllogism is presumed to contain all of the

relevant data in its premises.

Likewise, according to

Hample, Toulmin says the same of data in the Toulmin model,
that it must be complete. 66 While it is true Toulmin considers that all of the relevant evidence to which one has
access should be included in an argument, he does not say
that it should be included as data as Hample implies.
Toulmin makes a distinction which Hample does not acknowledge, differentiating a statement of data which bears
directly on the question at issue from another kind of
statement he terms "a second-order comment on our previous
information" or a "statement about the nature of our
6
data." 7 It is this latter kind of statement which Toulmin
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implies ought to be included as rebuttal because it bears
on the applicability of the warrant to the case at hand.
Toulmin does not, as Hample states, suggest that such
second-order comments be excluded from the model.

68

Hample

and some other logicians seem to find this distinction
between kinds of data difficult to grasp.
Indeed, Toulmin's distinction between information
that is best considered data and that which is best considered rebuttal is not carefully described.

Further

clarification and exemplification would be appreciated by
those who wish to apply the model without being hindered
by, for example, having to consider what may be an infinite
number of exceptions to an otherwise simple claim.

But

this need for further definition and illustration is not
necessarily grounds for discarding rebuttal as an element
of the Toulmin model.
Rebuttal, like backing, is one of the unique fielddependent aspects of the Toulmin model which makes it
different from the traditional syllogism.

Rebuttal gives

the Toulmin model a more dynamic quality than it would have
without it since it is the element which can reflect
changing circumstances within a field or the discovery of
new relevant evidence.

Finally, a rebuttal which is

judiciously conceived can potentially serve as an invaluable
guide in the investigations of a critic or arguer.

The

rebuttal would appear to be an attractive feature of the
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Toulmin model for speech communication professionals concerned with practical argumentation.
In the case of each of the alleged ambiguities
between warrant and data, warrant and backing, and data and
rebuttal, it has been argued here that further clarification of definitions and the development of standardized
procedures for their application are more desirable than a
return to the static absolutism of the traditional approach.
This opinion is supported by the applications which some in
speech communication believe can effectively be made of the
Toulmin model; these are discussed in chapter V.

This is

not to suggest that the Toulmin model is somehow the ideal
way to view argument; as the remainder of this section will
show, there are still important questions to be answered
about some of the basic features of the model.

For the

purposes of analysis and comparison of rational procedures
of various disciplines and as a basis for the criticism of
conclusions asserted within a field, philosophical criticism
notwithstanding, the Toulmin model has many attractive
features which the syllogism lacks.
Backing Cannot Provide
Justification for
Arguments
Perhaps the charge most widely leveled by critics of
the Toulmin model is this:

backing for the warrant cannot

provide justification for an argument.

Instead it defines
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only the first step in an infinitely regressive set of supporting arguments.

This idea is well represented by

Cowan's statement:
• assuming justification to be what is required,
we will need a justification of warrant (3) for our
passage (2) to conclusion (1). But if this is the
case, we will surely need a further warrant (4) to
justify our passage from (2) and (3) to (1) and a
further warrant (5) for passing from (2) and (3)
and (4) to (1) and so on ad infinitum.69
Toulmin presents the concept of backing with two qualifications meant to circumvent this objection.

First, he

introduces backing last among the six functional elements of
his model, and he states "this form may not be final but it
is significantly complex for the purpose of our present discussions. "70

This leaves the door open for modification of

the model perhaps to allow for further justification of
backings where necessary.7 1 Second, Toulmin specifies that
in some cases backing need not be made explicit since the
warrant is uncontested by the disputants.7 2 Further, he
states that if every warrant were challenged, no argument
could ever begin, and he provides an illustration of how an
infinite regress might result from infinitely successive
challenges.73

Ironically, several of Toulmin's critics

refer to the illustrative passage to support their contention that this feature is a major weakness of the model.7 4
The issue seems to involve not the "infinite regress"
itself which Toulmin acknowledges as a possibility but the
definition of where and in what argument rests.

Formal
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logicians appear to view argument primarily as a product, a
particular message, a linguistic artifact with a defined
formal structure that can be evaluated on its own merits.
Toulmin, on the other hand, is concerned with argument as a
process involving interacting disputants using linguistic
forms which represent various functions of argument.

In

other words, formal logicians appear to object to the
infinite regression because it makes difficult any .absolute
determination of the soundness of an argument based solely
on its form.

After all, a form without limits is not sub-

ject to a complete analysis or evaluation.

Thus, some

formal logicians seem baffled by Toulmin's apparent satisfaction with backing as representative of justificatory
criteria.

For example, Cooley writes of Toulmin's examples

of backing:
• • • these illustrations • • • have a remarkably
casual quality. It is clear that nothing in the
process of fixing the extent of evidential support
is raising any philosophical queries in Mr. Toulmin's
mind at this point • • • • Toulmin has not erased
evidential support as a factor in the situation but
he seems to have convinced himself that when it is
associated with backing rather than probability the
old problems disappear.75
While the philosophical problems created by infinite regress
are familiar to Toulmin, he believes that it represents a
perversion of the process of practical argument.

In the

determination of the soundness of real-life arguments, the
infinite regress problem is never a significant factor.7 6
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Toulmin and formal logicians are clearly divided on
this question of justification and backing.

To formal

logicians there can be no final justification for anything. 77

Hence, they conceive of logic as a matter of

structural organization useful in the determination of
inconsistencies in reasoning.

For Toulmin, justification

is possible to the extent that it is founded on the agreed
upon historical achievements of rational investigators
within their special enterprises.7 8
Toulmin's Concept of Data
is Questionable
Perhaps no element is less discussed or illustrated
by Toulmin than data.

The data, assumed by Toulmin to

provide the foundation of any argument, are described as
"facts," "categorical statements of fact," and "information."79

He assumes that data must be found acceptable to

the respondent if an argument is to proceed.so

From this

it may be inferred that data consist of those statements
in which all parties to an argument share belief, perhaps
as the result of separate supporting arguments through
which the acceptability of such data is established.

In

this regard, Toulmin's model is similar to the syllogism-like minor premises which depend upon prior arguments for
their material validity, data become established through
prior arguments.

108
Formal logicians have many questions about how statements become data and in what way they affect the force of
a claim.

Three issues about the nature of data emerge from

the comments of critics of the Toulmin model.

First, can

data consist of multiple items of evidence or only single
items such as those given in illustrations of arguments in
The Uses of Argument?

Second, can data be qualified in the

same way that a claim is?

Finally, should there be an ele-

ment specifying support for data in manner similar to the
way backing specifies support for a warrant?

These issues

are so intermeshed that to take a position on one of them
is to imply answers to the others.
First, are data multiple or singular?

This question

arises because nowhere in The Uses of Argument does Toulmin
specify that multiple items of data may be included in an
analysis using his model; all his diagrammatic examples
rely on singular items of data.

On the other hand, he does

not specifically deny that multiple items may be used and
his choice of the plural term "data" rather than the singular "datum" suggests that his concept of data may be more
complex than his examples imply.

The fact that he appro-

priately refers to a datum now and then supports this
interpretation. 81
Hardin is uncomfortable with what appears to him to
be Toulmin's ambivalence on this matter of multiple or
singular items of data.

Why, he asks, should data be
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limited to particular statements or statistical summaries. 82

Hample suspects that Toulmin "confines himself to

singular data" in order to make them appear more distinct
8
from warrants which are, by definition, genera1. 3

He

proposes that the restriction of data to particular statements be removed to make the Toulmin model more useful and
more like the traditional approach.

These critics, along

with Manicas, interpret Toulmin as limiting data to particulars although such a restriction is not clear from Taul. 's
min

d'lSCUSSlOn.
.
84

The second major concern of critics is the question
of whether or not data may be qualified.

Certainly if

prior proofs provide the data statements for an argument,
such previous data-claims are likely to carry a qualifier
with them.

Trent argues that Toulmin does not allow for

qualification of data statements even though such a function would render the model more applicable. 8 5

After all,

there are not so many absolute arguments on which we can
rely for support; much practical argument is grounded in
probabilities.

Cooley's doubt about what counts as data

and what as rebuttal is related to this question of the
potential qualification of data.

Some second-order com-

ments about the nature of data may simply be qualifications, that is, statements of the degree of confidence
one may have in the data. 86 On the other hand, Hample
argues that not only should the claim be qualified but so
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should warrant and data.

While this would complicate the

Toulmin model, according to Hample it would also specify
the sources of the force of a claim more clearly than a
rebutta1. 8 7
Third, critics wonder why there is no element specifying support for the data in the Toulmin diagrammatic
model.

Cooley, Trent, and Manicas each argue that chal-

lenges to the reliability of data statements are a significant part of argument which Toulmin seems satisfied to
overlook. 88

Trent claims that passing off responsibility

of support for data to prior arguments "results in a fragmentation of the argument. 118 9

However, as Hample acknowl-

edges, once one includes matters of support for the data,
the same objections may be raised against this new element
as are raised against backing, that it leads to an infinitely regressive chain of supportive arguments unless one
arbitrarily specifies some acceptable level of justification. 90

The point of these critics' objections is that

without some element which can address challenges made
against data in argument, the diagrammatic model appears
incomplete.
If Toulmin had been clearer in his discussion of the
nature of data, these questions might never have arisen.
However, the problem may involve more than data, perhaps
stemming from a lack of clarity in his distinction between
macro-arguments and micro-arguments.

According to Toulmin,
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formal logicians have restricted themselves to microarguments. 91

Similarly, he introduces the Toulmin model in

the context of micro-arguments, focusing on the sentenceby-sentence structure of arguments in order to demonstrate
the comparative limitations and weaknesses of the syllogism.

Thus, while the "finer, as-it-were physiological"

structure of micro-arguments is well described, Toulmin
does no more than hint at the "gross anatomical structure"
of macro-arguments or how the line is specifically drawn
between the two categories.9 2 Of macro-arguments, Toulmin
implies that they consist of general phases of enquiry
which begin with the identification of a problem and candidates for solution which must be considered and end with
the selection of one of the solutions which, in light of
evidence, appears best.93

Elsewhere in The Uses of Argu-

ment Toulmin states that, whereas micro-arguments may
reflect a mathematical analyticity when viewed in isolation,
when returned to their larger, macroscopic contexts and
considered in light of their applications, they become
substantial.94 In other words, according to Toulmin's
implication, the usefulness of the diagrammatic model is
not primarily at the level of microscopic analysis but at
the level of practice involving substantial macro-arguments.
Thus, while Toulmin does not discuss the mechanics of
macroscopic analysis of arguments, he apparently intends
the model to be applicable at either level.
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If Toulmin intends his model to be applicable not
only at the level of individual sentences but also to
extended discourse and the larger contexts of practical
argumentation, then he must mean to consider multiple items
of data.

Indeed, it is doubtful that a philosopher so con-

cerned with how language is used in argument would select
the plural term "data" to indicate an exclusively singular
element.

Still, more than Toulmin's tacit endorsement of

the concept of multiple items of data is needed for critics
of arguments to be able to make good use of the Toulmin
model.

For instance, how are multiple items of data to be

organized in relation to a claim?

Are multiple warrants

required to justify the movement from multiple items of
data to a singular claim?

Is the qualifier in some general

way affected by the quantity of data?

For the Toulmin

model to be effectively applied to macro-arguments, answers
will need to be developed for these questions.
Proposals to add a qualifier to the data, or warrant
for that matter, are interesting but they have the potential
to create confusion about the functional nature of the elements of the model.

The modal qualifier which is added to

a claim represents the qualification which accrues from
the data in light of the strength and applicability of the
warrant.

Whether dividing the modal qualifier into several

other elements reflecting various sources of qualification
would add to the candidness or usefulness of the Toulmin
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model is not clear.

Further research involving specific

schemes of this nature, like Hample's, may eventually bring
to light the comparative benefits and costs of this
approach.

At the present state of development of the Toul-

min model, the addition of elements may serve to further
confuse the issues of argument as much as clarify them.
Further, the inclusion of an element of support for the
data may supercede the need for explicit qualification of
data, just as backing specifies the force a warrant may
confer upon a claim.
The question of introducing an element to specify
support for data raises some important theoretical questions.

The consequences of such a proposal for the critic

of argument are not clear.

Proponents claim that such an

addition presents a more complete picture of the challenges
which may be brought against a claim.

Because it is

modeled after backing for warrant, an element specifying
support for data may raise some of the same questions as
those surrounding backing.

For example, how does one dis-

tinguish statements of support for data from statements of
data, backing, or rebuttal?

Also, as previously mentioned,

the infinite regress problem is as applicable to an element
of support for data as it is to backing.
Inclusion of an element of support for data implies
that it is sometimes practical to argue from data which are
not believed by the audience.

Requests for documentation
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of data may in practical situations be requests for something less than a complete enumeration of a line of argument leading up to the current controversy.

Rather, such

challenges to data may be requests for an explicit lemma
(a tentatively accepted auxiliary argument).95

Thus, an

argument may be advanced at least tentatively without
straining the patience of an audience, violating time limitations or other constraints of practical argument.
Accordingly, an element of support for data may prove to
be a practical modification of the model.
An element of support for data raises another issue

regarding the assumptions it reflects about fields of argument.

To use an analogy with kindred elements, warrants

may require backing to make explicit their special acceptability within a field by indicating the degree to which
they have become established as reliable principles of
inference.

Every field is thus conceived as consisting at

any one time of warrants which are firmly established,
warrants which have been rejected, and innovative warrants
or hypotheses still in some degree of contention.

The

question is, does the inclusion of support for data imply

the same kind of field-dependence for data as for warrant?
Are we to conceive of fields as consisting of

set~

of data

which are considered in varying degrees of establishment?
Are some facts and information believed in all fields
while others are found acceptable only in some fields or
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perhaps only in one field?

Though Toulmin does not discuss

these questions, the epistemological consequences of the
inclusion of an element specifying support for data are
intriguing.

Assuming data may be looked at in this field-

dependent way, one wonders if this commits us to a more
completely relative view of reality, a position Toulmin
warns against because of the paradoxes into which it leads.
On the other hand, such epistemological issues are the concern of some current speech communication theorists who
view rhetoric as epistemic, architectonic or "a way of
knowing."9 6
Finally, rhetorical implications of the Toulmin model
are directly related to the issue of whether or not an element of support for data should be included as part of the
model.

As described by Toulmin, data are dependent upon

the consent of the audience.

That is, one cannot call data

that which is challenged by the respondents to an argument;
you have not the basis of an argument unless you have
acceptable data on which to ground it.

Others contend that

some support for the data should be considered part of the
argument.

How this conflict may be resolved has implica-

tions for the application of the Toulmin model as a model
for attitude change and persuasion.

Can data be defined

merely as whatever the audience may believe at the moment
of presentation?

Or are there field-invariant criteria for

what is to be considered "fact" which need to be made
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explicit?

Or, as suggested above, does each field have its

own criteria for what can be taken as fact which should be
reflected as part of the model?

Further research and

experimentation involving the practices of actual arguers
may point towards definitive answers to these questions.
However, the answers arrived at may depend upon the epistemological assumptions with which one begins as later discussion of the implications of conflicting theoretical
perspectives will suggest.
Warrant-Establishing Arguments
Are Never Clearly Explained
Toulmin claims that one of the main distinctions
between deduction and induction is that the first kind of
argument relies on already-established warrants while the
second is used to establish the reliability of particular
warrants.

The classification of arguments into those which

are warrant-using and those which are warrant-establishing
is not given much attention by Toulmin.97

Nearly all of

the examples presented by Toulmin involve warrant-using
arguments which rely on a single datum, leaving in doubt
the nature of the other kind.

It is worth noting, too,

that warrant-establishing arguments are the counterpart of
induction--about which there is controversy among logicians. 98
The notion of warrant-establishing arguments is not
a major component of Toulmin's approach and therefore has
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not merited much attention from commentators.

However, two

formal logicians have registered their objections to the
concept.

Cooley is surprised that Toulmin would simplify

the inductive process to one of a successive testing of
warrants.

He concludes that the concept represents an

obvious "slip" on Toulmin's part.99

Casteneda is less

severe, noting that "it is unfortunate that Toulmin neither
discusses nor illustrates warrant-establishing arguments;
so he leaves the relationships between B and W in the
d ar k • ulOO
Speech communication professionals would have to
agree that it is unfortunate that Toulmin was not clearer
on this point.

Specific questions which may be asked about

warrant-establishing arguments include:

does it make any

difference to the way an argument is analyzed whether it
is warrant-using or warrant-establishing and, if so, how?
One solution is to assume that it makes no difference and
the analysis will look the same.

The claim will represent

the yet-to-be-established warrant, data will include the
records of various successive trials, and the warrant will
assert the suitability of empirical testing to the establishment of general principles within the particular field.
An example of a simple scientific argument analyzed in this

manner appears in Figure 6.
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Because (D) in
~
So, (Q) it may be
successive trials
presumed as a genthe boiling point
eral rule that the
of water has been
boiling point of
found to vary with
water will vary
altitude.
with altitude.
Since (W) if in experimental
trials a specified variable
is found consistently to vary
in direct relation to changes
in another specified variable,
then it may be presumed that
the variables are correlated
and will vary together predictably.
Figure 6.
One approach to the analysis of a
warrant-establishing argument.
Another view is to assume that warrant-establishing
arguments are analyzed differently than warrant-using arguments.

For example, the tentative warrant may be stated as

a warrant while the data include the controlled variables
and the claim predicts a result.

Then, every time the

argument is found to successfully predict the results of an
experimental trial, the backing for the tentative warrant
becomes stronger and the warrant becomes slightly better
established.

If, as trials continue, no warrant can be

devised which is more generally applicable, simpler, or
otherwise more attractive to investigators, then the warrant may become established within the field.

This

"hypothetical-deductive" process in which the presumption
of a warrant involves no contradiction of data or successive results represented by the claim is illustrated in
Figure

7.
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> (C) The boiling point

(D) Given that all other
factors are controlled
and that water is heated
until boiling at various

of water will be
found to be lower
than 112°F. below sea

specific altitudes below,

level, 112°F. at sea

at, and above sea level.

level, and higher
than 112°F. above sea
level.

(W) Since it may be presumed
as a general rule that the
boiling point of water will
vary with altitude.

I

(B) On account of successive
trials in which this has consistently been found to be
the case.
Figure 2. A second approach to the analysis of
a warrant-establishing argument.
Judging from Toulmin's discussion, it is this second
approach to the analysis of warrant-establishing arguments
which he has in mind.lOl

Still one may legitimately wonder

whether it makes any difference which approach to analysis
one uses.

While the second approach appears to draw atten-

tion to field-dependent features of an argument as specified in backing, the question of which approach is more useful or appropriate may prove inconsequential to the larger
issue of the potential applicability to speech communication
of Toulmin's approach.

The distinction between warrant-

using and warrant-establishing arguments is primarily useful in defining the relationship of Toulmin's approach to
formal logic.
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Other Crucial Issues Regarding
the Toulmin Model
There are several lines of criticism which have not

been explored by Toulmin's critics but may be of interest
to users of the Toulmin model in speech communication.
This writer believes there are three additional areas which
merit investigation:

the appropriateness of a retrospective

approach, the relationship of the Toulmin model to the syllogism, and the alleged irrelevance of field-invariant
aspects of argument.
First, while Toulmin's case in favor of a jurisprudential model is persuasive, it requires that one view
argument as a retrospective process.

In other words, for

Toulmin an argument begins with the assertion of a claim.
Is this the only way an argument may be produced in practice?

Might not the claim be the last thing made clear to

the arguer himself through the discovery and organization
of reasons:

The model may provide a useful tool with which

arguments can be analyzed, functions compared, and justification procedures evaluated according to the relevant
criteria of the applicable fields.

However, it is not

clear how or if the model can help a critic deal with argument as an interactive process in which people engage
independently or in various communication networks.

It

does not appear to be the only useful way to view argumentation.102
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Does the use of the Toulmin model make the syllogism
obsolete?

Toulmin appears to reject the approach of formal

logicians and argues that his model provides a more candid
and applicable tool for the analysis of practical arguments.
Of the syllogism and formal validity, he says only that
they apply in certain limited systems of calculus like pure
mathematics, and that the matters of linguistic consistency
which they describe are prerequisite to any rational consideration of arguments.
them entirely.

He does not, however, dismiss

Should the syllogism be considered a com-

plementary model which deals with prerequisite linguistic
matters of stating an argument clearly, a task Toulmin
recognizes is beyond the scope of his model?
Finally, Toulmin devotes most all of his attention
to the field-dependent aspects of argument which he contends have all but been ignored by formal logicians.

Does

this mean that there are no field-invariant aspects of
argument worthy of consideration?

What then becomes of the

study of fallacies, general forms of reasoning and other
field-invariant notions long associated with argumentation?
Are such matters to be considered as irrelevant to argument analysis as Toulmin believes formal validity to be?
Or can these field-invariant aspects of argument be reconciled with his approach?

More basically, how are specific

fields to be clearly distinguished and how absolute is the
dichotomy between field-invariance and field-dependence in
practice?
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These questions, in addition to the previously discussed issues of needed clarifications and possible modifications of the diagrammatic model, provide some directions
research may usefully take with regard to this approach to
argument.

In subsequent chapters, some of the efforts of

speech communication writers to deal with these issues are
discussed.

In the remainder of this chapter, a hypotheti-

cal relationship is explored between the kinds of criticisms
Toulmin and formal logicians make of each others' approaches
and the divergent theoretical perspectives in which they
appear to be rooted.

DIFFERENCES OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
As we have seen, in advancing his attack upon traditional notions of logic Toulmin proceeds from novel assumptions and moves towards unconventional aims.

His practical

orientation and analysis of argumentative functions are in
sharp contrast to formal logicians' idealism and structural
focus.

Given the fundamental nature of these differences

and Toulmin's professed intention to ''draw the fire of
others," it is perhaps not surprising that his proposals

have met with philosophical antipathy.l03

Indeed, it would

be more surprising to find formal logicians working towards
Toulmin's aims:

to provide justification for claims, to

explicate support for premises and to explore the elements
of argument beyond their formal consequences.

As has been
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shown, many formal logicians believe that such matters are,
at best, beside the point of logical analysis.

Much of the

criticism directed against Toulmin's approach by formal
logicians suggests a hypothesis that Toulmin and formal
logicians are operating in different frames of reference,
from divergent theoretical perspectives.

In this section

of chapter III, the apparent contrasts between their theoretical perspectives are explored.
Ideal vs. Practical Aims
Perhaps no greater or more consequential distinction
exists between the theoretical perspectives of Toulmin and
formal logicians than their divergent aims.

Formal logic

provides a standard toward which creators and critics of
argument may strive.

The best arguments are those which

conform to the criteria of the analytic syllogism.

Further,

the syllogism serves as a critical structure, useful in
discovering errors and weaknesses in arguments.

It is the

goal of formal logic to ensure that argumentative discourse
is given credence only when it meets the rigorous standards
of formal validity.

In other words, the aims of formal

logic are prescriptive and evaluative, defining an ideal
model and criteria for the proper organization of statements given in arguments.
Toulmin, on the other hand, is interested in argument
as it is practiced.

Practical arguments may include claims

which fall short of rigid standards of formal logic and yet
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are found to be useful in the fields to which they apply.
Because of this, Toulmin emphasizes the process by which
claims in general are justified in various fields of argument.

The functionally-defined elements of his model are

meant to provide a frame of reference for the comparison of
justification procedures in different fields.

How knowl-

edge becomes established or disestablished within a field
of thought and how various fields differ or are similar in
their justification procedures are issues of practical
argument with which Toulmin's revised logic is intended to
deal.

In other words, his aims are descriptive and com-

parative, providing a language and model which directs and
focuses a critic's observations of the practice of argument.
Formal logicians' prescriptive-evaluative aims are to
Toulmin's descriptive-comparative aims much as the treatment of disease is to the investigation of its causes.
While there is overlap in the subject matter, the problems
and procedures of each approach are likely to be different.
Absolute vs. Relative
Assumptions
Another area where the different theoretical perspectives and aims of Toulmin and formal logicians are reflected
is in their different assumptions about the nature of truth.
Formal logicians have generally assumed truth to be an
absolute, timeless, and universal feature of reality.

For

instance, the proper combination of premises is assumed by
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formal logicians to define a domain of entailment within
which any and all necessary, valid conclusions will be
found.

The combined premises, then, imply an absolute

relationship among terms with which an asserted conclusion
must be consistent to be valid.

Thus, formal logicians'

approach to argument is to designate a connection between
correctly-reasoned conclusions and the truths from which
they are derived.

This is accomplished through an absolute

structure, the syllogism.

If an argument can be success-

fully recast into one of the limited number of predefined
acceptable syllogistic structures, it can be considered
formally valid and its conclusion a candidate for truth.
Other arguments will be judged fallacious and ruled out of
formal logicians' considerations.

In other words, a pre-

scriptive-evaluative logic of argument defines absolute
procedures for determining absolutely what follows from a
combination of two propositions taken to represent true
concepts.
Toulmin's approach involves more relative notions of
truth. 104 His concept of practical argument involves the
relative probabilities of competing conceptions within a
field of inquiry.

Some fields, like pure geometry, involve

closed systems of calculi to which the absolute assumptions
of formal logic may be appropriate. 105 However, in most
fields of practical argument, according to Toulmin, claims
cannot be judged according to absolute standards of truth.
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Instead they must be judged in terms of the justifications
available for them within their fields of application.
More importantly, the elements of argument are themselves
defined not in terms of any absolute structure but by their
functions in relation to a particular claim.

In essence,

claims and the arguments of which they are a part are not
found by Toulmin to be true or false, but are instead
judged to have some degree of applicability within a field
of competing concepts.

In other words, a descriptive-

comparative logic of argument relies on relative procedures
of justification to determine degrees of relative probability.
Formal logicians assume that what is most important
in an argument is the potential correctness or truth-value
of the conclusion.

They may wonder, "can this argument be

somehow transformed into an unassailable, ideal type?"
Practitioners of the Toulmin approach assume that what is
most important in an argument is the degree of probable
applicability of a claim within a particular field.

They

may ask, "how justifiable is this claim when compared to
similar claims of like type made within this field of argument?" and also question the justification procedures themselves.

The assumptions and procedures maintained by

formal logicians and Toulmin are as different as their aims.
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Geometric Structure vs.
Jurisprudential
Functions
The centrality of geometric structure to formal logic
and jurisprudential function to Toulmin's approach represents a third manifestation of difference in theoretical
perspectives.

He contends that an argument depends for its

soundness on the kind of justification offered in support
of a claim asserted.

This justification is conceived as

deriving from the combined functions of the elements of an
argument.

He assumes that the justification of assertions

is the primary function served by arguments and it is to
this that all other functions are subordinate and dependent .106

Toulmin's concept of the phases, functions, and

justificatory purpose of argument is based on an analogy
which likens logic to jurisprudence, arguments to lawSUl·t S.
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Formal logicians charge that Toulmin is unclear in

what is meant by "jurisprudence" in his comparison and
therefore that "justification" is equally undefined.

In

contrast to Toulmin, formal logicians determine the soundness of an argument by applying the structural standards of
the syllogism.

If an argument is found to exhibit a for-

mally valid structure, then it is considered by formal
logicians to be soundly reasoned.

This difference of

attitude toward the structure and functions of an argument
is further evidence of a difference in theoretical perspectives of Toulmin and formal logicians.
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Perhaps Toulmin could have been clearer in his
description of what is meant by the "jurisprudential analogy," although he does make several attempts to explain himself.lOS

Chiefly he draws comparisons between logical

argument and jurisprudence focusing on (1) the presence of
disputants to a claim, (2) the phases of a dispute leading
to its settlement, (3) the sorts of propositions or elements
of an argument bearing upon the soundness of claims in
general, and (4) the differences among kinds of criteria
for soundness and the contexts from which they derive.
Given the quasi-geometric structure of the formally
valid syllogism discussed in chapter III, it should not be
surprising that some formal logicians find Toulmin's
inattention to structural features of argument disturbing
and unclear. 10 9 To them, anything less than the perfection
of the analytic ideal is likely to seem uncertain and
perhaps confusing. 11
Formal logicians question the

°

clarity of Toulmin's jurisprudential analogy, citing
multiple varieties of jurisprudence discoverable in history
and across cultures as well as the complexity of jurisprudential procedures. 111 They request that he discuss in
more depth what he means by the term "jurisprudence" and
that he rely less upon the everyday expression "court of
reason" as an explanation. 112 Further, they wonder why he
fails to provide in-depth examples of legal reasoning and
thus specify the paradigmatic qualities of legal reasoning. ll3

Cooley speculates that Toulmin, in his
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enthusiasm for discovering the "key mistake" made by formal
logicians, too easily embraces a corresponding key solu-

tion; however, philosophical wrangles of the type which
bother Toulmin are seldom so easily resolved.
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Field-Invariant vs. FieldDependent Features of
Argument
The difference in theoretical perspectives of formal
logicians and Toulmin appears to be a factor in the disagreement over the significance of his field-dependent features
of argument.

It will be recalled that formal logicians are

concerned with those aspects of argument which are universal
and timeless.

These field-invariant features are the focus

of formal logic and the concern for formal validity.

Toul-

min, on the other hand, claims that a large proportion of
real-life arguments with which people must deal rely for
their logical candidness upon criteria drawn from various
fields of application.

In other words, to determine the

soundness of a claim, one must know not only the data from
which it is drawn but also principles which are operative
in a given field.

Field-dependent features are, then,

central to his approach.
Formal logicians contend that the notion of fielddependent sources of validity is a weakness of Toulmin's
approach because it limits a critic to arguments within his
special areas of expertise.

The general applicability
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which logicians claim for formal logic is absent, they say,
from his model.

Manicas, among others, believes that Toul-

min is proposing that logicians become lexicographers,
recording all the acceptable warrants which may apply in
various contexts. 11 5

Given the breadth of possible argu-

ments among various fields, such a collection of warrants
would be enormous if not infinite.

Formal logicians

instead concern themselves with field-invariant features
of argument which are broadly generalizable.
Toulmin, on the other hand, argues that a logic cannot be considered practical if it is divorced from its
particular applications.

It is his practical orientation

which leads him to attend to field-dependent features of
arguments.

He writes, "questions about the acceptability

of arguments have in practice to be understood and tackled
in a context." 116
Toulmin's aims conflict with those of formal logicians.

Formal logicians, in seeking to evaluate and

improve arguments in general, emphasize field-invariant
features.

Toulmin, in seeking to describe and compare

justification procedures, emphasizes field-dependent features of argument in practice.
Formal Validity vs.
Justification
Finally, the divergent perspectives of formal logicians and Toulmin is reflected in the respective products
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of the two approaches to logical analysis.

Formal logic

produces a determination of formal validity or its con-

verse.

Toulmin's model produces a description of some

degrees of justification for assertions.
Toulmin generally avoids the term "validity" in reference to his approach, perhaps because to do so would
cause confusion with the more restrictive concept of "formal validity."

He prefers to discuss the "soundness" of
11
reasoning or the "logical candidness" of an argument. 7

His critics find this notion of logical candidness at once
too broad and too unconnected with traditional formal
validity.

Says Cooley of Toulmin, "he wants to broaden

the subject [of logic] so that it covers every case where
conclusions are backed by reasons of one sort or another,
not merely those in which the result follows analytically."

118

He is correct; Toulmin is interested in clarifying the functions of statements used in argument to justify conclusions.
To formal logicians who judge arguments according to the
structural relations of their propositions, Toulmin's functional focus seems peculiar and unclear.
Toulmin uses the jurisprudential analogy in part to
make clear what he means by justification.

Not surpris-

ingly, formal logicians expressing doubt about clarity of
the first concept are equally unhappy with the second.
Justification is what Toulmin asks of sound reasoning.

To

him, logic is representative of "standards of achievement
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which a man, in arguing, can come up to or fall short of,
and by which his arguments can be judged."ll9

In other

words, he believes the rules of logic should provide critical guidelines for the determination of soundness in
reasoning by examining the ways conclusions are justified.
Justification, then, refers to the defensive function which
arguments are meant to supply for assertions.

More imper-

tantly, the concept of justification is introduced by
Toulmin specifically to exclude from consideration any
other purposes for which argument might be used.

Other

than to say it could be argued that the justificatory function is more important than other kinds of purposes arguments may serve, a position he is clearly in sympathy with,
this limitation of his discussion is nowhere defended. 120
Some critics of Toulmin contend that he does not
demonstrate that he has solved the problem of how arguments
are justified.

They believe he has merely relocated the

problem through his relabelling of the parts of the syllogism, and so does not clearly solve it.

Cowan, among

others, believes that Toulmin is seriously remiss in the
matter of justification:
Surely it is not enough to say that this [the Toulmin model] is the sort of procedure we call "justification" and that is all there is to it. This
would leave justification a wholly empty ceremony. 121
If justification is what is needed for a sound argument,
how is one to know when he has reached it?

What does a
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critic of argument look for?

These are questions the for-

mal logicians wish Toulmin would answer more clearly.
is quite explicit in what he means by backing

for the war-

rant, the main justificatory feature of his model.
formal logicians this is not enough.

He

Yet to

They seem uncomfort-

able with less than absolute rules for and less than universal sources of justification.

From the theoretical

perspective of formal logicians, such concrete standards
appear to be mandatory.
Linear vs. Systems Perspectives:
A Meta-Theoretical Context
Throughout the preceding analysis, several differences
in the theoretical perspectives of Toulmin and formal logicians have been examined.

It may be helpful at this point

to step back from the specific approaches to logic and
place these differences into a meta-theoretical context.
It is the opinion of this writer that the formal logicians'
approach to logic reflects a linear theoretical perspective
while Toulmin's approach reflects a systems perspective.
This fundamental difference of theoretical perspective may
affect all levels of observation, description, and evaluation engaged in by theorists.

In addition, this difference

of perspectives may account in part for the depth of disagreement with and occasional misapprehension of Toulmin's
approach by his formal logician critics.
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According to Bennett, theories of communication are
roughly classifiable into three kinds of perspective:
linear, systems, and process. 122 These perspectives are
conceived as existing along a continuum defined first by
varying degrees of absolutism-relativism in the structures
and functions of a theory and, second, by varying degrees
of interaction assumed to exist among defined elements.
Theories marked by the highest degree of absolutism
in descriptions of structures and functions represent a
linear perspective.

The interaction assumed to exist among

the immutable elements in linear theories is a limited,
one-at-a-time, one-directional chain of events.

An example

of a communication theory which typifies the linear perspective is David Berle's "S-M-C-R" diagrammatic model of
the communication process. 12 3
Theories of communication which are less absolute in
their descriptions of structures and functions as well as
more complex in the interactivity of their elements represent a systems perspective.

The term "systems perspec-

tive" is derived from General System Theory, a body of
concepts presumed to be applicable to systems in any
124
field.
A systems perspective views the structures and
functions of a phenomena as relative, that is, as a product
of the interdependent relationships among elements.

In

other words, the assumption of bi-directional interaction
among elements and possible change in their relationships
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is viewed as potentially more meaningful than the independent description of the parts of the system.

The whole

effect of a system is considered greater than the sum of
its parts.

An example of a communication theory which

typifies the systems perspective and contrasts with Berle's
linear diagrammatic model is the model of the process of
communication rule acquisition developed by Watzlawick,
Beavin, and Jackson. 12 5 The openness of structures, relativity of functions, and complex interactions described in
theories based upon the assumptions of a systems perspective contrast with the static structures, causal functions,
and deterministic interactions discussed in theories based
upon assumptions of a linear perspective.
With this linear/systems meta-theoretical context as
a frame of reference, we can return to the previously noted
differences between the two approaches to logical argument
under consideration here.

Our contention is that formal

logicians are working with theoretical aims and assumptions
quite different from Toulmin's.

Therefore, the criticisms

to which his concepts have been subjected by formal logicians cannot be very surprising.

It may be a conflict

between a linear and systems perspective of the same phenomena.126

In addition to the generally negative and in

some cases caustic responses his approach has received from
formal logicians which have already been discussed, two
further examples should serve to illustrate this hypothesis.
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Differences Regarding Structure and Functions.

Struc-

tures and functions are interpreted and evaluated differently by formal logicians and Toulmin.

As linear theorists,

formal logicians view function as an aspect of structure.
For example, formal validity is a structural matter, determined by evaluating the relationships between terms in the
premises of a syllogism and terms in the conclusion.

If the

relationship of terms is found to meet criteria specifying
their number, distribution, quality, and existential import,
then the syllogism may be considered formally valid.

In a

formally valid syllogism, the truth-value of the conclusion
is considered a function of the structural relationship of
the elements of the verified premises.

Thus, for formal,

logicians the structure and functions of an argument can be
made no more candid than when stated as a formally valid
syllogism.
Toulmin contends that a logic focusing on structural
matters is misdirected.

He argues that with a mere "shuf-

fling of parts of the premises and rearranging them" the
formal validity of nearly any syllogistic conclusion can be
12
demonstrated.
7 Toulmin, adopting more of a systems perspective, is interested in the functions of propositions
within their fields of application.

To him, structure is a

separate, prerequisite consideration having to do with consistency in the use of language.

To determine the soundness

of arguments, Toulmin proposes a pattern for the layout of
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arguments for analysis which represents the functional
roles played by the elements of arguments.

Rather than

represent some universal structure in his model, he presents an organizational device to aid critics of arguments.
His model represents the functions of statements given in
arguments and their relative impact upon one another with
regards to the justifiability of a claim.

The justifica-

tion of argument is to the Toulmin model what formal validity is to the syllogism.
Manicas, among others, takes great pains to establish
that Toulmin is virtually without support among logicians
in his quest for the justification of arguments. 128

Formal

logicians are unconcerned with the justification of deductive conclusions.

In response to Toulmin's charge that the

"principle of the syllogism" is inadequate warrant to serve
as field-invariant justification for analytic syllogisms,
Manicas writes "of course it is; but whoever said that it
did that job?" 12 9 He continues:
No one so far as I can see considered these principles [of the syllogism] as functioning as warrants
in Toulmin's sense • • • • The principle was not
employed to justify moves from premises to conclusions, but rather was thought of as a generalization
of all s~llogistic argument. The ~brfect syllogism
(Barbara) needs no justification.l)
In others words, Toulmin's notion of the justificatory
functions of argument is to formal logicians an inadequate
substitute for structural standards of formal validity.
Thus, they seem unwilling to comprehend how an argument can
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be made any more candid than through syllogistic analysis.
While Toulmin emphasizes the relative functions of elements

of argument and their relationships to justification, formal validity can be precisely determined.
Differences Regarding Interactivity Among Elements.
In addition to differences over structures and functions, a
similar difference apparently arising from the contrasting
theoretical perspectives involves the degree of interactivity assumed to exist among the elements of argument.
Formal logicians, consistent with a linear perspective,
presume that propositions function in a linear causal way.
The structure and function of terms within propositions
are predetermined by the rules of grammar which are not
considered a province of logic.

However, when premises are

placed in syllogistic combination with each other, they may
"cause" a conclusion.

A conclusion is conceived by formal

logicians as the outcome or result of the major and minor
premise.

For instance, if one knows that all men are

mortal and that Socrates is a man, then one must arrive at
the conclusion that Socrates is mortal.

This one-

directional, additive relation which "causes" a conclusion
is the basis for formal validity.

It is also one reason

why inductive arguments are taken by formal logicians to
be formally invalid; true conclusions can be derived only
from true universals and not the other way around.

Thus,

the assumption of absolute, linear-causal interaction
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among elements reduces the concerns of formal logicians to
matters of structure.

The functions of elements are pre-

determined by rules of grammar and by this linear-causal
assumption.
In contrast to formal logicians, Toulmin pays little
attention to structural matters which he considers prerequisite details having to do with the internal consistency and comprehensibility of linguistic expressions used
in argument.

Instead, he focuses on the functions of the

parts of an argument in context to determine the justif iability of a claim.

While all the elements of an argument

are defined by Toulmin in terms of some claim, the relationships among them are presumed to be more complex than
linear.
mutually:

Elements are conceived as affecting each other
warrant affecting what may be taken as data;

backing affecting warrant as well as potential rebuttals;
and all affecting the qualifier.

This amounts to a bi-

directional interactivity, a feature consistent with a
systems perspective.
In summary, a number of criticisms formal logicians
make of the Toulmin approach appear to be due to their
different theoretical assumptions.

The linear perspective

of formal logicians assumes an absolute structure, causal
functioning, and prescriptive-evaluative aims.

The

systems perspective of Toulmin assumes structural relativity, bi-directional interaction among functionally-defined
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elements and descriptive-comparative aims.

Fundamental

disagreements about the nature of argument and the goals of
the critic of argument are likely to be unresolvable unless
the theoretical perspectives and the assumptions they imply
can be reconciled.

SUMMARY
In this chapter criticisms made of the Toulmin approach
have been examined and their consequences for speech communication evaluated.

In addition, a hypothetical explanation

has been explored which attributes to a fundamental divergence of theoretical perspectives the negative responses of
formal logicians to Toulmin's approach.
Four general criticisms of the Toulmin approach have
been identified:

that it is unoriginal, grounded in obso-

lete ideas, unrepresentative of an innovation in logic, and
unnecessarily broad in its implications for logic.

These

charges have been found to be not particularly salient to
the question of the potential applicability of the approach
to the area of speech communication.
Less easily dismissed for their implications than
general criticisms of the Toulmin approach are criticisms
specific to the Toulmin model.

Formal logicians have

charged that (1) several elements of the model, including
warrant, backing, data, and rebuttal, are indistinguishable
from each other; (2) backing cannot provide justification
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for arguments;

(3) the concept of data as discussed by

Toulmin is questionable; and (4) warrant-establishing argu-

ments are not clearly explained.

With regard to (1), (3),

and (4) it has been found that in several cases Toulmin's
style of definition and illustration lend themselves to
ambiguous interpretations, although not so much as the
critics have charged.

It is concluded that, while there

may be a need for clarification of some points, this does
not argue for a rejection of the model as critics have
contended.

Instead, it is noted that the model appears to

have several promising features, among them qualification
of claim, specification of rebuttal and explication of
backing for justification, which may be attractive to
speech communication professionals.

Issues regarding the

nature of data and warrant-establishing arguments are
identified as areas where further research may prove useful.
The remaining criticism, (2), is considered of interest
only as partial evidence for the hypothesis developed in
the final section of the chapter.
To explain the negative response of formal logicians,
the following hypothesis has been suggested:

formal logi-

cians and Toulmin draw their assumptions and aims from
divergent theoretical perspectives.

Two perspectives are

discussed, the linear perspective associated with formal
logic and the systems perspective associated with Toulmin's
approach to argument.

Linear theories tend to attribute
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all significant qualities of a phenomenon to independently
defined elements which, when added together in a linear
sequence, create particular effects.

Such a perspective

is represented by these features of formal logic:

ideal

aims; absolute assumptions; and an emphasis of geometric
structure and field-invariant aspects of argument for the
purpose of determining formal validity.

In contrast,

systems theories tend to view elements and relationships
among elements as significant factors and posit synergistic
outcomes from certain changes in relationships.

Further,

such changes or interactions are presumed to be complex
rather than one-directional.

Such a perspective is repre-

sented by these features of Toulmin's approach:

practical

aims, relative assumptions, and emphasis of jurisprudential
functions and field-dependent aspects of argument for the
purpose of describing justification procedures.

Both formal

logicians and Toulmin may be unduly harsh in their negative
assessments of each other's approaches due to this apparent
paradigmatic conflict.
The critical issues and divergent theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter are referred to in the analysis of speech communication textbook presentations of the
Toulmin approach in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER IV
TEXTBOOK REPRESENTATIONS OF THE TOUL1'1IN
APPROACH:

INTERPRETATIONS OF SPEECH

COMMUNICATION PROFESSIONALS
That the Toulmin model has had an impact upon speech
communication is undeniable; what kind of impact this has
been is the subject of this and the next chapter.

In addi-

tion, the impact of speech communication upon the Toulmin
approach is evaluated and areas of potential development
suggested.

In light of criticisms and questions about

Toulmin's approach discussed in chapter III, what interests
us here are these questions:

which of the innovations of

Toulmin's theoretical approach are maintained by textbook
writers and which have been ignored?; how have the Toulmin
diagrammatic model, terminology, and definitions been
represented, altered, or extended in textbook discussions
and illustrative examples?; to what extent is the Toulmin
model presented in textbooks in isolation of or in conjunction with discussions of the syllogism?

The answers

to these questions are based on selected speech communication textbooks which have helped to disseminate the Toulmin
model.

In this chapter, textbook representations of the
Toulmin approach are examined, compared, and evaluated in
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five areas:

(1) theoretical basis of the Toulmin approach,

(2) the Toulmin diagrammatic model, (3) terminology and
definitions of the model, (4) illustrative examples of the
model, and (5) treatment of the syllogism in conjunction
with the Toulmin model.

As shall be seen, the theoretical

bases discussed in textbooks relate most directly to those
general criticisms of the Toulmin approach discussed in
chapter III while the representations of the diagrammatic
model, terminology, and definitions in textbook discussions
and illustrative examples relate to specific criticisms of
the Toulmin model.

Further, the diversity of interpreta-

tions of the Toulmin approach presented in textbooks may
be an effect of the various theoretical perspectives held
by speech communication professionals.
THEORETICAL BASES OF THE TOULMIN APPROACH
AS REFLECTED IN SPEECH COMMUNICATION
TEXTBOOKS

In addition to introducing a model of argument more
complex than the syllogism, The Uses of Argument is controversial for the view of argument it defends, identified in
this study as approximating a systems perspective.

The

theory involves field-dependent sources of soundness, substantive argumentative claims based in relative probabilities rather than absolute certainties, and a rejection of
idealized static notions of truth in favor of practical
evolving concepts.

To what extent are these innovative
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features of his theoretical approach to logic reflected in
speech communication textbooks?

If speech communication

treatments of the model are meant to preserve the major
innovations of his theory, they should reflect in some
explicit manner the features of these innovations.

In

other words, we should expect to find in textbook discussions of the model some reference to (1) the field-dependent
sources of soundness in argument, (2) the probable nature
of substantive claims, and (3) the relative, time-bound
changeability of substantive arguments.

The explicit

absence of these features or the implicit contradiction of
them would indicate that the model as applied by speech
communication professionals is something quite distinct
from that suggested by Toulmin.
Field-Dependent Sources
of Soundness
As we have seen, according to Toulmin the justifiability of a claim depends not upon universal standards of
truth but upon criteria that are derived from fields or
contexts of argument.

In this sense, the logical assess-

ment of an argument may only be performed by a person
knowledgeable in a field, an expert in the subject matter
of the argument. 1 Field-dependent aspects of argument are
central to the design and purpose of his model.

Yet, with

one exception, none of the twelve textbooks on oral communication examined in this study so much as mentions the
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distinction between field-dependence and field-invariance
or its significance for evaluating the soundness of argu-

ment. 2

Some textbooks appear to substitute audience anal-

ysis procedures for a consideration of field-dependent
standards.3

The authors of these textbooks on oral com-

munication do not appear to believe as Toulmin does that
familiarity with the concept of field-dependence is essential for the useful application of the Toulmin model.
It can be said that textbooks on argumentation and
debate are the only ones surveyed that do not ignore the
role of field-dependent sources of soundness in argument.

4

Windes and Hastings imply the notion of field-dependence
in their discussion of evidence.5

The second edition of

Decision by Debate includes a brief discussion of fields
of argument and extends the concept to include interpersonal and situational factors. 6 In other words, in
addition to the ideational dimensions of fields discussed
by Toulmin, Ehninger and Brockriede include a_s part of a
field the setting of an argument, communication channels
used, and personalities and emotional states of the
arguers.

Rieke and Sillars have integrated the concept

of field-dependence into their discussion of the Toulmin
model and data while devoting whole chapters to argument
within various fields.7

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik in

their textbook on reasoning go even further, making the
differences among fields the central theme of their
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textbook. 8

Some other argumentation textbooks do not dis-

cuss fields at all, notably the first edition of Decision

by Debate, both editions of Mills' Reason in Controversy,
Bettinghaus in Perspectives on Argument (Miller and Nilsen
eds.), and Freeley's Argumentation and Debate.9
Does the apparent disregard for Toulmin's fielddependence by some authors signify a rejection of that
aspect of his approach to argument?

Not necessarily.

It

may be'that what speech communication writers have done is
to reinterpret the concept to fit their interests and
desire for a model of argument which elucidates the rhetorical functioning of arguments.

Bradley, for example,

characterizes the Toulmin model as a "rhetorical-logical
model. 1110

While it has been noted that Toulmin's notion

of fields of argument may be thought of as a way of
speaking about different expert audiences consisting of
sets of listeners with authority to judge claims within
special fields, some writers appear to conclude that the
notion may as well be applied to general audiences.

For

example, Bettinghaus contends:
Toulmin claims that the elements he discusses are
those which are persuasive in argumentation • • • •
Arguments so constructed [via the Toulmin '~del]
will be generally acceptable to audiences.
Further, these authors emphasize that the ''appearance of
logic is important in persuasion, but the actual use of
logic is much less so. 1112 Scheidel makes similar comments
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in both of his textbooks. 1 3

Thus it appears that for many

speech communication writers who discuss the Toulmin model,

there is no practical distinction between a "field" and a
"popular audience."

It has even been suggested that "the

standards for judging the acceptability of data (evidence)
and the validity of arguments may vary from field to
field, or from person to person. 1114

Arnold states that the

model is useful in helping a critic determine the "rhetorical validity" of an argument which he defines as "a
critic's estimate of the psychological credibility of
'Argument A' as its 'judges'--the listeners--probably
viewed the matter. 111 5
If speech communication textbook writers have not
ignored field-dependence, they have more often than not
reinterpreted the concept to emphasize the rhetorical
dimensions of argument.

This shift in emphasis from a

linguistic-conceptual focus to a rhetorical or persuasive
focus, though not explicitly identified as such, represents
an extension of Toulmin's theory of argument. 16

A major

consequence of this development is the apparent expansion
of the general applicability of the Toulmin model.

Warrant

and backing, once thought to depend upon a field of argument, may instead be conceived as originating in members
of the audience in a manner analagous to the propositions
of an enthymeme.

Instead of evaluating claims according

to some criteria established within a field of thought, an
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argument would be evaluated with an eye to psychological
and sociological variables arising out of the particular
audience and situation.

In sum, the soundness of an argu-

ment becomes equivalent to its persuasive success, that is,
whether it gets the desired response from the targeted
listeners.

Such a situational view of argument is surely
1
far more relative than Toulmin ever intended to promote. 7
Whether it is more useful to abandon all pretensions of
objectivity in logical argument and focus instead on subjective variables as those who have tacitly denied or
expanded the field-notion have done is a matter deserving
of careful debate.
ensued.

Indeed, such a debate has apparently

Scholarly concern for how the terms "argument,"

"persuasion," and "logic" should be defined and distinguished is evident in recent publications. 18
Several writers use the Toulmin model to illustrate
general forms of argument which may be viewed as fieldinvariant although they are not discussed in such terms.
These treatments are discussed in chapter V as applications
of the Toulmin model to field-invariant forms.
Among those writers who discuss the field-dependent/
field-invariant distinction, there seems to be broad disagreement as to what the boundaries and features of fields
are or should be.

Rieke and Sillars believe that little

if any injustice is done to the field-notion by translating
it into an audience-centered view as is done implicitly by
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1
other writers previously discussed. 9

Ehninger and Brock-

riede in the second edition of Decision by Debate argue in

favor of an expanded view of fields to include ''the ideat ional, the situational, and the interpersonal.

1120

Toul-

min, Rieke, and Janik defend a more limited view of fields
or, as they call them, "forums" of argument:
Just because the kinds of issues raised in each
forum are of such different sorts, the procedural
organization of the resulting discussions is correspondingly different, and the manner in which
claims and arguments have to be presented and
defended also differs. These variations from forum
to forum are not a mark of rhetorical subtlety or
dishonesty but a direct consequence of the functional
differences between the needs of the enterprises concerned, for example, law or science, business or
medicine.21 [Emphasis added.]
They go on to say that arguments from different forums
cannot be compared except in the broadest way. 22

The

point is that little agreement exists as to what fields of
argument may be even among those authors who feel the concept is important enough to merit explicit discussion.
The issue of field-dependent sources of soundness
in arguments is apparently far from resolved among speech
communication professionals.

Many have ignored the notion

of field-dependence, apparently finding that it is not
crucial for an understanding of argument.

This position

is not unlike that of formal logicians and may be an
indication of the degree to which their linear perspectives
and attendant assumptions and aims are shared by speech
communication textbook writers.

Other writers have
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implicitly redefined the field notion to redirect the focus
of the Toulmin model to the rhetorical dimensions of argu-

ment and so raising important definitional if not epistemological questions.

Some have proposed expansions of the

field-notion which are as yet untested.

One might conclude,

then, that Toulmin's notion of field-dependence has not
been an important or influential factor in the impact of
his approach on the area of speech communication.
The Probable Nature of
Substantive Claims
Probability is another innovative feature of the
Toulmin approach to argument. 2 3 It involves the notion
that most practical arguments are substantial, involving
claims which entail relative degrees of probability rather
than the absolute certainty implied by syllogistically
demonstrable conclusions.

As with the concept of field-

dependence, the notion of probability in arguments has
received little emphasis in textbooks on oral communication
while receiving greater emphasis in textbooks on argumentation and debate.
Only one of the twelve oral communication textbooks
surveyed makes prominant mention of the probable nature of
most argumentative conclusions as discussed by Toulmin. 24
Most of these authors explicitly introduce the element of
the Toulmin model most closely associated with the notion
of probability, the qualifier.

However, Mccroskey, Terris,
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Verdeber, and, in their first edition, Wilson and Arnold
omit the qualifier from their diagrammatic models and one
must infer from the examples offered whether or not these
authors believe that probable or qualified claims can be
the result of a sound argument. 2 5
It is uncertain whether the obscuring or omission of
probability from explanations of argument in textbooks on
oral communication reflects a genuine disagreement with the
concept or merely an attempt by authors to avoid explanatory complications.

Either way, an explanation of argument

which fails to introduce a student to the concept of probability and ignores the element of qualifier would appear
to be little different in this respect from a syllogistic
approach and consequently may serve as tacit confirmation
of the linear theoretical assumptions of formal logic.

On

the other hand, textbooks on oral communication which
introduce the element of qualification as part of their
diagrammatic models clearly imply the probable nature of
substantive arguments.

While Toulmin's notion of proba-

bility in argument differs in some respects from notions
of probability traditionally associated with the enthymemes of rhetorical arguments, these differences are perhaps too technical to merit specific discussion in textbooks on oral communication.

In other words, a treatment

of the role played by qualifiers in arguments may well be

160
all that is needed by way of explanation of Toulmin's
notion of probability in substantive arguments.

Textbooks on argumentation and debate surveyed have
been found in general to provide greater emphasis to the
notion of probability than textbooks on oral communication.
Bettinghaus, in Miller and Nilsen, refers to the Toulmin
model as a "probability model." 26

Even Windes and Hastings,

who do not introduce the qualifier element in their treatment of the Toulmin model, discuss probability. 2 7

Freeley

does not discuss probability but introduces a qualifier. 28
It may be argued that argumentation textbooks provide
greater attention to probability as well as other specifics
of the Toulmin approach than do oral communication textbooks
because the focus of their subject is narrower and, therefore, more attention can be afforded such matters.

Even

so, what is notable here is not the differences in the
extent to which probability is treated in different classes
of speech communication textbooks, but that in some texts
it does not appear at all.

Toulmin devotes large portions

of The Uses of Argument to the establishment of a unique
view of the role of probability in arguments.

From the

number of pages he devotes to each, one might presume that
Toulmin is more concerned with his special view of probability than he is with the layout of arguments which has
received so much more attention in speech communication
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textbooks. 2 9

Of course, both concepts are innovative fea-

tures of his approach to argument.
Yet, as we have seen, speech communication writers
generally grant little emphasis to the notion of probability,
some choosing to omit it altogether.

One possible explana-

tion for this may be that, to students of rhetorical theory,
the introduction of probability into the logic of argument
does not seem innovative.

To the contrary, it may be this

feature which is most familiar and attractive to speech
communication professionals.30

As mentioned before, Aris-

totle introduced the notion of argument from probabilities
in the Rhetoric in the form of enthymemes.3 1

Like the

enthymeme, the Roman epicheireme involves argument from
probabilities, as discussed in chapter II.

Some writers

have commented upon similarities between the Toulmin model
and these traditional forms of rhetorical syllogism.

For

example, Scheidel half apologizes for the resemblance of
the Toulmin model to the epicheireme, while McCroskey
appears to feel that it is too much like the syllogism of
formal logic and therefore suggests revisions to make the
model more enthymematic.3 2

So the role of probability in

argument suggested by Toulmin may seem a less noteworthy
feature to those with a background in rhetorical theory
than it does to formal logicians to whom he has addressed
his theory.

In other words, while it may be a crucial

feature of the Toulmin approach, some rhetorically-oriented

162

writers appear to believe that probability is a commonplace
that does not merit special explanation in speech communi-

cation textbooks.
Relativistic Assumptions
About the Nature of
Argument
In addition to field-dependence and probability,
another theoretical base of the Toulmin approach involves
its relativistic assumption.

In contrast to the universal,

timeless absolute conclusions of formal logic, the soundness of a claim is assumed by Toulmin to be relative over
time to the available data and historical developments
within a field.

In addition, the elements of the structure

of an argument are defined by him according to how each
functions in relation to a particular claim.

Finally, as

previously discussed, claims are assessed according to their
relative probabilities.

Relativism, as opposed to absolu-

tism, is fundamental to Toulmin's conception of argument.
Other than the relativism implied by field-dependence and
probability, matters already discussed, the relative
nature of the Toulmin approach is for the most part not
reflected in speech communication textbooks.
Of the twelve oral communication textbooks surveyed,
only one, Speech Communication in Human Interaction by
Scheidel, dwells at any length on the "flexibility" of the
Toulmin model in contrast to the Aristotilian model, the
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syllogism.33

Scheidel points out that logic itself is an

example of a growing, changing field in which the Toulmin

model represents but one--and not the final--modification.
Other textbooks surveyed focus on individual arguments
which may be presented within a speech and do not comment
on the relativity of arguments over time or across cultural
boundaries.
Textbooks on argumentation more frequently discuss
the relativistic nature of argument than do oral communication textbooks.

It would appear that Brockriede and

Ehninger, in emphasizing the "dynamic" relationship of
data, warrant, and claim, mean to draw attention to the
relativistic nature of argument as found in Toulmin.3 4 In
the second edition of Decision by Debate, these same authors
present a detailed discussion of "argument as a corrective
method'' emphasizing the tentative nature of all claims.35
The tentative nature of claims as opposed to the static conception of syllogistic conclusions in formal logic is discussed in several contexts by Rieke and Sillars.3 6 Toulmin,
Rieke, and Janik are perhaps the most emphatic about the
importance of relativity in arguments.

Pointing out that

standards of judgment will "inevitably vary in time or
differ according to context and circumstances of judgment,"
these authors discuss the problems of criticizing argument
in light of their "historical variability."37

Other

authors imply or obliquely refer to the static and inflexible
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nature of the syllogism as compared to the Toulmin model,
but their discussions leave in doubt the degree to which

relativity plays a role in argument. 38

Both Mills and

Freeley appear to ignore the relativistic implications of
the Toulmin approach.39
At least one textbook uses the Toulmin model primarily because of its relativistic assumptions.

Condon

and Yousif, in An Introduction to Intercultural Communication select the Toulmin approach to help illustrate cul40
tural variety in argumentation.
Writers of oral communication textbooks, perhaps
because their focus is on the role of an argument in one
particular audience setting, fail to discuss the relativism of claims over time.

In essence, the static nature of

the syllogism is not necessarily a problem for those concerned with argument in speech design.

However, some

writers of argumentation textbooks seem to exhibit more
concern for relativism in argument than writers of oral
communication textbooks.

They recognize that one of the

advantages of the Toulmin approach is its emphasis of the
tentative or controversial nature of claims established in
arguments and how the introduction of new evidence may
affect the evaluation of them.

It may be significant that

the authors who do not mention Toulmin's relativistic
assumptions emphasize that the formal validity of an argument cannot be demonstrated with his model.

They each
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present the syllogism to assist the critic in this regard.

Thus, it may be that we are observing a split between speech
communication writers who favor the systems theoretical
perspective of argument which appears to be reflected in
Toulmin's approach and those who adhere to the more linear
theoretical perspective of formal logicians.

THE TOUL1'1IN DIAGRA1'IT1ATIC MODEL AS REPRESENTED
IN SPEECH COMMUNICATION TEXTBOOKS
The Toulmin model and variations of it are widely published and quite familiar within speech communication.
First introduced in the third essay of The Uses of Argument,
"The Layout of Arguments," the Toulmin diagrammatic model
has since been borrowed, interpreted, truncated, extended,
.
db y various
.
. speec h communica
. t•ion. 42
an d re d esigne
wri•t ers in
The nature of these various visual representations is our
concern here, especially with regard to the effect which
each diagrammatic alteration may have on the potential
applicability and comprehensibility of the Toulmin model.
Of the twenty-seven editions of speech communication
textbooks examined, only two were found to include both a
diagram and terminology matching Toulmin's in The Uses of
Argument. 4 3 All other textbooks exhibit diagrammatic
models which vary from Toulmin's layout in their visual
relationships, identified elements, or terminology.

Of

these texts, fourteen present a standard diagram consisting
of six elements and the same visual relationship between
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warrant, data, and claim as represented by Toulmin.

44

Seven other textbooks present truncated diagrams in which

the layouts are simplified through the omission of one or
more elements, while three present extended diagrams in
which the layout is expanded to include new elements or
relationship among elements. 4 5 Three textbooks included
diagrams which are both truncated and extended versions of
the Toulmin layout. 46 Variations in terminology are discussed later in this chapter.
Standard Diagrams
The diagrammatic model presented by Toulmin consists
of six elements representing the functions of sentences
used in arguments and the relationships of these functionally-defined elements are illustrated with a horizontal
arrow between data and claim and some vertical lines
extending downward from warrant to backing and qualifier
to rebuttal.

This model is illustrated in Figure 3 in

chapter II, p. 41.

To be considered a standard diagram a

model must at least include all six functionally-defined
elements of the Toulmin layout and preserve the same visual
relationship among the data, warrant, and claim.
With regard to the standard diagrams represented in
textbooks, three kinds of alterations are noted:
directional, and configural.

lineal,

Lineal relationships are

those illustrated by lines which connect the elements.
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Directional relationships are those illustrated with arrowheads on the lines between elements.

Configural relation-

ships have to do with the overall pattern of visual display
of the elements.
The most common deviation from Toulmin's layout is
the lineal relation of warrant and rebuttal.

This first

appeared in the article by Brockriede and Ehninger in
Quarterly Journal of Speech and was subsequently repeated
with different terminology in their first edition of
Decision by Debate. 4 7 See Figure 8.

(D)ata

r-------

Since

CW)

The ref ore
(Q)uf lifier

------>

(C)laim

Unless
(R)ebuttal

Because
(B)acking
Figure 8. The Toulmin model according to Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960.
Other authors, for example Bryant and Wallace, Minnick,
Bettinghaus in Miller and Nilsen, Freeley, and Hastings in
Mills' first edition of Reason in Controversy, have also
drawn a line connecting warrant and rebuttal or reservation
in their diagrammatic models. 48 Like Brockriede and
Ehninger's diagrammatic model in Figure 8, most of these
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diagrams connect R to both W and

Q or C, creating kind of a

"square of proof."

Among the textbooks examined, Basting's
4
diagram is alone in connecting R only to
9 In his

w.

second edition, Mills omits the line between W and R
entirely, returning to a more standard representation of
the Toulmin layout.50
Minnick not only connects W to R but inexplicably
introduces a line connecting support for warrant to conclusion.

Further, he alters the line connecting W to the

arrow between evidence and conclusion so that it begins at
the line between W and R and snakes its way directly to
the conclusion.

These alterations are illustrated in

Figure 9.5 1

Evidence:

-------------------------------->

Warrant:

I
--->

Conclusion:

r

Reservations:
l\

i

Support:
Figure 9.
Minnick.

The Toulmin model according to

Minnick's modifications of the standard diagram appear to
add nothing in the way of clarification of the relationships among elements.

It is possible that Minnick intended

this diagram to apply only in the case of the particular
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argument he illustrates with it; however this is uncertain
because Minnick offers no explanation or alternative dia-

gram.
The significance of lineal linkages of W to R is not
altogether clear.

However, it is evident from the novel

configuration introduced by Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik that
they consider such a link inessential if not a distortion
of the role of rebuttals in arguments.

Their diagram,

representing the only modification of configural relationship proposed in textbooks presenting standard diagrams of
the Toulmin model, maintains Toulmin's original lineal
relationships while making visually inappropriate any conception of a link between W and R.

According to these

authors, "given grounds, G, we may appeal to warrant, W
(which rests on backing, B), to justify the claim that C-or, at any rate, the presumption (M) that C--in the absence
of some specific rebuttal or disqualification (R)."5 2
This diagrammatic model which precludes the configural
relationship of W and R appears in Figure 10.
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B

The accumulated experience of meteorI ologists in the North Temperate Zone
indicates that

W

I front is normally followed after a few

In these latitudes, passage of a cold
hours by clearing, cooler weather.

c
This evening the wind has
veered around from SW
toward NW; the rain has
nearly stopped; there are t-->So,
local breaks in the
clouds--all signs indicating the passage of a cold
front.

f1

chances
are,
A

It will
be
clearing
and
cooler
by the
morning.

G

Unless some unusually
complex frontal system
is involved.
R

"G" represents "grounds"
or data.

Figure 10. An illustration of an argument analyzed in terms of the Toulmin model according to
Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik.
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Unlike other writers, Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik claim that
rebuttal is only used in conjunction with a particular

modal qualifier.53

Those writers linking W and R offer

more general recommendations for its use.5

4

Thus it

appears that the presence, absence, or difference of linear
connectedness of rebuttals to other elements of the Toulmin
model may be related to differences in definition and suggested use of these elements.

Variations of definitions

and terminology are discussed later in this chapter.
Directional relationship, illustrated with arrowheads
on lines between elements in diagrammatic models, are frequently presented in variations of standard diagrams.

It

will be recalled that only one such directional relation is
illustrated in Toulmin's original layout, the arrow representing the movement from data to claim.

Apparently Toulmin

intended the arrow to represent the function of the warrant
itself .55

The significance of arrows indicating directional

relationships is that each may imply a supportive, causal,
or temporal interaction between elements.

Toulmin uses the

arrow to indicate that a claim depends upon data for
foundation or support, and that the warrant functions as an
incidental explanation of the justification for the movement
from data to claim.

As he states:

We may symbolize the relation between the data and
the claim in support of which they are produced by
an arrow, and indicate the authority for taking
the step from one to the other by writing the warrant immediately below the arrow • • • • As this
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pattern makes clear, the explicit appeal in this
argument goes directly back from the claim to the
data relied on as foundation.56

Thus, his arrow is not intended to imply that one reasons
in only one direction, namely from the data with which one
begins to a claim at which one arrives.

Rather, the arrow

symbolizes the interactive relationship between data and
claim regardless of the direction or sequence of one's
inferential process.57
What speech communication writers intend by the
arrows many of them have added to lines in their diagrammatic models is not clear.

To Toulmin's single directional

relation, Bettinghaus in Miller and Nilsen adds an arrow
on the vertical line connecting R to Q as is shown in
Figure 11.5 8 Such an arrow also appears in Freeley's diagrammatic model, parallel to a downward arrow which has
been made of the vertical line connecting W to the arrow
between D and C as shown in Figure 12.59

By this downward

arrow, Freeley may mean to illustrate that one moves from
data to claim on one level and from data through warrant
and rebuttal to claim on a deeper level.

Blankenship shows

a similar loop made more explicit by an additional arrow
from W to R. 60 Interpreted as a visual representation of
the deepening levels of argument to which challenges to a
claim and warrant will take an argument, these downward
arrows appear to be roughly consistent with Toulmin's
explanation of the progressive phases of argument. 61
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Figure 11. The Toulmin model according to Bettinghaus in Miller and Nilsen.
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Figure 12.
Freeley.

The Toulmin model according to
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Bradley curiously places arrowheads on each of the
lines in his diagrammatic model, most of them pointing away

from the directional line from evidence to claim as shown
in Figure 13. 62

What one is to make of Bradley's arrows is

difficult to guess.

Perhaps he means to illustrate that an

examination of the relationship of evidence and claim leads
one deeper into the argument, to warrant, reservation and,
eventually, backing for warrant.

Thus, his downward arrows

may mean something similar to the downward arrows of Bettinghaus and Freeley already discussed.

However, like Min-

nick who also places arrows on each of the lines in his
diagrammatic model as illustrated in Figure 9, Bradley
fails to explain the meaning of his arrows.

It is possible

that the arrows have no particular meaning for Bradley or
Minnick.
Evidence:

~----------~>

Qualifier:

Claim:

'\/

'\/

Warrant:

Reservation:

!

Backing for Warrant:
Figure 13.
Bradley.

The Toulmin model according to

In short, the directional relationships indicated by
arrows which have been added to Toulmin's layout by some
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speech communication writers are subject to interpretation.
The significance of these alterations may be that they do
not agree, are not explained, and therefore, contribute
little more than an increased potential for misunderstanding.

Linear, directional, and configural modifica-

tions which are presented in several standard diagrams also
are found in truncated and extended variations of the Toulmin model.

Truncated diagrams of the Toulmin model pre-

sented in speech communication textbooks are discussed next.
Truncated Diagrams
Truncated models are those which omit one or more
elements of the standard diagram of the Toulmin model.
None of the three basic elements of the Toulmin layout-claim, data, and warrant--are omitted by any author of the
surveyed speech communication textbooks.

Backing, rebuttal,

and qualifier are by individual authors selectively omitted.
Indeed, in two textbooks a Toulmin diagram is presented
which omits all three of these secondary elements, giving
the model the appearance of ''a syllogism lying on its
side. 116 3

One author, Gary Cronkhite, who presents a dia-

gram which is both truncated and extended, borrows only the
three basic elements of the model on which to build his
64
.
ex t ension.
None of these authors discusses the syllogism; their truncated Toulmin diagrams are presented in
isolation.
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Other truncated models come in various combinations.
Wilson and Arnold in their first edition and, more recently,
Ehrlinger have included backing or support for warrant while
omitting qualifier and rebuttal. 6 5 Terris relies on rebuttal while omitting qualifier and backing. 66

Similarly

Mccroskey, who both truncates and extends the Toulmin model
in his diagram, omits backing and qualifier. 6 7 Another
extended and truncated version of the Toulmin model, this
one introduced by Condon and Yousif, omits both backing and
68
.
reserva t ion.

Wilson and Arnold in their fourth edition,

Ehninger and Brockriede in their second edition, and Blankenship each exclude only the backing from their diagrammatic models. 6 9 So, among speech communication textbook
writers who have in one way or another simplified the standard diagram of the Toulmin model for their presentations,
which elements are thought to be most essential appears to
be a matter of contention.
It is interesting to note the changes over time in
the diagrammatic models presented by Wilson and Arnold,
and Ehninger and Brockriede.

Wilson and Arnold, who have

in some way modified their presentation of the Toulmin
model with every new edition of their textbook, have gradually added elements originally excluded and finally eliminated backing which is one of the four elements with which
they began.7°

No explanation for these modifications is

provided in their textbooks.

Ehninger and Brockriede have
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introduced some directional arrows to their diagram which
perhaps indicates a changing emphasis in their thinking, as

a comparison of their original diagram in Figure 8 to their
more recent diagram in Figure 14 shows.7 1

Figure 14. The Toulmin model according to Ehninger
and Brockriede, 1978.
The roles played by reservations and qualifiers seem visually
more central in this newer conception of Ehninger and Brockriede' s diagram of the Toulmin model.

However, this diagram

seems more complex than others examined thus far; even a
close reading of their text fails to make clear how the
evidence-qualifiers relationship is affected by the warrantreservations relationship or how warrant affects reservations.

Ehninger and Brockriede imply that support for the

warrant has been ruled out for the same reason that evidence
requires no element of support:

namely, both evidence and

warrant are subject to support through separate units of
proof.7 2

In other words, separate arguments are needed to

support evidence and warrant just as separate arguments are
required to establish the truth of the major and minor
premise of a syllogism.

Why the connection between warrant
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and reservations, an innovation apparently attributable to
these authors, has been given greater emphasis is uncertain.
The advantages of truncated models may be their simplicity, the ease with which they can be presented briefly
in a text and, presumably, comprehended by a learner.

In

addition, such models focus attention on elements and
relationships of greatest interest to the individual textbook authors.

For instance, because of the constraints of

academic debate such as time limits and audience bias,
authors of textbooks on debate may not be especially concerned with teaching students how to perform a fully developed analysis of an argument.73

In other words, a truncated

model may be viewed by some textbook authors as of more
immediate pedagogical value than a standard diagram of the
Toulmin model.
Extended Diagrams
The standard Toulmin diagrammatic model has not only
been truncated in a variety of ways; it has also been
extended, by having new elements or relationships added to
it.

Such extended diagrams are offered by speech communi-

cation textbook writers apparently as improvements intended
to increase the applicability of the model in general and
in particular to certain common forms of argument to be
discussed in chapter V.
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Those who propose extensions appear to be especially
aware that arguments, as they occur in discursive forms,
are seldom as simple or neat as Toulmin diagrams.

Some

elements, warrants for instance, may not be explicitly
stated while an abundance of other items may be included in
discourse which are the elements of separate arguments or
not aspects of argument at all.

The point is, in order to

deal with the natural complexity of argumentative discourse, several writers have suggested more complex structures and extensions of the Toulmin model.

Not coinciden-

tally, the three most common proposals for extensions of
the standard diagram--regarding the inclusion of multiple
data, chains of reasoning, or support for the data--are
directly related to issues raised by Toulmin's critics
about potentiallimitations or defects of the Toulmin layout
as discussed in chapter III.
As has been discussed, Toulmin's explanation of data
in The Uses of Argument leaves room for doubt as to whether
he intends an analysis of an argument to include multiple
items of data as the word implies or only a single item
as many have interpreted him to mean.

Regardless of what

Toulmin's initial intentions may have been, it is in connection with the element of data that most extensions have
been proposed.

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, for _ example,

clearly imply in their diagrams and illustrations that
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multiple data items are permissible in conjunction with an
4
individual claim and warrant.7
However, they do not

amplify on the mechanics of this feature; thus, it is difficult to determine what difference this modification makes
to the process of analysis.

Bettinghaus and Book et al.

both present diagrams illustrating the use of multiple data
items in various forms of argument.75

For example, both

textbooks present extended diagrams which graphically
illustrate the role of multiple data in a single argument,
as shown in Figure 15.7 6

While these diagrams represent

patterns of presentation, arguments as they may appear in
discourse, they presume that in some cases a single warranted claim may require several items of data to be valid.
In addition to the deductive and probabilistic patterns,
Bettinghaus presents two other "general patterns of proof,"
termed "functional" and "genetic."77

Even more complex

than the patterns illustrated in Figure 15, these patterns
resemble some of the general forms of argument discussed
in chapter V.
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I

Claim
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and
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Figure 15. Two extended diagrams of the Toulmin
model appearing in Bettinghaus and Book et al.
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Another extension apparently related to the application of the Toulmin model to arguments in discourse or
macro-arguments is the diagramming of chains of reasoning.
Many authors follow Toulmin's suggestion that if data are
challenged, a preliminary argument must be presented to
establish the reliability of the data.

Some have presented

diagrammatic models which illustrate various ways in which
arguments may be chained together to support a conclusion. 78

Ehninger and Brockriede identify two patterns

according to which individual units of proof may be combined
to build a case or macro-argument.79

Likening arguments to

electrical circuits, the two structures are termed "series
and parallel circuits" by Ehninger and Brockriede and are
diagrammed as shown in Figure 16. 80 By comparison to a
standard diagram of the Toulmin model, these extended diagrams representing chains of reasoning look very complex as
is shown by the illustration of a "chain argument" presented
by Book et al. which appears in Figure 17.

The complexity

results from the number of related claims, sets of data, and
warrants which are involved in the diagramming of a lengthy
argument.

It would appear that the candidness which analy-

sis with the Toulmin model is meant to provide a critic
might be lost in some of these complex diagrams of chains
of reasoning. 81
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Figure 16. Extension of the Toulmin diagrammatic
model to chains of reasoning according to Erulinger
and Brockriede, 1963.
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Figure 17. An illustration of a chain argument analyzed in
terms of an extended Toulmin diagram according to Book et al.

Warrant 1

Anyone born in the
U.S. is a U.S.
citizen.

Mike was born
in Chicago.

Datum 1

3

Mike is
18 years
old.

Datum

Mike is
a male.

Datum 4

~

+::-

CX>

185
A different approach to the problem of specifying the
reliability of statements given as data in argumentative

discourse is suggested by Rieke and Sillars.

In their dia-

grammatic model they include a seventh element, related to
data in a manner which parallels the relationship of
backing to warrant, which serves to specify support for the
data. 82

The new element is termed "support for data" while

the element of data is termed "assertion of data."

In all

other respects, their model resembles a standard Toulmin
diagram.

Condon and Yousif introduce a similar element

related to data but for a different purpose:

to separate

raw data, as in statements of fact based upon direct observation, from what they term "evidence," as in statements of
interpretation of selected data.

This distinction is intro-

duced to draw attention to the cultural relativity of what
is taken as evidence for assertions by comparison to phenomenal reality which is assumed to be more universal. 8 3
Others have proposed that an element representing support
for data be introduced into the Toulmin diagram. 84

Thus,

the introduction of a seventh element of argument, linked
to data and serving a function which parallels that of
backing for the warrant, has emerged independently from
several sources and deserves further examination.
In addition to diagrammatic models which are extended
to accommodate modifications in the concept of data, there
are two other extensions which deserve mention here.
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First, there is McCroskey's "model of the enthymeme which
employs terms set forth by Toulmin as labels for its

parts." 8 5 This model is unique in that its configural layout is entirely different from a standard Toulmin diagram,
implying very different relations among elements than conceived by Toulmin.

Also, its fourth element, reservations,

may be appended to any and all of the three basic elements,
claim, warrant, and data, as shown in Figure 18.

McCros-

key' s diagram is simpler than the standard Toulmin diagram,
having fewer parts and implying no directional relationships.

In addition, the reservation is intended to repre-

sent a general modifier or screen which may serve to invalidate any of the three legs of an argument.

T

Reservation

Datum

~

Warrant

Reservation

/

Datum

Reservation

~

Warrant

Figure 18. Two versions of the extended Toulmin
diagram proposed by Mccroskey as a model of the
enthymeme.
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While Mccroskey entitles his discussion of this model
"A Psychological Model of Argument," there are as many ref-

erences to classical distinctions and Aristotle as there
are references to psychological concepts or research
studies.

It appears that McCroskey has in mind a synthesis

of old and new ideas, a hybrid model which combines Aristotle's enthymeme, Toulmin's layout, and psychological
theories applicable to persuasion.

However, his model

appears to have more in common with the syllogism than it
does with Toulmin's model despite the use of some of Toulmin's terminology. 86

Thus, the extent to which McCroskey's

model may represent an extension of the Toulmin approach
rather than a return to formal logic is in doubt.

It is

interesting that in an earlier publication, McCroskey proposed that the Toulmin model be used in Basic Speech
Communication courses in several ways. 8 7

Mccroskey has

abandoned the Toulmin model more recently because, he
says, "the model's usefulness for communicators is severely
limited" due to the fact that it is based in logical
rather than rhetorical considerations. 88
A second notable extended diagram of the Toulmin
model has been proposed by Cronkhite.

Cronkhite combines

the Toulmin model with a model of attitude change.

Of the

potential applicability of the Toulmin model to persuasion
theory, Cronkhite writes:
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If the Toulmin model is used to encompass an
entire argument, it has an obvious shortcoming:
both the data and warrant may require support and
may, in effect, become claims in new units of
proof. If this modification is made [that of
allowing for chains of support] • • • the Toulmin
model appears to have great utility ~U describing
a part of the process of persuasion. ~
Using only the three basic elements of the Toulmin model
and suggesting that any questionable data or warrants be
viewed as the claims of preliminary arguments, Cronkhite
proposes that we distinguish data-claims from warrantclaims.

In addition, the overall macro-argument is cen-

tered upon a major attitudinal or behavioral objective,
termed an "object concept."

The object concept represents

the final endpoint or goal of all the chains of arguments
leading up to it.

Cronkhite also discusses "motivational

concepts" which represent the stimuli for an attitude
change involving the object concept.

In other words, in

persuasion, arguments are used to establish claims of
relationship between particular motives and object concepts.

For instance, if one who is motivated by greed

(motivational concept) is confronted with an opportunity
to invest in large amounts of silver (object concept) and
can be convinced through a series of arguments that there
is a relationship between the act of silver investment and
a satisfaction of greed (claim of relationship), then a
behavior change is likely to result.90

Cronkhite has

developed mathematical formuli to represent the degree to
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which each of these elements must be present for change to
occur.9 1

While this quantification of the elements invol-

ved in persuasion is the more important aspect of Cronkhite' s extended model, he also presents a diagrammatic
model which appears in Figure 19.

In short, according to

Cronkhite persuasion may be described in terms of the
establishment of asserted claims of relationship between
motivational and object concepts through the use of chains
of data-claims and warrant-claims presented as arguments.
While this extended diagrammatic model is inventive in its
combination of a psychological theory with an epistemological one, it suffers from an extreme and seemingly infinite
potential for complexity.

The universe of concepts which

may bear upon a single change in attitude could easily fill
a book.

Thus, the value of such a model probably should

be judged in terms of its qualities as theoretical explanation and its use in quantitative prediction.

As a

descriptive analytic tool, Cronkhite's extended diagrammatic
model appears to be cumbersome, to say the least.
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Figure 19. An extended Toulmin diagram proposed
by Cronkhite as a model of persuasion and attitude
change.
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To their credit, speech communication textbook
writers who have proposed extended Toulmin diagrams by
developing and specifying support for data may have
increased the usefulness of the model by providing at least
tentative solutions to some of the problems posed by critics
of the Toulmin model.

In addition, attempts by Mccroskey

and Cronkhite, among others, to find connections between
Toulmin's approach and psychological theories current in
speech communication are positive developments which may
eventually result in a refinement of Toulmin's diagrammatic model.9 2 On the other hand, it is not at all clear
that the major modifications proposed by extenders of the
Toulmin diagram have resulted in a conceptually superior,
more candid or applicable model of argument.

Some of the

extensions are marked by a complexity which may threaten
the comprehensibility and applicability of the model.
Empirical investigation may be helpful in establishing the
descriptive and predictive values of extended models which,
on the surface, seem promising.93
TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS OF THE TOULMIN
MODEL AS REPRESENTED IN SPEECH
COMMUNICATION TEXTBOOKS
There are some significant differences in the terminology and definitions of the elements of variations of
the Toulmin model presented in speech communication textbooks.

Modifications of terminology and definitions may
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serve as an indication of which aspects of Toulmin's
approach are maintained and which have undergone adjustment
to the field of speech communication.

While some subtle

shifts of meaning or emphasis presented in a textbook or
two may possibly indicate nothing more than the unique perspectives of individual authors, an overall pattern of
change in the textbooks surveyed may signal the directions
of theoretical development which the Toulmin approach is
undergoing in the hands of speech communication professionals.
Modified Terminology
In general, the elements of the Toulmin model are
identified either in the terms supplied by Toulmin or in
those first used by Ehninger and Brockriede in the first
edition of Decision by Debate.

Twelve of the twenty-seven

textbook editions surveyed were found to present roughly
the same terminology introduced by Toulmin in The Uses of
Argument while all the rest were found to use Ehninger and
Brockriede's terminology or some combination of Toulmin's
and Ehninger and Brockriede's terms.

The definitions

associated with these terms vary little with regard to
claim, warrant, and qualifier but more frequently with
regard to data or evidence, backing or support for warrant,
and rebuttal or reservations.

Of course, as discussed in

the previous section, not all textbooks treat all of these
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elements.

What differences appear to exist, and their con-

sequences for the applicability of the Toulmin model, are

discussed here.
As will be recalled, in The Uses of Argument Toulmin
uses six terms to refer to the elements of his diagrammatic
model:

claim (C), data (D), warrant (W), qualifier (Q),

rebuttal (R), and backing (B).

Occasionally he uses other

terms as if they are synonymous with these, for example,
"conclusion" for C, "grounds" or "information" for D,
"inference-license" for W, "probability term" and "modal
qualifier" for Q, "conditions of exception" for R, and
"assurances" or "grounds • • • supporting a warrant" for
B.94 Ehninger and Brockriede first published their adaptation of the Toulmin model using Toulmin's terminology for
each of the six elements of argument.95

However, in

Decision by Debate some substitute terms were introduced by
these authors who explain their move in this manner:
We have departed in several instances from Toulmin's
terminology in favor of traditional language • • • •
[However] no traditional terms say ~~equately what
Toulmin means by warrant and claim.~
Therefore, they maintained the terms warrant, claim, and

qualifier while using "evidence" for D, "reservations" for
R, and "support for warrant" for B.

Presumably, these

substitute terms are more widely recognized and understood
within speech communication than Toulmin's originals.
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One wonders if Ehninger and Brockriede had motives
other than their stated intention to preserve the more
familiar traditional language.

Their shift makes some

sense in the case of substituting the term evidence for
data.

While evidence may have a somewhat broader meaning

than implied by Toulmin's characterization of data as
"statements of fact," the difference does not seem likely
to affect the functional role of the element in the Toulmin model and, as Ehrlinger and Brockriede contend, evidence
is perhaps better recognized in speech communication than
data.97

However, they must have had another reason for

substituting the term "reservations" for rebuttal.

Rebut-

tal is a term better known in speech communication than
reservations, the meaning of which is less obvious.

Per-

haps these authors intended to avoid the confusion between
this element of argument and that aspect of academic
debate referred to by the term "rebuttal."

Still, one

wonders why they did not select one of Toulmin's substitute
terms, namely, "conditions of exception" or even "exceptions," which seem to be clearer and more precise to this
writer than the term reservations.

Finally, as regards

their term "support for warrant," one can only wonder how
this is any more traditional or clearer than Toulmin's
"backing."
Semantics aside, the adapted terminology of Ehninger
and Brockriede is used as well by many other writers of
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speech communication textbooks.

Nine textbook editions

rely strictly upon Toulmin's terms while three others vary
somewhat from Toulmin.98 Seven textbook editions use only
Ehninger and Brockriede's terminology.99

Eight textbook

editions are found to include some combination of Toulmin's,
Ehninger and Brockriede's, and their own terminology.lOO
Thus, the elements of the Toulmin model are referred to by
various labels supposedly representing the same concepts.
Despite the good intentions of Etminger and Brockriede in
using terms which are supposedly more traditional and
clearer, the profusion of different terms used in various
textbooks may create as many opportunities for confusion
as for clarification.

If the concepts to which the terms

refer are indeed synonymous, then these alternative terminologies appear to be superfluous.
Definitions of Elements
More important than the terms used to label elements
are the meanings for which they stand.

Do variations in

terminology also represent variations in the definitions
and explanations of the elements of the Toulmin model?
To find the answer to this question by surveying the content of textbooks is complicated by the differences in
depth among the various treatments of the Toulmin model.

A

number of the textbooks considered here include only cursory definitions and explanations of the elements and their
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functions.

Some of these textbook explanations of the

elements of the Toulmin model are no longer than a paragraph or two while others only imply definitions through
i· 11 us t ra t.ions. lOl

Students and instructors in speech com-

munication exposed to the Toulmin model only through such
cursory textbook presentations must infer how elements may
be distinguished and used in practice.

Even textbooks

which treat the Toulmin model at some length, for instance,
Decision by Debate by Ehninger and Brockriede, often define
each element differently depending upon which fieldinvarient form of argument it happens to be classifiable
as.

In spite of these complications, it is possible to

assess the clarity and degree of unanimity of definitions
for each of Toulmin's elements across textbooks.
Claim.

In speech communication textbooks, a claim

is generally defined as any assertion, proposition, statement, or conclusion in which a communicator wishes to
induce belief, that is, to get an audience to accept as
102
true.
While several authors conceive of claim as identical to the "conclusion" of a syllogism, Ehninger and
Brockriede explicitly differentiate the two on the grounds
that conclusions are the endpoints of an argument, but
claims may serve as intermediate steps in a series of
related units of proof which may lead to a final conclusion.103

What Ehninger and Brockriede imply about the
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role of claims in a lengthy argument, no other author
explicitly denies:

the Toulmin model is properly appli-

cable to macro-arguments as well as micro-arguments.

104

This position would appear to be a reasonable shift from
Toulmin's apparent focus upon micro-arguments to include
macro-arguments in that speech communication is more often
than not concerned with lengthy argumentative discourse
rather than the sentence-by-sentence structure of single
arguments.
There are other minor variations among types of
definitions and explanations offered of claim, but these
appear to be of little consequence to the applicability
of the Toulmin model to speech communication. 10 5
Qualifier.

As with claims, there is apparently

general agreement among speech communication textbook
writers as to the definition and role of qualifiers.

A

qualifier is generally defined as a word or phrase which
serves to limit the degree of force, cogency, certitude,
reliability, strength, or probability of a claim. 106
However, there are variations in the expressed sources
of qualification.

Some writers identify the strength

or probability of the warrant as the source of qualification of a claim. 10 7

Others state that qualifiers are

the result of qualified data or warrants. 108
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Arnold states that qualifiers are always the outgrowth of
conditions of rebuttal.l09

Some writers discuss the per-

.
· 1 u d.ing qua l.f.
· argumen t s. 110
suasive
va 1 ue o f inc
i iers in
The concept of qualified warrants and qualified data
implied by some authors as the source of the qualifier of
a claim raises the question of whether such subordinate
qualifiers can usually be represented as independent elements of argument in an extended Toulmin diagram.

No

author says as much, but the potential value of such an
.
.
.
d • 111
ex t ension
is
un d e t ermine

In sum, while these differences in the assumed
sources of qualification may be quite significant to the
theoretical assumptions of Toulmin's approach particularly
with regard to distinction between data and warrants, they
appear to have little direct impact upon the function of
qualifiers in the Toulmin model.

Thus, it is judged that

speech communication textbook writers agree as to the
nature of qualifiers and the role they play in arguments.
Warrant.

There appears to be general agreement among

authors of speech communication textbooks surveyed as to
the nature of warrants and their function in arguments.
Warrants are conceived as general, hypothetical statements
which serve as justificatory links connecting data to
claim.

Some authors emphasize in their explanations that

the warrant is the element most likely to be implied
rather than explicitly stated in an argument. 112

Other
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than Condon and Yousif who liken them to value-orientations,
warrants are frequently associated by textbook writers with
assumptions held by an audience. 11 3 As noted elsewhere,
the field-dependent nature of the content of warrants is
mentioned in only four textbooks. 114 One textbook clearly
introduces audience related standards as warrants. 11 5
Other than these differences and with the exception of some
authors who apply the Toulmin model to field-invariant
forms of argument, there appears to be considerable agreement about the nature of warrants. 116
Data or Evidence.

In the matter of data, there is an

important difference among authors, a difference which may
be related to the shift in terminology introduced by
Eh~inger

and Brockriede.

Data, less carefully defined than

other elements, are in general conceived as specific facts,
opinions, reasons, or anything else given as "evidence" in
support of some claim. 11 7 Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik introduce the term "grounds" as a substitute for data, defining
them as "statements specifying the particular facts about
a situation relied on to clarify and make good the previous
claims. 11118 However, all but one of the speech communication textbook writers who uses the term evidence and two
of those presenting extended Toulmin diagrams who use the
term data emphasize the relation of this element to
audience beliefs. 11 9 That is, while all writers appear to
agree that data are given as true, some place special
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emphasis on the notion that any information believed by an
audience may serve as evidence (or data).

In fact, Ehnin-

ger and Brockriede present only two conditions which a
statement must meet in order to qualify as evidence:

it

"must be believed by the listener or reader" and "some
principle of reasoning must warrant the connection between
a bit of information and some claim. 11120

In other words,

if an audience accepts it as true and if a warrant can be
found to connect it to the claim, then it may be judged to
be evidence.

Thus, in general, writers employing the term

data conceive of this element as consisting of statements
of fact about a particular situation, while those employing
the term evidence tend to emphasize the believability of
such statements to the members of a particular audience.
Defining data primarily in terms of its believability
to some audience may aggravate a problem alleged to exist
by some critics of the Toulmin model:

specifically, how

data statements are to be differentiated from warrant
statements.

If a key characteristic of both data and war-

rant statements is, according to speech communication textbooks, that they must be believed by an audience, this
differentiates them only from the claim and not from each
other.

To say that the warrant is a general statement

connecting the data to a claim is helpful, but how different
is this from the traditional distinction between major and
minor premises of a syllogism? 121

It is possible that
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speech communication writers who define data in terms of
audience believability are inadvertantly binding themselves
to the traditional syllogistic categories while employing
Toulmin's or, more frequently, El:minger and Brockriede's
terminology.

The point is, a failure to distinguish the

functions of data and warrant may result in an obscuring of
the justificatory, certifying role of the warrant in argument.

Unless both the relative, field-dependent nature of

warrants and the established, factual, field-invariant
nature of data statements can be maintained, the Toulmin
model may lose its essential character.

By defining data

and warrant in such a way that both are dependent upon the
particular beliefs of an audience, speech communication
textbook writers present the Toulmin model as something of
an elaborated syllogism, potentially with all of the trappings of absolutism, a geometric notion of validity and
ambiguity in the functions of its parts.
In sum, these differences between the definitions of
data and evidence presented in speech communication textbooks may be symptomatic of a distrust for or misunderstanding of some of the unique features of the Toulmin
model in comparison to the syllogism.

Or, as suggested

previously, such differences may be a reflection of the
different theoretical assumptions held by speech communication textbook writers.

Whatever their source, these dif-

ferences among definitions of data, subtle as they may be,
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are considered of serious consequence to the potential
applicability of the Toulmin model in speech communication.
Rebuttal or Reservations.

Another of the unique fea-

tures of the Toulmin model is the element termed rebuttal
or reservations.

There seems to be a concensus of opinion

as to what the role of rebuttal in an argument is, but less
agreement as to the proper conditions for its use.

Rebut-

tals, it is generally agreed, have to do with the conditions or circumstances of exception to a claim.
122
authors say nothing more about this element.

Several
Thus, it

is possible for students or instructors using such textbooks
to see rebuttals as anything from existing or potential
counter arguments to specifications of the sources of qualification of a claim.

Freeley's defifiition hardly brings

matters into any sharper focus by stating that "rebuttal
(R) indicates exceptions, limitations, special conditions,
counter argument or counter evidence which may refute the
claim, discount it, or restrict or qualify it in some way. 1112 3
This definition leaves in doubt when a rebuttal is called
for and when, if ever, it is not.
Several authors suggest the relationship between qualifier and rebuttal.
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Ehninger and Brockriede discuss

three roles which reservations may play in an argument:
they may eliminate the claim altogether, specify circumstances under which the claim would not hold, or specify
circumstances which may affect the qualifier used in
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conjunction with the claim. 12 5

To Ehninger and Brockriede,

then, reservations are used only in certain special situations for rhetorical effect.

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik

concur that rebuttals are used to indicate "extraordinary
or exceptional circumstances" and present an even more
limited view of when such rebuttals are properly used in
argument. 126

These authors claim that rebuttals apply only

in cases of presumptive argument.

In other words, a rebut-

tal is not appropriate when the modal qualifier modifies
the strength of a claim, as in the adjectives "certainly"
and "probably," but is appropriate when the qualifier means
that the claim is only so under certain conditions, as in
"presumably" true. 12 7

This is a more exacting definition

of the term rebuttal and the conditions for its use than
is generally found in speech communication textbooks.
In sum, rebuttals are less precisely defined in
speech communication textbooks than other elements thus far
considered.

While some authors contend that they should be

included, like qualifiers, for their persuasive support of
a claim, others imply that they serve only to specify
weaknesses in the claim, or even to eliminate all support
·
f or a c 1 aim.

12 8

Th"is imprecision
·
. .
. d e f'ini·t·ion 1 eaves
in

unsettled the issue or whether or not rebuttals can ever
be used independently of qualifiers.

Indeed, some defini-

tions leave uncertain the distinctiveness of rebuttal and
qualifier from each other.
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Backing or Support for Warrant.

An imprecision sim-

ilar to that in definitions of rebuttal occurs in definitions of backing and support for warrant making possible
multiple interpretations of this element.

Backing is

termed by some textbook writers "support for warrant" and
one writer, Scheidel, is satisfied to say nothing more about
it. 12 9

Most writers describe backing as additional argu-

ment to help establish or make more credible the warrant
itself.

It is unclear whether such additional argument may

consist of one item of data or several units of proof.l30
Ehninger and Brockriede in the first edition of Decision by
Debate state that support for warrant may consist of a complete unit of proof, a group of acceptable standards for
evaluating the warrant, or the assertion of a relation
between a doubtful feature of the warrant with a valued
concept or principle believed by listeners. 1 3 1

Ehninger

says virtually nothing about this element while, as noted
previously, in the second edition of Decision by Debate
Ehninger and Brockriede drop all references to support for
warrant, replacing them with oblique references to shared
"frame of reference" or common ground. 1 3 2

In other words,

according to Ehninger and Brockriede, warrants are supported
by audience-beliefs, established in previous units or circuits of proof.

McCroskey expresses a similar view, arguing

that prior arguments or chains of reasoning must be used to
"verify" warrants. 1 33
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Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik present a more precise but
limited view of backing than is found in other textbooks.
They contend that backing consists of generalizations
explicating the "body of experience relied on to establish
4
the trustworthiness" of a warrant. 1 3
Backing, they say,
is used to demonstrate that the warrant, first of all, is
sound or generally reliable and, second, is applicable to
the case at hand.

This explanation is unique in that it

implies increasing generality as one moves from data to
warrant to backing, and it introduces as a matter of
backing the relevance of a warrant--a matter which Toulmin
originally associated with rebuttal.

Although it is dif-

ficult to determine exactly what some speech communication
textbook writers believe backing to be, Toulmin, Rieke, and
Janik's description appears to be significantly different
from most.

Diversity amongst speech communication textbook

definitions of the elements of Toulmin's model may in part
be due to the tendency of most writers to overlook his
innovative theoretical bases and, consequently, the degree
to which his perspective differs from the traditional
approach of formal logic.
THE TOULMIN MODEL AS REPRESENTED BY
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES IN SPEECH
COMMUNICATION TEXTBOOKS
In addition to the theoretical explanations, diagrams,

definitions, and terminology with which the Toulmin model is
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presented in speech communication textbooks, it is also
illustrated by illustrative examples.
kinds, invented and discursive.

These are of two

Invented examples are those

apparently constructed by writers to demonstrate particular
points.

Included as invented examples are those which appear

to be purely the products of creative imagination and those
which appear to be based upon or adapted from some actual
argumentative discourse which is not specifically cited.
Discursive examples are those drawn directly from the texts
1
of particular public speeches or published essays. 35
Of the textbook editions surveyed, twenty present
invented examples while four present discursive examples.

1 6

3

Three other textbooks were found to include examples of each
kind.137

In general, the textbooks which include the

greatest number of different illustrative examples are those
which present several field-invariant forms of argument and
provide at least one example per form represented. 1 38

An

exception to this is the textbook by Toulmin, Reike, and
Janik which, while providing no diagrammed illustrations of
field-invariant argument forms, includes far more illustrative examples than any other textbook examined.l39

However,

nine of the textbooks examined were found to include no
more than two illustrative examples of the Toulmin diagram.140

Speech communication textbook writers tend to

favor invented over discursive examples and range from
briefly illustrated to heavily illustrated.
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A comparison of examples from several different textbooks indicates the strengths and weaknesses of each type
of illustrative example.

Invented examples, like Toulmin's

discussion of the case of Harry, the alleged Bermuda
national, have the advantage of being clear and to the
point. 141 That is, they are constructed to fit the concept
being illustrated.

Several of the textbooks replicate

Toulmin's examples or present close imitations of them.

142

The disadvantage of invented examples is their artificiality:

they are perhaps too neat and therefore atypical

of real arguments encountered in discourse.

For instance,

Ehninger and Brockriede's example, shown in Figure 20,
regarding the effects of an increase in the price of oil
is so simple that it boggles the imagination to create a
situation where such an assertion would be a matter for
14
argument.
3 The same criticism, of course, can be applied
to almost any invented example.
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EVIDENCE
The price of
raw petroleum
has gone up.

k~
A

QUALIFIERS
Probably
soon • • •

CLAIM
The price of
products made
from petroleum
will go up.

T
RESERVATIONS

WARRANT

Unless price controls are
Since higher
invoked/other costs in
costs of sigrefining oil go down/ceilings
nificant raw
are placed on profits in such
materials usually result in ---~---~ industries/new sources of raw
petroleum are found/competihigher prices
tion from other industries
of finished
(refined)
keep prices from rising/etc.
products.
Figure 20. An illustrative example of the Toulmin model presented by Ehninger and Brockriede,

1978.

Discursive examples are rarely too simple and have
the advantage of illustrating not just a completed Toulmin
analysis, but also the difference between the argument as
it appears in its actual context and as analyzed in terms
of the Toulmin model.

Frequently, translation and extrapo-

lation of the actual text is required before analysis can
begin; such hidden steps are usefully displayed by some
authors using discursive examples. 144

On the other hand,

such explanations may suffer from their length, complexity,
and the fact that arguments in which all six elements of
the Toulmin model are explicitly demonstrated are difficult
to find.

Because both kinds of illustrative examples
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appear to have inherent strengths and weaknesses, an ideal
solution would be to include both in a textbook presentation.

Yet, as noted before, few textbooks present such a

combination of illustrative examples.
Another problem with examples worth noting in passing
is the frequency with which invented examples mimic categorical syllogisms in their use of data and warrant.

That

is, they rely upon a generalization which resembles a major
premise and a single datum which resembles a minor premise.
Consider this solitary illustration of the Toulmin model of
argument presented in a textbook by Bryant and Wallace,
shown in Figure 21.

Except for the inclusion of subsidiary

elements, backing, reservation, and qualifier, this argument appears to have the form of a categorical syllogism.
Similar quasi-syllogistic examples in which a general rule
is used as warrant for drawing a conclusion based on a
single datum may be discovered in nearly all of the textbooks in which invented examples are used to illustrate the
Toulmin model.
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/El Prices are
going up

/RI Rising prices

are a sign of
inflation

I

/Q/ There is some
>
danger of
inflation

/Res/ Unless productivity
keeps pace with
price increases,
etc.

/B/ The more moeny people have the more they can buy.
Professor X says wages will continue to rise. Etc.

"R" represents "reasons" or warrants
Figure 21. An illustrative example of the Toulmin
model presented by Bryant and Wallace.
Finally, there are some cases in which examples are
offered that appear to be poorly conceived or in error in
terms of the definitions of elements presented.

For

instance, Ehninger and Brockriede appear to go astray of
their own general definitions of the elements of argument
in their illustration of "classification" which appears in
Figure 22.

In discussing the characteristics of argument

from classification, Ehninger and Brockriede assert that
the evidence in a classification is a generalization.

How-

ever, if one ignores that admonition and instead relies on
their previously established definitions of the elements,
then a different, significantly simpler analysis becomes
possible to the effect that (E) Russia is a totalitarian
state, since (W) a majority of totalitarian states can
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usually make fast crisis decisions, therefore, (C) Rissia
can [(Q) probably] make fast crisis decisions.

In order to

make their example fit their theoretical category, El:minger
and Brockriede have apparently confused E with S for W, and
W with E.

Rieke and Sillars appear to have similar problems

with an illustrative example, as do Toulmin, Rieke, and
146
Janik in their handling of questions of law.
(E) A majority of
totalitarian states
can usually make
fast crisis
decisions.

------------>

Therefore, (C) Russia
can [(Q) probably]
make fast crisis
decisions.

i

Since (W) what is usually~Unless (R) Russia does
true of a majority of
not share the attribute
totalitarian states is
of making fast crisis
probably true of a partic- decisions.
ular totalitarian state,
viz. Russia.
Because (S for W) Russia is a totalitarian state/
the totalitarian class is reasonably homogeneous
and its attributes relatively stable and predictable.
Figure 22. An illustrative example of the
Toulmin model presented by Elminger and
Brockriede, 19E3.
In short, there appear to be weaknesses in illustrative examples used in textbook presentations of the Toulmin
model.
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DISCUSSION OF THE SYLLOGISM IN SPEECH
COMMUNICATION TEXTBOOKS PRESENTING
THE TOULMIN MODEL
One of the issues raised by critics of the Toulmin
model and discussed in chapter III is whether the Toulmin
model constitutes an adequate substitute for the syllogism
as a structure useful in the analysis of arguments.
Whether the Toulmin model is best conceived as an alternative or complement to the syllogism is, as yet, an unresolved
matter.

However, speech communication textbook writers

imply their positions on this point by their treatment or
omission of the syllogism in conjunction with their discussion of the Toulmin model of argument.
In general, the Toulmin model is just as likely to be
presented in conjunction with an exposition of the syllogism
as it is in isolation.

Ironically, among textbooks in oral

communication, there are some which purport to present concepts from our rhetorical heritage, such as the one by
Wilson and Arnold, in which the Toulmin model has apparently
replaced the syllogism, while other textbooks claiming a
concern for more modern perspectives, such as Scheidel's,
compare the Toulmin model with the syllogism and note the
benefits and costs of each approach. 14 7

Thus, it is not

simply a matter of historically-minded authors featuring
the Toulmin model, as one might expect.
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Similarly, authors of argumentation and debate textbooks are far from unanimous in their treatment of the cat-

egorical syllogism in conjunction with the Toulmin model.
For instance, in their pioneering article in which they
introduced the Toulmin model to speech communication, Brockriede and Ehninger reflect much of the tone and content of
The Uses of Argument, including a favorable comparison of
the Toulmin model to the syllogism. 148 However, by the
time their first textbook was published three years later,
Etminger and Brockriede apparently no longer felt any need
to justify their preference for the Toulmin model in that
they chose to include only the slightest reference to "the
rules, moods, and figures of syllogisms." 14 9 These authors
and, incidentally, Toulmin in collaboration with others
have removed the syllogism entirely from consideration in
recent publications. 1 5° Mills in the first edition of
Reason in Controversy takes a similar course and presents
only the Toulmin model as interpreted by Hastings. 1 51 For
reasons not at all clear, Mills dropped the chapter by
Hastings for his second edition, severely shortening the
discussion of the Toulmin model, while at the same time
redeeming the syllogism. 1 52 Like Mills, Freeley has
updated his widely-used textbook to include both the syllogism and Toulmin's model. 1 53 Both models are also presented
in two other recent textbooks, one by Rieke and Sillars,
4
the other edited by Miller and Nilsen. 1 5
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Nothing in the preceeding discussion should suggest
that those textbooks which treat both the syllogism and the

Toulmin model are superior to those in which only the Toulmin model is discussed.

What can be inferred from the

variety of approaches to the Toulmin model regardless of
the general purposes of given textbooks, is that some
authors present the Toulmin model as a self-sufficient
approach to the analysis of arguments while, in contrast,
others present it in conjunction with the categorical syllogism, perhaps implying more clearly the developing nature
of the theory of argument. 1 55 Thus, these speech communication textbook writers appear by their discussions of the
Toulmin model and the syllogism to be ambivalent or in
disagreement as to the status of each model in speech communication.
SUMI'1.ARY

Five aspects of textbook representations of the Toulmin model were examined in this chapter:

(1) theoretical

bases, (2) diagrammatic models, (3) terminology and definitions, (4) illustrative examples, and

(5) discussions of the

syllogism.
With regard to innovative theoretical bases of the
Toulmin approach, there appear to be differences between
the extent to which they are treated in textbooks devoted
to oral communication as opposed to textbooks devoted to
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argumentation and debate.

In general, oral communication

textbooks tend to overlook the field-dependent sources of
soundness, the probable nature of substantive claims, and
the relativistic assumptions about the nature of argument
on which the Toulmin model is based.

On the other hand,

argumentation and debate textbooks more frequently attend
to these features although only three can fairly be
credited with giving some recognition to all three concepts.156

The most complete treatment of Toulmin's theoret-

ical bases is found in a textbook coauthored by Toulmin
himself. 1 57 Thus, the influence of Toulmin's innovative
theoretical bases on speech communication textbook writers
is far from overwhelming and definitely not uniform.
Whether this indicates that speech communication professionals by and large reject Toulmin's overall approach,
fail to understand it, or simply find it easier to adapt
it to their own purposes remains unclear.
There is ,a great deal of variety found in diagrammatic representations of the Toulmin model in speech communication textbooks.

While few textbooks replicate the

original six-part model presented by Toulmin in The Uses
of Argument, most textbooks offer modified diagrams,
ranging from the overly simple, which seem to obliterate
all that differentiates the Toulmin model from the syllogism, to the incredibly complex which seem difficult to
comprehend and apply.

Several of the extended diagrams
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presented involve some expansion of the data element
through the explication of multiple data, chains of argument, or the addition of an element representing support
for data.

However, if any single adaptation or modifica-

tion of the Toulmin model is gaining in popularity or
authority, it is not apparent from the textbooks examined
for this study.

What is perhaps most surprising is that in

spite of all this diversity of interpretations, modification, and development, all of these diagrammatic models are
associated with Toulmin.
The terminology and definitions of the elements of
the Toulmin model as presented in speech communication textbooks indicate several things.

First, the modified termi-

nology introduced by Ehninger and Brockriede, while it has
gained some degree of popularity, appears to be superfluous,
potentially confusing, and probably related to differences
among authors in the definition of data.

Second, despite

other differences, there appears to be general agreement
among textbook writers as to the nature of and roles of
each of three elements, claim, warrant, and qualifier.
Third, speech communication writers agree on the applicability of the Toulmin model to macro-arguments and that
the standards of argument are a reflection of the audience
to whom a claim is addressed and are not necessarily dependent upon established fields of argument.

Fourth, rebuttals

and backing are less precisely defined by nearly all speech

217
communication textbook writers than are the other elements
of the Toulmin model.

This may explain why some authors

choose to omit these elements from their diagrammatic
models.

The variety of interpretations of some elements

seems to indicate that the Toulmin model is being adapted
and developed by speech communication textbook writers in
a number of different ways.

As in the case of diagrammatic

representations, the differences among definitions and terms
do not appear to be convergent.
Of illustrative examples used in textbook presentations of the Toulmin model, it may be concluded that the
tendency of most writers to favor invented examples over
discursive ones has led to some problems.

First, many

invented examples illustrate arguments with primary elements
which resemble syllogistic premises, perhaps obscuring
some of the unique features of the Toulmin approach.
Second, some invented examples appear to have errors in
them which may be the result of too much attention to
theoretical categories and interests of textbook writers
and too little attention to arguments as they occur in
practical situations.

This is not to suggest that most

textbook writers distort or confuse the Toulmin model in
their examples, but only that there are inconsistencies
presented in some textbooks which may be attributable to
an inattention to discursive examples.

Ideally, both dis-

cursive and invented examples would be used in a presenta-

tion of the Toulmin model.
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Finally, it is noted that some authors present the
Toulmin model in conjunction with a discussion of the syllogism while others present the Toulmin model in isolation.
This is further evidence of a problem suggested by some of
the criticisms of the Toulmin model discussed in chapter III,
to the effect that the nature of the relationship between
the two models, whether alternative or complementary, is as
yet undetermined.
In short, the Toulmin approach is diversely interpreted in speech communication textbooks and, in some cases,
there appears to be confusion regarding some innovative
features of the Toulmin model.

This diversity and confusion

may be related to the hypothesized conflict of theoretical
perspectives between formal logicians and Toulmin.

Speech

communication writers draw theories, models, and methodologies from many other disciplines apparently with little
regard for their associated theoretical perspectives.
Accordingly, concepts drawn from alternative theoretical
perspectives including "linear" and "systems" may be freely
interpreted and presented as if compatible, while their
inconsistent assumptions and aims are not examined.

Thus,

the eclectic nature of speech communication may be a contributing factor to the diversity of interpretations of the
Toulmin approach.
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The various interpretations of the Toulmin model has
led to a variety of suggested applications by the writers
of speech communication textbooks.
chapter V.

These are discussed in
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CHAPTER V
APPLICATIONS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL:

UTILIZATION

BY SPEECH COMMUNICATION PROFESSIONALS
Throughout this study the issue of potential applications of the Toulmin model to speech communication has been
raised.

In this chapter, suggested applications found in

speech communication textbooks are discussed and evaluated.
Three general kinds of applications are suggested in textbooks:

the Toulmin model may be useful (1) in the analysis,

classification, and exemplification of differences among
field-invariant categories of argument, (2) as a theoretical
construct applicable to concepts and arguments of specific
fields relevant to speech communication, and (3) in the
analysis, construction, and criticism of rhetorical discourse.

In the course of discussing these suggested areas

of application, other possibilities not fully explored in
speech communication textbooks will be submitted.
APPLICATIONS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL TO
FIELD-INVARIANT CATEGORIES
OF ARGUMENT
About general categories of argument such as "generalization," "sign," and "cause-effect," Toulmin makes two
points:

first, they represent field-invariant basic

232
assumptions which may underlie the warrants of arguments;
and second, like other field-invariant aspects of argument,
such categories are largely irrelevant to that upon which
the soundness of an argument rests--field-dependent criteria as represented by backing. 1 The field-invariant/
field-dependent distinction is at the heart of Toulmin's
view of argument categories and their significance.
As has been shown, many of the writers of speech communication textbooks do not explicitly maintain the fieldinvariant/field-dependent distinction or its consequences
in the same way as Toulmin.

Further, several of these

writers propose that the Toulmin model be applied in the
analysis, classification, and exemplification of fieldinvariant as well as field-dependent aspects of argument.
The nature of this proposed application offers clues as
to the degree of difference between speech communication
textbook writers and Toulmin with regard to the potential
value of his model in the analysis of general forms of
argument.

Is such an application an irrelevant exercise

as Toulmin asserts or a valuable tool as some speech communication textbooks suggest?
divided into four parts:

Discussion of this issue is

(1) the nature and scope of text-

book treatments of general categories of argument, (2) the
rhetorical approach of Ehninger and Brockriede and their
followers,

(3) the empirical approach of Hastings to the

233
reformulation of general categories of argument, and (4) an
evaluation of conflicting orientations to general categories of argument and the role of basic assumptions in this
application of the Toulmin model.
Textbook Treatments of General
Categories of Argument
Of twenty-seven textbook editions surveyed, fourteen
were found to present analyses of general categories of
2
argument exemplified in terms of the Toulmin model.
Arguments are frequently categorized in speech communication
textbooks under various headings, such as "forms of argument," "types of reasoning," "patterns of proof," and
"classifications of warrant."3

In this study, they shall

be referred to as "general categories of argument."

While

these textbook treatments have much in common, their differences tend to be confusing.

Mills has observed that

such classifications are seldom in agreement with each
other or clear as to upon what they are based. 4 Mills
argues that the bases of categorization must be clarified
and systematically applied if the forms of argument are to
be a help to students in the construction or criticism of
arguments.5

To this end he presents his own "eclectic

system of classifying arguments" which in no way relies
upon the Toulmin model. 6
Writers of speech communication textbooks presenting
the Toulmin model of fer a variety of solutions to the
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problem of the analysis of general categories of argument.
Ehninger and Brockriede were first to propose that the
Toulmin model be used as the basis for an analysis of general forms, and their approach appears to have influenced
several subsequent textbook writers.

Hastings has presented

an empirically-based reformulation of the general categories
in terms of the Toulmin model.
discussed later.

Both of these approaches are

However, despite minor differences in

terminology and definitions presented, nearly all of the
schemes are found to include the following categories:
causation, sign, generalization, analogy, and classification. 7

Several other general forms are mentioned in speech

communication textbooks, but only these five are frequently
represented.

However, the significance of these five

apparently agreed upon forms is questionable, for as Toulmin,
Rieke, and Janik argue, ''it turns out not to be possible to
give an exhaustive or formal account of all the possible
types of argument • • • [and] many of the types listed here
merge into one another and are hard to distinguish sharply
from one another." 8 It appears that applying the Toulmin
model to the analysis, classification, and exemplification
of general categories of argument has not resulted in an
end to the confusion observed by Mills.
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A Rhetorical App.roach: Eb.ninger
and Brockriede and Their
Followers

While the various categorizations of general forms of
argument are subject to criticism on several grounds, what
is of most interest here is the role of the Toulmin model
in such schemes.

Ehninger and Brockriede were the first to

find the Toulmin model to be "suggestive of a system for
classifying artistic proofs."9

Their work is significant

because of the influence it appears to have had upon the
work of several subsequent writers.
Ehninger and Brockriede's approach has four features
which indicate their reliance upon the Toulmin model in
categorizing general forms of argument.

First, they rely

upon the concept of warrant to differentiate between an
inartistic and an artistic proof:

if to accept the data

as true is to accept the claim as true, then an argument
is judged inartistic; on the other hand, if the warrant is
"the crucial element • • • and its function is to carry
the data to the claim," then the proof is judged artistic. 10
Second, the Toulmin model is viewed as applicable to each
of the three modes of proof of classical rhetorical
11
theory.
The authors offer substitute terminology--substantive, motivational, and authoritative proofs--for the
traditional logos or appeal to reason, pathos or appeal to
emotions, and ethos or appeal of a speaker's character,
respectively. 12 While all three are analyzed with Toulmin
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diagrams, the most detailed analyses presented are of the
categories of substantive proof.

Third, the authors sug-

gest that analysis of an argument in terms of the Toulmin
model can facilitate the identification of the general
category to which the argument belongs.

Their initial

presentation implies that each unit of proof may be analyzed with a single Toulmin diagram representing one or the
other general categories of argument.

This contention has

more recently been revised; the authors currently view the
process of analysis as highly complex, often requiring
multiple diagramming of the same argument from different
perspectives. 1 3

Fourth, in presenting their detailed

aLalyses of substantive, motivational, and authoritative
proofs, these authors imply that their categories represent
field-invariant forms of argument. 14
The most significant of the four features of the
rhetorical approach for our discussion is that which bears
upon what Toulmin says about general categories--that they
are field-invariant.

Several of Ehninger and Brockriede's

illustrations seem to indicate field-dependence rather
than field-invariance.

The net result is that one cannot

determine from Ehninger and Brockriede's presentation
whether or not their categories are more field-dependent or
field-invariant.

Clear criteria by which the distinction

can be made are never presented.
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Several subsequent textbook writers follow the rhetorical approach of Eb.ninger and Brockriede, although none
pursue it with the same depth and detail.

In textbooks by

Blankenship and McCroskey, and to a lesser degree Bettinghaus, Bradley, Freeley, Rieke and Sillars, and Verdeber,
one can recognize Ehninger and Brockriede's major categories as well as some of their terminology and style of
illustration.

Despite many differences in depth and con-

tent among these treatments, all have at least one important feature in common with the approach of Ebninger and
Brockriede:

none presents an explicit or coherent explana-

tion of the nature of field-invariance or of the basic
assumptions said by Toulmin to underlie the general categories of argument.

Ehninger and Brockriede and their

followers appear to confuse field-dependence and fieldinvariance in presenting their categorization of general
forms of argument.
Ehninger and Brockriede have at different times
published three presentations of the general categories of
argument. 1 5 Overlooking for the moment differences among
these treatments, the categories which have been presented
by Ehninger and Brockriede are these:

cause-effect, effect-

cause, generalization, classification, parallel case, analogy, statistics, motivational, and authoritative. 16 The
authors appear to believe each of these categories to be
field-invariant for they preface their discussion of them
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in Decision by Debate, 1st edition, with a quote from
The Uses of Argument in which Toulmin describes fieldinvariance .17

Moreover, their verbal discussion of each

category of proof implies field-invariance; almost no
attention is given to field-dependence in arguments as discussed by Toulmin.
Despite the implication of field-invariance in the
general categories of argument discussed by Ehninger and
Brockriede, their analysis and exemplification of arguments
in some categories creates doubt as to their invariant
nature.

Only generalization, and potentially analogy,

parallel case, and authoritative proof seem from their
examples to be more field-invariant than field-dependent.
Other categories discussed by Ehninger and Brockriede are
either unclear or apparently more field-dependent than
field-invariant.

Followers of Ehninger and Brockriede,

while altering some terminology and consolidating some of
the categories also imply the field-invariance of their
general categories without clearly or explicitly demonstrating it through examples presented. 18
The most clearly field-invariant of the general categories of argument discussed by Ehninger and Brockriede is
generalization.

This is because it is the only form of

proof in which these authors explicate an underlying fieldinvariant assumption which is the basis of a content-free
warrant statement.

They state "because a class, by
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definition, exhibits a certain uniformity, the warrant
assumes that what is true of the items forming the sample
is also true of other members of the class not included
in the sample. 111 9

While the assumption is identified in

this case, in all other examples of forms of proof, these
authors define the warrant only in terms of what it
"states" or "asserts. 1120 In their example of generalization
shown in Figure 23, Ehrlinger and Brockriede use a warrant
which, while somewhat ambiguous in its phrasing as to
whether or not its authority is dependent upon the field of
international relations, parallels the field-invariant
21
.
assump t ion.

Further, while the rebuttal is field-

dependent, the support for warrant is field-invariant in
nearly all respects.

Thus, more than in any other category

of argument exemplified by Ehrlinger and Brockriede, the
field-invariant nature of the warrant in generalization is
apparent.

Some followers of these authors similarly imply

the field-invariance of warrants in proofs by generalization
in examples.

Blankenship's example of generalization appears
in Figure 24. 22 Unlike Ehninger and Brockriede, Blankenship
phrases her warrant like a basic assumption--completely
devoid of any content which is specific to the case at
issue.

Regardless of whether warrants as stated in each of

the examples in Figures 23 and 24 are representative of basic
assumptions or poorly phrased warrants, they are apparently
independent of the particulars of the content of statements
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of evidence and claim.

So long as the warrant of an

argument states a principle not directly derived from or
dependent upon an appropriate field of argument, it may be
judged to be field-invariant.

(E) Leaders of India,
Sweden, Japan, East
Germany, and Ghana
oppose the U.S. position on disarmament. .

Since (W) what i's true of the sample
is probably true
of a majority of
members in this
class.

~

Therefore, (C) a majority of leaders of world
states [(Q) probably]
oppose the U.S. position
on disarmament.

i

Unless (R) more leaders
(or more representative
leaders) do not oppose
the U.S. position on
disarmament.

Because (S for W) instances in the evidence sample are germane to the claim/
adequate in number/and fairly selected
on the basis of political alignment and
geographical location.

Figure 23. An illustrative example of proof by
generalization according to Ehninger and Brockriede, 1963.
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E.

"The people of
the U.S. individually could not
have developed
the Tennessee
Valley. Collectively, they could
have"
"Seventeen million
Americans who live
over 65 on an average social security
check of about $78
a month--they're
not able to sustain
themselves individually, but they can
sustain themselves
through the social
security system"

W.

~

C.

Therefore, in
cases where
individual
action is
ineffective,
then national
governmental
action will be
effective

v

Since what is
true of a selected
sample is probably
true of the majority of members in
its class

Figure 24. An illustrative example of proof
by generalization according to Blankenship.
In no other category of argument but generalization
is the matter of a field-invariant underlying assumption
so clearly expressed by Ehninger and Brockriede or their
followers.

Warrants, said by these authors to be "hypo-

thetical and content-free," are almost never phrased this
way in examples.

More often than not, the warrant used in

an example is tied to backing drawn specifically from the
field of argument in which the claim applies.

In some
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cases, such as the examples of analogy, parallel case, and
authoritative proof, the warrants themselves appear to be
subject to translation or rephrasing that will render them
clearly content-free and field-invariant.

Such transla-

tions would be likely to increase the candidness of examples
by explicating the underlying assumptions and presenting a
warrant phrased in a form immediately generalizable to
arguments in other fields.

In other words, the warrants

could be rephrased as abstract field-invariant assumptions.
However, Ehninger and Brockriede and their followers do not
provide such translations.

Further, the support for warrant

offered in examples of analogy, parallel case, and authoritative proof is field-dependent thus giving rise to doubts
as to whether Ehninger and Brockriede believe these categories of argument to be of a field-invariant nature. 2 3 Of
the potential field-invariance of argument from classif ication, even less may be said with certainty because this
category appears to be confused and possibly the result of
. ana 1 ysis
. or i·11 us t ra t 'ion. 24 The remaining
an error in
categories, cause-effect, effect-cause, and sign, appear
from the examples of warrant and backing in each case to
be more field-dependent than field-invariant.

In order to

assess the soundness or strength of the warrants in these
categories, one must investigate issues which are applicable
to only one field. 2 5 See for instance their example of
effect-to-cause proof in Figure 25. 26

In this case not
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only is the warrant inextricably bound to the content of
the data and claim statements, neither is anything of a
general nature said or asked of causation in the support
for warrant.

There is no hint of the underlying field-

invariant assumption.
(E) Russia keeps a
large number of
divisions under arms.

Since (W) nations
that keep a large
number of divisions
under arms often do
so because of aggressive motivation.

>I

Therefore, (C) Russia
is (Q) probably demonstrating aggressive
motivation.

Unless (R) Russia keeps a
large number of divisions
under arms for national
defense/internal security/
stimulation of the economy /etc.

Because (S for W) Expert X reports that a large
number of divisions under arms almost always
indicates aggressive intent/a large sample of
instances exist in which aggressive motivation
caused the arming of large numbers of divisions/
etc.
Figure 25. An illustrative example of effectcause proof according to Eb.ninger and Brockriede, 1963.
Similarly, followers of Ehninger and Brockriede use
field-dependent arguments to exemplify causal and sign
arguments.

For instance, consider the example of sign

argument presented by Blankenship, as shown in Figure 26. 2 7
As in Ehninger and Brockriede's examples, the warrant in
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Blankenship's example is phrased in terms of the particulars
of the evidence and claim.

No support for warrant or basic

assumption is stated to help us judge whether this argument
is field-dependent or field-invariant.

Thus, the asserted

field-invariance of this category is not at all obvious.
The role of signs in the warrant seems less important than
potential backing from the fields of international politics
or military strategy.

It may be concluded from this and

other examples presented by followers of Ehninger and Brockriede that the field invariance of the categories of argument and the assumptions which underlie their warrants are
far from explicit and less than candid.

There is, therefore,

reason to doubt that Ehninger and Brockriede and their followers share Toulmin's sense of the cruciality of the fieldinvariant/field-dependent distinction to the assessment of
soundness of arguments.
E.

There exist in Cuba~> C.
"large, long-range,
and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction"

W.

Since the buildup
of offensive
weapons by one
nation constitutes

'V

Therefore, the "presence" of these missiles constitutes an
"explicit threat to
the peace and security of all the
Americas"

a threat to the
security of
other nations

Figure 26. An illustrative example of sign
proof according to Blankenship.
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In summary, proponents of the rhetorical approach
believe that the Toulmin model can usefully be applied in

the analysis and exemplification of general categories of
argument.

At the same time, they fail to acknowledge Toul-

min's objection that such inquiries into field-invariant
aspects of argument are irrelevant, to clearly identify
field-invariant basic assumptions underlying the warrants of
each category, or present clear criteria by which an argument in field-invariant form may be readily distinguished
from an argument in field-dependent form. 28 The major contribution of Ehninger and Brockriede and their followers
appears to be their suggestion of the potential of the
Toulmin model in this application to general categories of
argument.

However, solutions to the problems created by

such a move are still to be determined.
An Empirical Approach: Arthur
Hastings' Reformulation of
General Categories of
Argument
Another writer who uses the Toulmin model to elucidate
the differences among various general categories of argument
is Arthur Hastings. 2 9 Hastings claims to have reformulated
the general forms of argument into categories which more
accurately reflect the practices of actual arguers than do
traditional categories.30

Unlike Ehninger and Brockriede

who extrapolate from the traditional categories of classical
rhetorical theory, Hastings draws from his empirically-based
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doctoral research in which he performed Toulmin analyses of
over 250 examples of arguments from various fields of discourse. 31

Based upon his results, Hastings has identified

nine categories of argument--five commonly used "major
methods" and four less commonly used "further methods."3

2

While Hastings' method of defining his categories
differs from that used by Ehninger and Brockriede, many of
the categories recognized in the two approaches appear to
be roughly the same.33

One important difference between

the rhetorical and empirical approaches is the precision
with which the warrant is phrased in the latter.

While the

rhetorical approach focuses primarily on the characteristics
of the warrant as a basis for the categorization of an argument, Hastings' empirical approach examines the relationship
between data and claim in order to develop an accurate warrant statement.

Thus, while the rhetorical approach pre-

sumes the nature of evidence and claim in every category to
be roughly the same, Hastings is precise in describing differences in the kind of content in the data-statements and
the kind of conclusions asserted in the claim-statements
for each category.3 4
With regards to field-invariance and field-dependence,
Hastings' treatment of the general categories of argument
suffers from some of the same defects as the rhetorical
approach.

Hastings implies that his categories represent

field-invariant aspects of argument and even offers a
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content-free statement of the warrant for each category.35
Further, what Hastings refers to as rebuttal amounts to a

different set of field-invariant questions which may be
used to test the strength of arguments in each category.3

6

Although Hastings does not explicitly discuss or identify
assumptions which may underlie warrants in each category of
argument, in most cases such assumptions may be inferred
from the general statements of warrant, rebuttal questions,
and related discussions.37

In Windes and Hastings, dif-

ferences among arguments in different fields--in effect,
field-dependent aspects of argument--are discussed in connection with evidence.3 8 Thus, to Hastings it appears that
field-dependence is a matter of evidence, field-invariance
a matter of the classification of warrants.

That this

division more closely resembles the distinction between
material and formal validity of formal logic than it does
Toulmin's field-dependence and field-invariance does not
appear to be a problem for Hastings.
In spite of a strong implication of field-invariance
in Hastings' reformulated categories, the examples of arguments presented as illustration for each category tend to
support a field-dependent interpretation.

Hastings draws

his examples from real discourse and, despite having "been
rephrased for purposes of clarity and illustration," they
frequently do not include explicit warrants.39

Where war-

rants are cited, they are phrased in a content-bound
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manner whi0h obscures any field-invariant features they may
have, a problem made worse by Hastings' inattention to matters of backing that would provide clues to whether an argument should be judged field-invariant or field-dependent.
For example, Hastings presents the following illustration
of argument from cause to effect:
Recognition of Communist China (D) would harm our
relations in Asia (C) because we would be retreating
once more from the Communists (W). We have said we
are going to defend Formosa against Communist Chinese attack, but if we abandon the island of Formosa,
the effect
the Asians would be that we were
afraid (W).

EB

Hastings then goes on to summarize the warrant in two different ways:

"In recognizing Communist China the United

States would lose other nations' respect" and, elsewhere,
"when nations do not maintain consistent policies other
nations do not respect them." 41 Neither warrant, not even
the more general statement, would have much applicability
outside of the field of international diplomacy.

Further,

it is unclear what field-invariant basic assumption
regarding cause and effect would underlie each of the different versions of the warrant statement in this example.
The content-bound nature of the warrant-statements and the
undefinability of the basic assumptions in Hastings'
examples of arguments from different categories contradict
his implication of the field-invariance of his categories,
at least in practice.
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In summary, Hastings' main contributions are his
empirically-based approach, developing categories from a
study of actual arguments in various fields, and his precision in defining the warrant of an argument in terms of
the form of the relationship between data and claim.

The

empirical approach is promising in that it is consistent
with Toulmin's practical aims, and it may potentially bring
to light the extent to which it is possible or useful to
analyze arguments in terms of field-invariant categories.
Further, it may provide a method for examining the differences in the forms of argument used in different fields,
that is, the field-dependent aspects of argument.

However,

at present Hastings' approach provides little in the way
of criteria by which the distinction between fielddependence and field-invariance may be maintained.

While

Hastings' approach appears to be superior in other respects
to the rhetorical approach of Ehninger and Brockriede, both
approaches appear to begin with the assumption that all
arguments may be usefully categorized according to some
field-invariant scheme.

The reliability of this assumption

is challenged by Toulmin and remains undemonstrated by
these speech communication textbook writers.
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Conflicting Orientations to the
General Categories of Argument
and the Role of FieldInvariant Basic
Assumptions
As has been shown, there appears to be a sharp difference between Toulmin and some speech communication textbook writers as to the significance of general categories
of argument and the applicability of the Toulmin model to
such categories.

This difference appears to be related to

the distinction between field-invariance and field-dependence
and how it is interpreted in discussions and examples of
general categories of argument.

Elminger and Brockriede,

their followers, and Hastings all endorse the application of
the Toulmin model in the analysis and exemplification of
general categories.

In doing so, these authors suggest

various definitions and procedures which they believe will
facilitate this application of the Toulmin model.

While

acknowledging that this move represents an expansion of
Toulmin's approach to argument, these authors do not make
clear their position on Toulmin's field-dependent orientation.

Moreover, they do not address the field-invariant/

field-dependent distinction, nor do they clearly identify
the "deeper assumptions or rules" which embody common
features among warrants of arguments within each general
category.

In other words, these authors appear to believe

that argument is best viewed from a field-invariant standpoint and that the general categories of argument may
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usefully serve as field-invariant criteria.

The question

is, can this field-invariant orientation to argument
analysis be reconciled with Toulmin's position that fieldinvariant standards will be largely irrelevant to arguments
in particular fields?
To say with certainty that these approaches can or
should be reconciled is more than the evidence of this study
justifies.

Clearly, further investigation is warranted.

Nevertheless, a first step toward resolving this apparent
conflict might be, as Mills has suggested, to clarify the
bases of categorization, in this case by identifying the
assumptions which underlie the warrants of arguments within
each category.

Confusion as to the nature of these assump-

tions has been a consistent feature of the textbook treatments of general categories of argument.

Just what are the

underlying assumptions of these categories of argument and
to what extent may they be viewed as field-invariant?
One interpretation as to what these assumptions may
be is offered by a rhetorical theorist, Carroll Arnold, who
chooses not to present an analysis of general categories of
argument.

He argues that such general categories are

derived from cultural orientations of the arguer and the
audience:
Westerners habitually look for causes to explain
things as effects and they look for effects because
they believe there are causes. They also look for
similarities that authorize comparative conclusions
and for examples that allow generalizations. When
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we hear such connection-asserting, conclusionauthorizing relationships explicitly offered as
reasons, we do not just put labels on them-"causal," "analogical," "inductive," etc.--nor

do we analyze them for technical validity.

If

we respond to such reason giving by reasoning,
we follow in thought along the "logical" pathway
the speaker proposed (or some other), but we do
so for Q1ll: own reasons, not fo2 the sake of the
"logical" form the logos had.4
In other words, for all members of a particular society-in this case, Western society--arguments in these recognized forms are likely to have force regardless of their
fields of application.

A similar view is expressed by

Condon and Yousif who argue for an analysis of general
forms of argument which recognizes the differences in the
"epistemic structures" of various cultures. 4 3 Thus, general categories of argument may be conceived as culturallydependent as well as field-invariant within a culture.
This interpretation suggests that the field-invariant/fielddependent distinction may be overly simple if not a false
dichotomy. 44
It seems probable that Toulmin's charge of the irrelevance of field-invariant criteria is appropriate in the
most highly evolved and clearly delineated disciplines such
as the older branches of philosophy and the physical sciences.

The arguers in such fields argue from common

assumptions which are the product of their indoctrination
to the history, goals, and justification procedures of
4
various fields. 5 In those situations where a shared
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context or sense of

com~on

problems and techniques pre-

vails, any field-invariant or universal criteria may be
superfluous.

The issues of argument in a field like

physics are likely to be more precisely defined and specific than can be resolved by recourse to common-sense
principles of causality such as those embodied in the warrants of a general category representing "causal argument."
In such a case, Toulmin's charge of the irrelevance of

field-invariant standards seems appropriate.
Field-invariant criteria are more likely to apply in
situations where no common assumptive base exists, as in
arguments among lay-persons or among experts from different
fields.

In defending research in techniques of genetic

engineering, a biochemist must argue differently to colleagues than to a minister or to an investigating comittee
of congress.

The difference is not just a matter of rhe-

torical strategy:

it is a problem of arriving at a common

basis for linking data to claims and conclusions.

Where

no field is available from which warrants may be drawn,
then whatever shared assumptions may exist among the
arguers provide the only available basis for argument. 46
However, the conclusion that field-dependent criteria
may not be the only relevant kind does not compel us to
presume what Toulmin implies about shared assumptions-that they are either field-dependent or field-invariant.
To the contrary, it is conceivable that such assumptions
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may be independent of fields and still other than absolute
or universal truths.

Just as each field has an associated

set of unique shared assumptions, so might each interpersonal relationship, small group, mass audience, culture,
or species.

Thus, one may conceive of relative "levels"

or types of rational assumption which may underlie the
criteria relied upon in practical arguments.

Toulmin's

apparent bias in favor of field-dependence is not ample
justification for disregarding other potential useful bases
for rationality.
The importance of the question of field-invariant vs.
field-dependent criteria should not be underemphasized.

In

a world which is becoming increasingly reliant upon instantaneous information and communication links among individuals and groups despite traditionally recognized geographical, historical, cultural, and national boundaries, the
study of similarities and differences in justification
procedures worldwide is vital. 4 7 A failure to recognize
how different assumptions about argument interact with each
other when representatives from differing cultures--the
United States and an Islamic republic, for example--negotiate their political differences can lead to disasterous
results. 48
What is needed, then, is a clearer characterization
of the field-invariant assumptions which may underlie the
warrants of arguments in each general category.

For
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example:

What are the assumptions of each category?

what degree are they isolable from one another?

To

To what

extent do they differ in force in their soundest forms?
To what extent do they differ in range of applicability to
arguments of different fields?

Once these assumptions are

made explicit, the ways in which they may interact with
field-dependent sources of soundness will require exploration.

For example:

should both field-dependent and field-

invariant criteria be applied to the same argument simultaneously or, if not, should field-dependent criteria be
thought of as a special category of argument in and of
itself?

Should either field-invariant or field-dependent

criteria be thought to predominate?

Which context vari-

ables, if any, should be considered in determining which
criteria are more appropriate--the field in which the issue
develops? the nature of the arguers? the content or substance of the arguments? the phrasing of the arguments?
Overall, these problems would be easier to resolve if speech
communication professionals were harmonious in their epistemological assumptions.

Formal logicians and Toulmin

clearly differ as to their assumptions regarding the nature
of truth; yet, this is a matter about which no single
position appears to predominate in the field of speech communication.

Thus, there is a need for clarification of

the comparative merits of many epistemological issues,
including absolutistic vs. relativistic assumptions, in
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terms of the various aims, interest areas, and methods of
speech communication.

Pending exploration and resolution of the issues discussed above, there appears to be no reason why the Toulmin
model cannot be applied in the analysis and exemplification
of categories of argument as it can to arguments in general
and arguments from particular fields of inquiry.

However,

the rhetorical and empirical approaches are, in the opinion
of this writer, unsatisfactory in their present state of
development because they introduce several problems while
failing to take clear positions on some of the theoretical
bases of the Toulmin approach. 4 9

APPLICATIONS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL TO SPECIFIC
FIELDS RELEVANT TO SPEECH COMMUNICATION
Several special applications of the Toulmin model to
areas of theory and fields associated with speech communication have been suggested in textbooks and other publications.
lat~r

By "special applications" we mean to exclude for
discussion the most frequently discussed use of the

Toulmin model, as a tool of analysis of arguments in general.

Special applications to fields relevant to speech

communication include the application of the Toulmin model
to (1) theories which bear on speech communication,
(2) fields of argument which may be the subject of communication research, and (3) particular communication settings.
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This brief survey is in no way exhaustive of the possibilities; rather it is meant to reflect some of the specific
applications which have begun to be explored by some writers.
The Toulmin Model in Theories
Bearing on Speech
Communication
As has been indicated in the preceding chapter, the
Toulmin approach as interpreted by some speech communication textbook writers is useful as a model of persuasion as
much as it may be useful as a model of logic.

The elements

of the model tend to be conceived by these writers as relative to the beliefs of an audience and the superiority of
the Toulmin model to the syllogism is considered its inclusion of certain rhetorical factors, such as qualifiers and
rebuttals, that have persuasive impact not recognized in a
syllogism.

Thus, because the Toulmin model may take into

account audience factors as well as message factors, it has
an impact on rhetorical theory.

In particular, the Toulmin

model appears to be more consistent than the syllogism with
emerging views of rhetoric as a way of knowing.

It is in

this regard--as representative of an "epistemic" view of
rhetoric--that the Toulmin model is introduced in the textbook by Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought.50
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As discussed in chapter III, there have been some
attempts to merge Toulmin's approach to argument with
psychological theories of attitude change.

Cronkhite's

extended diagrammatic model is the result of a blending
of Toulmin's concepts with Martin Fishbein's attitude
theory.5 1 Bae Keun Cha has examined the relationship of
Toulmin's approach to various consistency theories and
Gary D'Angelo has suggested a schema which places various
aspects of attitude theory, as developed by Hovland and
Janis, McGuire, Festinger, Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall,
among others, within the Toulmin model.5 2 Such attempts
as these to apply the Toulmin model to theories in psychology and other fields related to speech communication
are provocative and should be encouraged.
So far as is known to this writer, Condon and Yousif
are alone in applying the Toulmin model to intercultural
communication theories.

However, the epistemic dimensions

of the Toulmin approach would appear to be as applicable
to other areas as they are to intercultural and rhetorical
communication.

For example, the Toulmin model may have

applications to theories of interpersonal communication,
particularly interpersonal perception, acquaintanceship,
and conflict resolution; organizational communication, as
subsequent discussion of "management" as a field of argument will suggest; and oral interpretation, in the analysis of emotional content implicit in poems or other
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forms of literature.53

These applications are among the

more creative possibilities for applying the Toulmin model
to theories related to communication.
The Toulmin Model and Fields
Subject to Speech
Communication
Research
Potentially any field of argument may be subject to
the researches of argumentation theorists and other speech
communication professionals.

However, some fields have

received special attention in textbooks and other publications as being particularly suitable for study with the
Toulmin model.

For example, the field of politics, includ-

ing government and international diplomacy, has dominated
the illustrative examples presented in textbooks.

While

none treats political argument as having special features
which differentiate it from argument in general, the
applicability of the Toulmin model to the analysis of
arguments found in the speeches of government representatives and other political leaders is implicit in most
textbook presentations of the Toulmin model.

The fields

discussed below are explicitly mentioned in some textbooks.
Law.

There have been many articles and at least one

book written on the application of the Toulmin model to
legal arguments.5 4

Especially noteworthy is the work of
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Gottlieb who, in The Logic of Choice, presents an extension
of the Toulmin model to meet the special demands of anal-

ysis of legal argumentation.55
Figure 27.

His model is shown in

While this extension of the Toulmin model is

too complex to be explained here, a brief look at it
reveals that extensive modifications have been made in the
standard diagram:

new elements representing inference (I)

and future consequences (CD, CSL) have been added, no
qualifier is included because legal pronouncements always
represent absolute decisions, and rebuttal and backing have
been redefined as seven new elements representing the arguments both for and against a particular legal judgment
(L, L', IN, IN', P, P', FC).

Such an extensive redesign

of the Toulmin model raises a question:

does application

of the Toulmin model within any special field of argument
require that the model be modified to meet the needs of
that field?

Or has Gottlieb simply introduced a new model

which is more his own than it is Toulmin's?
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facts on record
process of selecting the material facts and reasoning from the material facts to the required or
desired conclusion.
= the decision.
= statement about the process of inference.
= formulation of the rule governing the case.
= the preexisting rules and procedures ultimately
selected for SL.
the
canons for the construction of rules and the
=
techniques for using precedents.
= the purposes and interests contemplated by L, IN,
and SL.
= the preexisting rules and precedents competing with L.
= the canons for the construction of rules and the
techniques for using precedents competing with IN.
= the purposes and interests competing with P.
= preexisting commitment to weigh the competing purposes and interests in favor of P whenever a conflict
arises.
= foreseeable consequences of the decision.
= foreseeable range of application of the formulated
rule (SL) in other cases.
Figure 27. Gottlieb's extended version of
Toulmin's diagrammatic model.
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Explanations of legal argumentation also appear in
three speech communication textbooks in which the Toulmin

model is presented:

Rieke and Sillars; Toulmin, Rieke, and

Janik; and Windes and Hastings.5 6

Because the Toulmin model

is drawn from an analogy with jurisprudence, the applicability of the model to arguments from the legal field seems
quite appropriate.
Science. Medicine, and Technology.

Scientific argu-

ments are discussed in two textbooks in which the Toulmin
model is presented.57

While many arguments in science, med-

icine, and technology involve the use of warrants already
established, scientific arguments are frequently warrantestablishing which means that the role of backing in a
Toulmin analysis may be somewhat different than in other
fields.5 8 While the Toulmin model would appear to provide
a valuable tool for the analysis and description of scientific paradigms and their epistemological implications,
there is little in the textbooks surveyed to indicate that
the Toulmin model is being used for this purpose.
Ethics.

Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik discuss the special

features of ethical arguments in terms of the Toulmin
model.59

Another writer, Joseph Wenzel, has suggested an

application of the Toulmin model to value claims in argument. 60

Although his ideas draw as much from Toulmin's

Reason in Ethics as they do from The Uses of Argument, his
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suggestions represent a potentially useful application for
the Toulmin mode1. 61

Other Fields.

Other fields related to speech commun-

ication which have been mentioned in textbooks presenting
the Toulmin model include history, the arts, and management. 62

Here as in previously discussed fields the Toulmin

model is identified as having potential in the identification and description of special features of these fields
and yet very little research appears to have been done
which uses the Toulmin model in this way.
If speech communication textbooks are any indication
of what applications the Toulmin model is being put to by
speech communication researchers, it appears that very
little has been done thus far to develop the applicability
of the model to special fields which may be the subject of
speech communication research.

While potential application

to fields such as politics, law, science, and ethics have
been referred to in a few textbooks, how much of this
potential can be realized remains to be seen.

Most text-

books discuss only the general applications to which the
Toulmin model may be put, as discussed in the final section
of this chapter.
The Toulmin Model in Particular
Communication Settings
The Toulmin model at one time or another has been
associated with all but one of the commonly discussed
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communication settings:

intrapersonal, dyadic, small

group, speaker-audience, and mediated communication.

In

most textbooks, the Toulmin model has been discussed as a
tool for the analysis and evaluation of arguments in oral
rhetoric either in a speaker-audience or presentational
dyadic setting--in other words, a public speech or academic
debate. 6 3 Gulley introduces the Toulmin model as an aid
to discussion in small decision-making groups. 64 At least
two textbooks discuss the Toulmin model in connection with
arguments used in written communication aimed at mass audiences, particularly journalism and scholarship. 6 5 However,
no textbook surveyed was found to associate the Toulmin
model with mediated settings such as broadcast messages.
While each of the above referred to applications of
the Toulmin model in a particular setting may be significant in its own right, they all seem to be based on the
implicit assumption that the Toulmin model is valuable at
the level of intrapersonal communication.

In fact, most

of the applications of the Toulmin model which have been
suggested and are discussed in this chapter have to do with
critical thinking, effective decision-making, or applied
reasoning.

The Toulmin model is seen by most fundamentally

as a tool useful in the evaluation of ideas and the connections among them.

It is this assumption about the

value of the Toulmin model which seems to have led to its
adoption by so many speech communication textbook writers.
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After all, among the goals of the Speech Communication
Association are "encouraging and developing instructional
programs for • • • effective decision-making, • • • critical analysis of persuasive messages, • . • use of ideas and
arguments supported by the evidence. 1166 In addition, a
recent survey of Basic Speech Communication courses at
American colleges and universities indicates that more than
fifty-five percent of basic courses with a public speaking
orientation and nearly forty-four percent of those with a
combination of public speaking, interpersonal, and group
communication orientation devote a significant amount of
time to the teaching of reasoning. 6 7 Over ninety percent
of the basic courses surveyed are taught with one or the
other of these formats.

Thus, it may fairly be concluded

that the teaching of reasoning is an important aspect of
speech communication instruction.

As a model of the

rational aspects of intrapersonal communication, the Toulmin model may fill a need in our discipline.

In summary, the Toulmin model has been associated in
speech communication textbooks with applications in nearly
every communication setting.

However, it is at the level

of intrapersonal communication, as a model of reasoning
or rational thinking that most speech communication professionals appear to locate the primary value of Toulmin's
approach.

Because intrapersonal communication is presumed

to be a part of every other communication setting, the
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applicability of the Toulmin model does not appear to be
limited to one setting or another; potentially, it may be
applicable to all.

In other words, general applications

of the Toulmin model discussed in the final section of this
chapter have been found to be pertinent to all communication settings except perhaps mediated communication.

APPLICATIONS OF THE TOULMIN MODEL TO
RHETORICAL DISCOURSE JN GENERAL
Toulmin's layout was intended to serve as a "pattern
of analysis," a way of describing "the operation of arguments sentence by sentence" to clearly display the sources
of soundness. 68 Most speech communication textbook writers
surveyed propose that the Toulmin model be used in the analysis of arguments and, as noted above, as a paradigm of the
reasoning process.

These writers appear to agree that the

Toulmin model may be suitable for the analysis of rhetorical
discourse from any field.

However, these writers appear to

differ as to whether Toulmin's pattern of analysis is primarily descriptive or evaluative, concerned with sentence
by sentence or overall organization, helpful in dealing
with the products or the process of argumentation.

In some

cases, such differences are subtle and possibly attributable to the special purposes of particular textbook presentations of the Toulmin model.

However, these differences

are worth considering because they are indicative of the
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breadth of suggested applications of the Toulmin model to
rhetorical discourse among those speech communication textbook writers who agree with Toulmin's view of the model as
a tool of analysis.
Two kinds of applications of the Toulmin model to
rhetorical discourse in general are discussed:

(1) in rhe-

torical criticism, retrospective analysis for the evaluation of arguments; and (2) in inventio and dispositio, the
first two canons of rhetoric, prospective analysis for the
development and organization of arguments in a message.
The Toulmin Model in Rhetorical
Criticism
As discussed in chapter II, Toulmin limited his discussion in The Uses of Argument, hence the applicability of
his model, to retrospective arguments brought in justification of assertions.

Some textbooks remain bound to this

limitation by emphasizing the retrospective analysis of
arguments for their description and evaluation.

Toulmin,

Rieke, and Janik introduce the Toulmin model first as a
descriptive device and second as an aid to the critical
evaluation of arguments. 6 9 They focus on the products of
argumentation, arguments already in verbal form, and they
make no explicit comments concerning how a descriptive
analysis can be useful in message design.7°

In their view,

the model provides the means of evaluation:

identification

of the purposes and elements of an argument, explication of

268

the force and structure of an argument, and opportunities
for clear comparisons within and among fields as well as

across history.7 1
Arnold, like Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, is concerned
with the products of argumentation and their retrospective
analysis.

Analysis of an argument in terms of the Toulmin

model is seen by Arnold aH one step in the overall process
of rhetorical criticism.7 2 The model is conceived of as
an aid to determining the role of arguments, if any, in a
speech, the manner of persuasion, the degree of contraversiality for a particular audience of parts of a message
and the specific force of the verbal content of a sentence,
paragraph, or the overall message of a speech.73
The authors discussed above, as well as Cronkhite,
and Condon and Yousif, give primary emphasis to the descriptive value of the Toulmin model in retrospective analysis.
In all other textbooks surveyed, the authors stress the
evaluative aspect of analysis, particularly as it pertains
to the process of message design.

Only Blankenship and

Scheidel present the Toulmin model as a description of the
process of argument at all, and along with Minnick and
Bryant and Wallace, these authors emphasize its role in the
"analysis of decision-making in speech communication."7 4
In the brief presentations made by each of these authors,
it is uncertain just how a student can usefully apply the
Toulmin model to his decision-making in speech preparation.
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Other speech communication textbook writers are also
less than clear on this point, but many appear to presume
the applicability of the Toulmin model in the retrospective
analysis and evaluation of arguments without specifically
discussing procedures of this application.

Further, they

appear to view the model as equally applicable in the retrospective and prospective analysis of arguments.

Gulley

claims that the Toulmin model is better suited than other
models to problem-solving group discussion "for laying out
arguments, both for expressing a line of reasoning quickly
in the group situation and also for testing arguments
others have advanced."75

Similarly, Rieke and Sillars iden-

tify the Toulmin model as "an analytical device that could
be used before or after the actual written or oral argument
is prepared (or after it has been heard)."7 6 In other
words, according to these authors the Toulmin model is not
limited to its application in the retrospective analysis
of arguments.
Ehrlinger and Brockriede are perhaps most explicit in
pointing out the usefulness of the Toulmin model in detecting
deficiencies in proofs before, during, and after a debate as
well as in lending assistance to the debater in assembling
reasonable proofs and organizing them into circuit-like
structures for presentation.77

Their enthusiasm for the

"anytime" applicability of the Toulmin model appears to have
been eroded somewhat by comments from readers of the first
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edition of their textbook, for in their second edition,
Ehninger and Brockriede express a more qualified conception
of the usefulness of the model in message design.

They

state:
We want to make explicit and emphatic our opinion
that the Toulmin model has little utility in
creating proofs. Its value lies in criticizing
them--before, during and after a debate.'78
Again, in another place, they state:
The Toulmin model is not a scheme for building
units of proof but for criticizing them; nevertheless, persons may view topoi [that is, fieldinvariant or field-dependent warrant forms] as
"places to look for help in criticizing rationales
for units of proof.79
Thus, at least in the context of its application in
academic debate, these authors emphasize the critical
functions of the Toulmin model.

One may use the model to

retrospectively analyze ones own or anothers proposed or
expressed arguments to assess their strengths and weaknesses; however one may not use the model prospectively
to develop or organize arguments for a message.
The Toulmin Model in Inventio
and Dispositio
As the preceding discussion indicates, whether or not
it is stressed in their textbook presentations, the use of
the Toulmin model in the description and evaluation of
already verbalized arguments is apparently recognized by
speech communication textbook writers.

Ehninger and Brock-

riede emphatically deny that the model has a prospective
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application, that is, they deny that it may be used in the
creation of proofs.

However, there are some writers who

propose primarily prospective applications for the Toulmin
model.
The prospective applications mentioned in speech communication textbooks generally involve one or both of the
first two canons of rhetoric.

These are:

inventio, con-

cerned with the selection of materials to be used in a message, determining which proofs a speaker or writer should
use; and dispositio, concerned with the organizational
structure of a message and the arrangement of proofs within
•t • 80

l

Except for textbooks discussed in the previous section,
most textbooks surveyed were found to recommend that the
Toulmin model be utilized in the construction and testing
of arguments to be used in a message.

This appears to be

the primary application explicitly discussed in speech communication textbooks.

Bettinghaus in Miller and Nilsen

presents a step-by-step list of instructions regarding how
to construct an argument using each of the elements of the
Toulmin model. 81 Other authors are less precise about the
procedures to be used. 82

Bradley argues that the Toulmin

model is helpful as a guideline for students who wish their
messages to possess an aura of credibility which sound
argument generates. 8 3 Thus, while none deny the value of
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the Toulmin model in reptrospective analysis, some writers
stress its prospective function in inventio.
Some speech communication textbook writers, for
example, Book et al., and Bradley, argue that the only
4
prospective use of the Toulmin model is in inventio.B
Bradley states "It is not a plan for organizing a speech
nor even necessarily a plan for organizing an argument in
a speech."B5

This position is in direct contrast to other

writers who contend that the Toulmin model may be useful
in dispositio, that is, "helpful to the communicator in
organizing his materials into formal argumentative units
for presentation to an audience. 11 B6 Bettinghaus in Miller
and Nilsen carries this position further, suggesting "that
the model is also applicable to the organization of the
entire speech."B7

Writers who do not express specific

positions on this issue appear to be primarily concerned
with the use of the Toulmin model to ensure that arguments
chosen by a student for use in speeches meet minimum
criteria of rationality.BB
Thus, there appears to be some disagreement about the
suitability of the model in dispositio as a plan for the
organization of an argument or a chain of arguments for
presentation in a message.

At the same time, many writers

agree that the Toulmin model may be helpful in inventio to
help a student create arguments.

These prospective applica-

tions of the Toulmin model to the first two canons of
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rhetoric represent an extension of Toulmin's approach which
is limited to retrospective analysis of arguments.

SUMMARY
Three kinds of applications for the Toulmin model
have been examined in this chapter:

to (1) field-invariant

categories of argument, (2) specific fields relevant to
speech communication, and (3) rhetorical discourse in
general.
The Toulmin model has been used in the exemplification and analysis of differences among general categories
of argument despite Toulmin's view of the irrelevance of
such field-invariant aspects of argument.

Two different

approaches to this application of the Toulmin model are
Eb.ninger and Brockriede's rhetorical approach and Hastings'
empirical approach to the classification of general categories of argument.

While each approach appears to have

its strengths and weaknesses, neither addresses the conflict this application of the Toulmin model creates with
theoretical bases of the Toulmin approach, in particular,
his field-dependent orientation.

It is concluded that the

Toulmin model may prove useful in the exemplification and
analysis of general categories if some acceptable means of
distinguishing field-invariance and field-dependence can
be devised and if the field-invariant assumptions which
underlie the warrants in each general form can be explicitly
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defined.

Further, it is suggested that several useful

distinctions may be obscured by the concept of fieldinvariance.

Investigation of these issues would be facil-

itated by a clarification of the epistemological assumptions of the field of speech communication.
The Toulmin model has been applied in textbooks to
special fields of argument relevant to speech communication.
Attempts have been made to integrate Toulmin's approach with
current rhetorical theory, psychological theories of attitude change, and intercultural communication theory.

The

model has been applied in textbooks to arguments in special
fields such as politics, law, science, and ethics.

Further,

the model has been associated with nearly every commonly
discussed communication setting.

Perhaps the most widely

recognized specific application of the Toulmin model is as
a model of rational thinking or the process of reasoning.
In speech communication textbooks, the Toulmin model
is more often applied to rhetorical discourse in general
than it is to any specific field of argument.
of application are discussed:

Two kinds

the more common is as a tool

of rhetorical criticism used in the retrospective analysis
and evaluation of arguments; also mentioned in some textbooks is the use of the Toulmin model in the prospective
analysis of arguments in inventio or dispositio, that is,
the creation and organization of arguments for presentation
in a message.

There is some disagreement as to whether the
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second of these applications is a sound idea.

However,

most speech communication textbook writers appear to agree
with Brockriede and Ehninger's initial assessment of the
Toulmin model that "as a means of describing and testing
arguments" the Toulmin model is superior to and "provides
a practical replacement" for the syllogism of formal
logic. 8 9

'
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Chapter 5--Notes
1 see this study, chapter II, pp. 51-53.
2 Brockriede and Ehninger in Golden et al., pp. 178180; Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed., pp. 125-167; 2nd
ed., pp. 73-91; Hastings in Mills, pp. 128-147; Windes and
Hastings, pp. 159-188; Ehninger, pp. 67-81; Freeley, pp. 145147; Rieke and Sillars, pp. 80-87; Reasoning, pp. 147-155;
Bettinghaus, pp. 109-110; Blankenship, pp. 171-177; Bradley,
pp. 211-223; McCroskey, pp. 89-99; Verdeber, pp. 186-193.
3see Mills, 2nd ed., p. 186. "Reasoning" types may
be found in Bradley, Freeley, and Verdeber. "Proof" patterns may be found in Bettinghaus, Ehninger and Brockriede,
1st ed . , and Hastings in Mills. "Warrant" classifications
are found in Blankenship, Ehninger and Brockriede, 2nd ed.,
and McCroskey. Other writers use "argument" forms or other
headlines.
4 Mills, 2nd ed., pp. 185-188.
5Ibid., p. 188.

6 Ibid., p. 191.

7Each of these five categories appears in at least
eleven of the fourteen textbooks examined; the first three
forms appear in all textbooks treating general categories
of argument. Causation is assumed to include both cause/
effect and effect/cause arguments which are in some textbooks treated as independent categories. Similarly, analogy
is assumed to include both figurative and literal analogies,
also sometimes treated independently. Classification
includes "definition" or "deductive" arguments which both
depend upon the relationship of classes of phenomena.
8 Reasoning, p. 155.
9Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument," p. 47.
lOibid.; see also Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed.,
p. 125.
11 Brockriede and Ebninger, "Toulmin on Argument," p. 51.
"We have exhibited the structural unity of the three modes
of proof by showing how they may be reduced to a single
invariant pattern using argument as a unifying construct. 11
12 Corbett, p. 50.
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l3Ehninger and Brockriede, 2nd ed., p. 91; "any unit
of proof can be defined and diagrammed predominantly as an
analogy, an authoritative proof or a motivational proof;
but its assessment by arguers, opponents and jud~es will be

made best by recognizing that in most instances (if not
all) several warrants have to be taken into account (even
though Toulmin's layout is not complex enough to handle
all of them in one diagram)."
14 Ehninger and Brockriede, 2nd ed., p. 92. These
authors compare these general categories of argument to
Aristotle's "general topoi" which are field-invariant, that
is, applicable to all arguments. While they acknowledge
the existence of "special topoi" which they view as equivalent to Toulmin's field-dependent sources of soundness,
their analyses are focused upon the field-invariant categories.
l5Respectively, "Toulmin on Argument," now in Golden
et al., and Decision by Debate, 1st and 2nd editions.
16 "Statistics" appears only in the 1st edition of
Decision by Debate, pp. 148-154. Because it has appeared
in no subsequent textbook, it will not be discussed here
as a category of proof.
1 7Ehninger and Brockriede, p. 125.
18 The degree to which field-invariant assumptions are
implied by the followers of Ehninger and Brockriede varies,
yet none provide a clear explanation of field-invariant
assumptions or examples which illustrate them. The collective result of these presentations is confusing. Textbooks
by Bettinghaus, Freeley, and Rieke and Sillars include
examples of warrants which appear to be field-dependent.
See Freeley, p. 145. On the other hand, Bradley, Eb.ninger,
and Verdeber imply field-invariance for all of their categories of argument and reinforce this implication by
supplying field-invariant tests or questions. See Bradley,
pp. 212-220; Ehninger, pp. 80-81; Verdeber, pp. 187-191.
Still there are no references to field-invariant assumptions
which underlie the warrant nor any examples which are
clearly consistent with this notion.
l9Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed., p. 134.
20
Ibid., p. 127, 129, 132, 139, 143, 145, 159, 163.
See also McCroskey, p. 98, who refers to an assumption
but unclearly.
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21 Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed., p. 135.
22 Blankenship, pp. 173-174. The discursive example
is drawn from the transcripts of the Nixon-Kennedy presidential candidate's debate of 26 September 1960.
2 3Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed., p. 139, 143, 159.
24 Ibid., p. 145. Similar questions may be raised
about motivational proof, pp. 163-165. Rieke and Sillars,
pp. 78-88, and Ehninger, pp. 73-79 appear to make other
errors of analysis and exemplification.
2 5Ehninger and Brockriede, 1st ed., p. 127, 132, 143,
163, 165.
26
Ibid., p. 129.
2 7Blankenship, p. 173. This discursive example is
drawn from a transcription of John F. Kennedy's "Cuban
Missile Address."
28 For an approach which identifies field-invariant
assumptions and discusses their relationship with warrants
in each category of argument, see Gibson, unpublished
manuscript.
2 9Hastings' work appears in two textbooks: Mills,
1st ed., pp. 125-148; Windes and Hastings, especially
pp. 157-189. His work has apparently not generated the
kind of following which Ehninger and Brockriede's has.
30Hastings in Mills, p. 128; see footnote.
3lArthur Hastings "A Reformulation of the Modes of
Reasoning in Argumentation," Dissertation Abstracts, 23
(1962), 4016A (Northwestern University).
32 This ranking reflects the frequency with which he
found such forms being used in his sampling of arguments
from various fields. In Windes and Hastings, ten categories of argument are identified, some of them different
than the nine categories of his dissertation and Mills'
1st edition.
33Hastings' nine categories are: argument from
(1) example to a descriptive generalization, (2) criteria
to a verbal classification, (3) definition to characteristics, (4) sign to unobserved event, (5) cause to effect,
(6) circumstantial evidence to hypotheses, (7) comparison,
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(8) analogy, and (9) authority or testimony. In Mills, 1st
ed., p. 142, Hastings refers to (4) as "observed effect to
an unobserved cause." In Windes and Hastings, p. 162, a
new category is added "characteristics to a value judgment
(by criteria of value)", while other categories are relabeled
and (2) and (4) are apparently replaced by a catchall category, "other processes of reasoning." See pp. 159-185.
34 on the other hand, Hastings pays relatively little
attention to the secondary elements of the Toulmin model-backing, rebuttal, and qualifier.
35Hastings in Mills, p. 129, 131, 133, 137, 140, 145,
146.
3 6 Ibid., p. 130, 132, 135, 137, 140, 143, 144, 145,
146.
37see, for instance, the description of the warrant
in argument from circumstantial evidence to a hypothesis,
Hastings in Mills, p. 144.
38windes and Hastings, pp. 104-150.
39Hastings in Mills, p. 129.
41 Ibid., p. 134, 133 respectively.
40 Ibid., p. 133.
42 Arnold, pp. 61-62.
4 3condon and Yousif, pp. 228-230.
44 A multiplicity of standards may be applicable to
any particular argument. Some may draw their authority
from a specific field, others from a cultural-orientation
and, perhaps, others which are inherent in universal features in the structure of human language. While this view
somewhat complicates what may be implied by "standards of
argument,'' it also provides a middle ground between the
field-invariant orientation of formal logicians and,
apparently, some speech communication textbook writers and
the field-dependent orientation of Toulmin.
4
5Human Understanding, pp. 378-380.
46
Ibid., pp. 395-411. What Toulmin terms nondisciplinary activities and would-be disciplines fit this category where a common assumptive base is unavailable. Toulmin might consider rational argument in such areas unlikely
if not impossible.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Just as it was Toulmin's intention in The Uses of
Argument not to solve problems but to draw attention to
them, so the purpose of this study has been to survey the
development of the Toulmin model as applied to speech communication and formulate questions which it is hoped will
lend impetus and direction to subsequent research.

In

this chapter the major findings of this study are summarized
followed by a discussion of main issues and implications for
further research.

SUM1'1.ARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
Major findings are presented here in four parts, each
representative of a main line of inquiry, chapter division,
and answer to one of the general questions toward which
this study has been directed:
In what ways may the Toulmin approach be viewed as

an innovation in the field of logic?

To what extent

and in what ways has the Toulmin model been developed
through exposure to philosophical criticism?

To

what extent and in what ways has the Toulmin model
been developed through interpretation by speech
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communication professionals?

What effect has devel-

opment of the Toulmin model had upon its various
potential applications to speech communication?
The conclusions drawn in the following are based upon an
analysis first of published criticisms of the Toulmin
approach and second of selected speech communication textbook discussions of the Toulmin model.
Formal Logic and the
Toulmin Approach

In chapter II, the Toulmin approach is compared to
formal logic.

Both are in general concerned with an assess-

ment of the soundness, truth-value, or acceptability of
assertions in argument.

However, the specific assumptions,

aims, and patterns of analysis of the two approaches differ.
The Toulmin model may be viewed as an innovation in the
field of logic because it is designed to accomplish the
same general ends while avoiding the limitations of formal
logic and the syllogism.
Characterized in earlier discussion as a linear theoretical perspective, formal logic is founded on the assumption that there is an absolute structure to reality such
that sound conclusions may properly be inferred from true
propositions, much as quantities are calculated in mathematics or geometry.

The specific aim of analysis in formal

logic is the determination of formal validity which may be
considered tantamount to truth.

The model for analysis
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used in such determinations is the syllogism, actually a
set of rules governing the relationship of meaningful

elements of sentences linked in an argument.

Toulmin

criticizes formal logic for its idealized assumptions,
irrelevant aims, and simplistic model used in analysis--all
which he believes contribute to the impracticality of
applying formal logic to arguments in general.
The Toulmin approach to logical argument represents
an attempt to avoid the limitations of formal logic with
the aim of developing a more practical and applicable
logic.

Characterized in earlier discussion as a systems

theoretical perspective, the Toulmin approach assumes a
world of relative probabilities, the strength and soundness
of which are subject to description and comparison in a
manner analogous to jurisprudential procedure.

The specific

aim of the Toulmin approach is the candid description of
methods of justification used in an argument and the degree
of force associated with each justification.

The model for

analysis in terms of which justificatory arguments can be
described is the Toulmin model.

More complex than the syl-

logism, the Toulmin model distinguishes the elements of an
argument according to their functions--drawing attention
to several previously neglected features of argument.
Perhaps the most significant innovative aspect of
the Toulmin model is that it may be used to describe the
degree of strength or soundness of arguments which,
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according to the rules of the syllogism, may be judged
formally invalid and therefore unsound.

This is possible

because the Toulmin model relies on criteria which are
field-dependent, that is, specific to well-defined fields
of inquiry.

Formal logic on the other hand, relies on

field-invariant criteria, that is, universal principles
which are applicable to arguments in any field at any time.
The Toulmin approach derives the broad applicability and
practicality claimed for it primarily from this distinction
between field-dependent and field-invariant criteria and
its groundedness on the former.
Accordingly, the Toulmin approach may be said to represent an innovation in the field of logic.

While sharing

the same general goal as formal logic, the Toulmin approach
differs in its assumptions, specific aims, model used in
analysis, and criteria.

These innovations are aimed at

increasing the practical applicability of logic to substantial as well as analytic arguments.
Criticisms of the Toulmin
Approach: Implications
for Development of the
Toulmin Model
In chapter III, principally philosophical criticisms

are surveyed to determine what weaknesses, limitations, or
difficulties may be inherent in the Toulmin approach.
Critical claims regarding the Toulmin approach in general
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and the Toulmin model specifically are summarized and found
to reflect the nearly unanimous skepticism of philosophers

schooled in formal logic.

These consistently negative

responses support a hypothesis that the difference between
formal logicians and Toulmin is deeper than a disagreement
over Toulmin's innovative proposals; rather the difference
may be indication of a conflict in their fundamental theoretical perspectives.

Available supports for this hypoth-

esis are examined.
General Objections to Toulmin's Approach.

Formal

logicians have four general objections to Toulmin's
approach:

(1) his ideas are unoriginal, derived from other

modern logicians; (2) his concepts of formal logic are
obsolete; (3) his proposals are not innovative, but essentially the same as current practices; and (4) his proposals
are too innovative, discarding essential and useful features of formal logic.

With regard to the effect of these

criticisms on the development of the Toulmin model, there
are two reasons why these objections may be judged inconsequential so far as speech communication is concerned.
First, these objections are contradictory--they cannot all
be true.

Apparently, while agreeing that the Toulmin

approach is unacceptable, formal logicians as a whole do
not agree as to why this is so.

Their rejection of the

Toulmin approach is therefore suspect.

At best no conclu-

sion can be drawn from such controversial criticism.
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Second, none of these general objections by itself constitutes sufficient grounds for rejection of the Toulmin
approach.

One may grant its unoriginality, obsolescence,

lack or excess of iilllovation without affecting the potential usefulness of applicability of the Toulmin approach
to speech communication.

Investigation of the philosophi-

cal implications of the Toulmin approach should not end in
these four general objections, for they appear to leave the
matter unsettled.

Additionally, because none of them

appears to affect the potential applicability of the Toulmin approach to speech communication, they may be judged
inconsequential to the present study.
Specific Objections to Toulmin's Model.

Formal logi-

cians present several specific objections to the pattern of
analysis proposed by Toulmin, the Toulmin model.
the primary objections are:

Briefly,

(1) several of Toulmin's

functionally-defined elements, notably data, warrant, and
backing, caIUlot be reliably distinguished; (2) backing cannot provide any real justification because there can be no
final justification in logic, only an infinitely regressive
chain of justificatory arguments; (3) the concept of data
as discussed by Toulmin is questionable; and (4) one cannot
know for certain what Toulmin means by the phrase "warrantestablishing argument."

Each of these objections has

direct bearing on the potential applicability of the Toulmin
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model and the directions its development may usefully take.
These are discussed below.

1.

Two main conclusions may be drawn from objections

regarding the distinguishability of elements of the Toulmin
model.

First, Toulmin never claimed that functional ele-

ments may be easily distinguished; however, his failure to
offer precise definitions and illustrative examples of arguments in various fields has tended to leave room for confusion.

Especially in the cases of data, warrant, and

backing, Toulmin has only hinted at the relative degrees
of generality associated with each, and he never compares
their essential features in a manner which would clarify
the distinctiveness of each element.

Such clarification

would increase the practical applicability of the model.
Second, formal logicians on the whole seem to object to the
delineation of nearly every functional element for which
there is no counterpart in the syllogism--the innovative
features of the Toulmin model.

Some speech communication

writers do not appear to encounter the same difficulties as
formal logicians in distinguishing the differing functions
of, for example, warrant and backing or data and rebuttal.
While it may be granted that functionally-defined elements
are not as obviously distinct as the linguistically-defined
elements of the syllogism, this is not to suggest that Toulmin' s elements cannot be reliably distinguished.

If the

bases for making such distinctions can be made clearer and
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more precise perhaps through the development of specific
procedures of definition and the selection of illustrative

examples drawn from discourse, then this objection may be
disregarded.
2.

Formal logicians object to Toulmin's apparent

satisfaction with backing as representative of justification in argument.

They argue that any resort to separate

assurances such as the criteria in backing constitutes not
justification but a separate argument--the first in an
infinitely regressive chain of arguments.

In other words,

there can be no real justification for anything, according
to formal logicians.

Wb.ile this objection may have a

sound philosophical basis, Toulmin contends that it has no
relevance to argument as practiced in human affairs.

If

there could be no practical justification, then there would
be no rational basis for choosing from among alternative
conclusions.

Yet in every field there exists some system-

atic basis for making choices.
As implied by earlier discussions of the conflict
between linear and systems theoretical perspectives, the
crux of the problem is this:

formal logicians and Toulmin

mean different things when they use the term "justification."

To Toulmin, justification refers to the field-

dependent criteria resorted to when the soundness of a
warrant is challenged, in other words, "backing."

To

formal logicians, justification refers to field-invariant
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criteria which are universal and absolute.

Toulmin might

agree with formal logicians who conclude that there can be

no final or absolute justification for an argument.

In

human affairs, however, criteria which are at least temporarily acceptable within a special field are commonly
resorted to as justification for arguments.

It is doubtful

that many formal logicians would accept this interpretation
of justification.
The source of this objection to Toulmin's backing
appears on the surface to be a semantic difference over the
term "justification."

This may only be symptomatic, how-

ever, of deeper theoretical differences.

More to the point,

the two concepts of justification need not be viewed as
mutually exclusive, and therefore this objection does not
present any obstacle to the potential applicability of the
Toulmin model to speech communication.

3.

Formal logicians raise a number of questions

about data for which Toulmin presents no explicit answers.
First, may data include multiple items as the term implies
or is the Toulmin model only applicable in arguments based
on a single datum?

Second, are data subject to qualifica-

tion; that is, wouldn't the candidness of the model be
increased if modal qualifiers were appended to the data as
well as to the claim in arguments where the data are less
than absolute?

Third, along the same lines, wouldn't the

candidness of the model be increased if there was an
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independent element specifying support for data in the
same way that backing specifies support for the warrant?

Although not emphasized by formal logicians, it is apparent
that each of these questions results from a confusion over
the size and complexity of arguments to which the Toulmin
model may be applied.

Toulmin discusses only micro-

arguments which yield most easily to analysis and involve
only single items of data.

Yet he nowhere explicitly pro-

hibits or advises against applying the model to more complicated arguments as they may occur, for example, in rhetorical discourse.

On the other hand, neither does he

discuss procedures for the analysis of extended arguments
which frequently involve multiple and qualified items of
data as well as complex linkages among micro-arguments and
major claims.

Thus, formal logicians appear to have iden-

tified some significant issues concerning the nature of
data.

How and if these issues may be resolved is a matter

of direct consequence to the applicability of the Toulmin
model to speech communication.
4.

The nature of warrant-establishing arguments is

never clearly explained by Toulmin, as some formal logicians have indicated.

While the concept of warrant-

establishing vs. warrant-using arguments appears to be
introduced by Toulmin merely to make a point about the
nature of induction and deduction, it is unfortunate that
Toulmin is not clearer on this point.

There are at least

293
two ways to interpret how a warrant-establishing argument
may be analyzed in terms of the Toulmin model.

It may be

that either interpretation is adequate, although this
determination will depend upon further investigation.

This

objection to the Toulmin model is, however, judged relatively inconsequential in that it appears that arguments
may be analyzed with the Toulmin model regardless of any
determination of whether they are warrant-using or warrantestablishing.
Other issues which receive only the passing attentions
of formal logicians may be raised about the Toulmin model.
For instance, Toulmin's assumption that argument is best
viewed retrospectively may be challengeable.

Aren't there

practical situations in which argument functions prospectively, that is, when claims are discovered through the
creative application of warrants to data?

Whether the

Toulmin model would be applicable to such cases is uncertain.
Further, the relationship of the Toulmin model to the syllogism remains unsettled.

According to Toulmin, formal

logic and the syllogism are inherently limited if not defective, and should therefore be discarded in favor of his
more candid practical approach.

Yet, if the two approaches

differ so much as to their aims and assumptions they need
not be viewed as incompatible.

Certainly the question of

whether or not the Toulmin model represents an alternative
or complement to the syllogism is an important one.
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Finally, Toulmin's assumption that field-invariant aspects
of argument are irrelevant to that upon which the soundness
of argument depends may be the single most controversial
feature of his approach.

More than any other, it is this

assumption which separates Toulmin from formal logicians.
The question is to what extent may field-invariant aspects
of argument be considered irrelevant?

Unless one is pre-

pared to discard them entirely as Toulmin seems to suggest,
their role in the analysis of argument is uncertain.

Many

formal logicians and, as it turns out, speech communication
textbook writers choose not to disregard them.

The rela-

tionship of field-invariant and field-dependent aspects of
argument and the relevance of each to the soundness of an
argument is an important matter for further investigation.
An Hypothesis:

Conflicting Theoretical Perspectives.

An obvious conclusion about the responses of formal logi-

cians to Toulmin's innovative proposals is that they have
been vigorous and almost unanimously negative.

One expla-

nation for this might be that Toulmin's approach is indeed
without merit.

Occasionally a weak theory or poor idea

will gain popularity in a particular field; perhaps this
is the case with the Toulmin model in speech communication.
On the other hand, the near total disagreement expressed by
formal logicians regarding Toulmin's view of the nature of
logical argument and the values of analysis suggests
another hypothesis:

Toulmin and formal logicians are not
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working within the same theoretical perspective.

To formal

logicians, logical argument has an absolute structure

involving elements which function in a causal, deterministic manner.

Such assumptions are consistent with a linear

theoretical perspective.

In contrast, Toulmin assumes the

structure of logical argument to be more relative, evinced
by the bi-directional interaction among its functionallydefined elements.

Such relativism is consistent with a

systems theoretical perspective.

The difference in the

fundamental assumptions of these theoretical perspectives
would at the very least inhibit the comprehensibility of
Toulmin's approach to formal logicians--and vice versa.
Moreover, the differences in theoretical perspectives
are not limited to the contrasting assumptions of Toulmin
and formal logicians; their specific aims diverge as well.
To formal logicians, the aims of logical analysis of argument are both prescriptive and evaluative--contributing to
the preservation of a standard against which all arguments
may be judged.

However, Toulmin's aims are both descrip-

tive and comparative.

His retrospective approach to logical

analysis is designed to provide the conceptual tools necessary to explain the epistemological functions of argument
and the role played by arguments in the evolution of ideas.
In other words, to Toulmin it is not the preservation of a

standard but the documentation of changing standards which
is of greatest interest.

Accordingly, he adheres to a
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systems theoretical perspective which is flexible enough
to facilitate his purpose.

The deterministic, linear theo-

retical perspective of formal logicians would appear to be
inadequate to the tasks Toulmin has in mind.
Just as Toulmin's objections to formal logic seem most
sensible when viewed from a systems perspective, so it is
that formal logicians' objections to the Toulmin approach
seem more sensible when viewed from a linear perspective.
This explanation of the gulf between Toulmin and formal
logicians is pertinent to the question of applicability of
the Toulmin model to speech communication in that among
speech communication professionals are both systems and
linear theorists.
Interpretations of Speech Communication
Professionals: Implications for
Development of the Toulmin
Model
In chapter IV are presented the results of a survey of
twenty-seven speech communication textbook editions in which
the Toulmin model is discussed.

How Toulmin's innovative

approach is represented in these textbooks and what that may
indicate about the interpretations of speech communication
professionals is the focus of this discussion.
tures of these presentations are discussed:

Five fea-

(1) theoretical

bases of the Toulmin approach; (2) the Toulmin diagrammatic
model and variations; (3) terminology and definitions of
the elements of the Toulmin model; (4) illustrative examples
of arguments analyzed with the Toulmin model; and (5)
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discussions of the syllogism in conjunction with presentations of the Toulmin model.

In general, speech communica-

tion textbook writers have appropriated the Toulmin model
for their own purposes regardless of the objections of formal logicians to the Toulmin approach.

However, the vari-

ous attempts to develop the model have led to wide diversity
of interpretations and apparent disagreements regarding many
features of the Toulmin model.
Theoretical Bases.

The theoretical bases of the Toul-

min approach are in general poorly represented in speech
communication textbooks.

As might be expected, argumenta-

tion and debate textbooks embody more of these concepts
than do oral communication textbooks.

Nevertheless, in most

cases theoretical bases of the Toulmin model are either
explicitly absent or implicitly contradicted in textbook
presentations.

Only a few textbooks are found to discuss

the significance of field-dependent sources of soundness,
the probable nature of substantive claims, and other relativistic assumptions of the Toulmin approach.
An apparent consequence of the poor representation of

theoretical bases of the Toulmin approach is the confusing
diversity of interpretations it promotes.

For example, the

distinction between field-invariance and field-dependence
is ignored in most textbooks.

However, in several textbooks

the notion of field-dependent criteria appears to have been
substituted with a rhetorical concept--audience-dependent
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criteria.

Similarly, probability and other relativistic

aspects of the Toulmin approach are seldom discussed,
lending support to an absolute and static view of argument
more in harmony with the linear perspective of formal logic
than the systems perspective of the Toulmin approach.
On the basis of the foregoing it may be concluded
that many speech communication textbook writers diverge
from the Toulmin approach by failing to acknowledge his
theoretical assumptions.

Whether the resulting diversity

of interpretations should be considered distortions or
developments of the Toulmin model probably depends upon
one's theoretical perspective.
Diagrammatic Model and Variations.

The Toulmin model

as represented in textbooks is not a single, recognizable
construct but actually a number of models which vary in
their complexity, structure, and definitive characteristics.
Diagrammatic models appear to come in three varieties:
standard, consisting of Toulmin's six elements in roughly
their original configuration; truncated, consisting of
fewer than six elements; and extended, consisting of more
than six elements or presuming more elaborate relationships
among elements than in a standard diagram.
Few standard diagrammatic models are presented in
speech communication textbooks.

Most authors present some

sort of truncated diagram of the Toulmin model, omitting
one or more of its innovative features.

Indeed, some
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diagrams are so truncated so as to resemble syllogisms on
their sides with major premise, minor premise, and conclu-

sion simply relabelled as warrant, data, and claim, respectively.

Extended diagrams, on the other hand, generally

emphasize innovative features of the Toulmin model by
adapting it to complex forms of argument.

Most extended

diagrams appear to provide various answers to some of the
questions posed by formal logicians.

Notably, extended

diagrammatic models exemplify the applicability of the
Toulmin model to macro-arguments, involving chains of interacting warrants and claims.

In addition, some extended dia-

grams involve the explication of multiple items of data in
support of a single claim as well as the inclusion of new
elements such as qualifiers appended to the data and elements indicating support for data.

On the whole, diagrammatic models presented in speech
communication textbooks constitute a confusing assortment,
even though nearly all of them are at least partially
attributed to Toulmin.
Terminology and Definitions of Elements.

Just as

there is diversity in interpretations of Toulmin's diagrammatic model, so is there also diversity in interpretations
of definitions of the elements.

While the concepts repre-

sented are ostensibly the same, some authors use substitute
terminology to refer to the elements of the Toulmin model.
More significant than differences in terminology are
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differences in definitions of the elements themselves.
According to speech communication textbooks:

(a) claim is

generally conceived as applying to both macro-arguments and
micro-arguments; (b) qualifier and warrant are generally
defined roughly as Toulmin suggests; (c) the term data is
defined differently by different authors, some emphasizing
its factual specificity, others emphasizing its credibility
to a particular audience; (d) rebuttal is defined roughly
the same by all, but there appears to be disagreement as
to the conditions for its use; and (e) backing, its nature
and conditions for use, is not clearly defined in most
cases.

Most variations in definitions are subtle; however,

overall there is a lack of precision and clarity in textbook definitions of the elements.
It may be significant that the imprecision of definition to which formal logicians have objected in Toulmin's
writing is also characteristic of presentations of the
Toulmin model in speech communication textbooks.

In other

words, speech communication textbook writers have not contributed to a needed clarification of Toulmin's terms.

They

may have added new opportunities for confusion with their
various definitions.

As previously suggested, this diver-

sity of definitions may be related to the apparent failure
of many writers to recognize the extent to which Toulmin's
theoretical perspective differs from that of formal logicians.
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Illustrative Examples.

Two kinds of illustrative

examples characterize textbook presentation of the Toulmin
model:

invented, including arguments created or freely

adapted from discourse to suit the needs of the presentation; and discursive, arguments drawn from specifically
cited public speeches or published essays.

Most textbooks

are found to include only a minimal number of invented
examples.

Few present discursive examples and even fewer

present both kinds of illustrative examples.

Some of the

invented examples are found to illustrate quasi-syllogistic
arguments which do not have features that may be distinctively displayed with the Toulmin model.

In some instances,

the illustrative examples presented appear to be in error-inconsistent with verbal explanations of the Toulmin model.
Ideally, textbook presentations would include illustrative examples of both kinds, invented and discursive.
In this way confusion as to the nature of the elements
might be avoided and procedures of analysis might be made
clearer.

In any case, illustrative examples which are

limited to syllogistic arguments or are inconsistent with
verbal explanations are bound to be detrimental to the
clear transmission of Toulmin's innovative approach.
Discussion of the Syllogism.

It cannot be determined

from speech communication textbook presentations of the
Toulmin model whether it is conceived as an alternative or
complement to the syllogism.

In general, the Toulmin model
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is as likely to be presented in isolation as it is in conjunction with the syllogism.

Thus, there appears to be

some ambivalence or disagreement about the relative status
of each model of logical analysis in speech communication.
Application of the Toulmin Model as
Suggested in Speech Communication
Textbooks
In chapter V, proposed applications of the Toulmin
model are discussed.

It has been suggested by speech com-

munication professionals that the Toulmin model is applicable to:

(1) the analysis and exemplification of field-

invariant categories of argument; (2) specific fields
relevant to speech communication; and (3) rhetorical discourse in general.

As with other aspects of speech com-

munication textbook presentations already discussed, the
interpretations of speech communication professionals are
diverse and often in disagreement on finer points.

Overall,

however, writers who present the Toulmin model tend to be
optimistic about its applicability to sp.eech communication.
General Categories of Argument.

Some authors have

utilized the Toulmin model in the analysis and exemplification of general categories of argument.
found in textbooks:

Two approaches are

one introduced by Ehninger and Brock-

riede which has developed a following within speech communication relates the Toulmin model to concepts drawn from
classical rhetorical theory; another, introduced more
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recently by Hastings, draws its reformulated general categories from an empirical study of the frequency with which
they occur in actual arguments.

The two approaches appear

to overlap at many points, including the assumption that
general categories are field-invariant and that the Toulmin
model is useful in describing them.
While Toulmin apparently agrees that general categories are field-invariant, his field-dependent orientation
which is based on the assumption that field-invariant features of argument are irrelevant is clearly inconsistent
with attempts to apply the Toulmin model to general categories of argument.

Neither the rhetorical nor the empiri-

cal approach addresses the issue of field-invariance vs.
field-dependence.

No clear criteria for distinguishing

field-invariant from field-dependent aspects of argument
are identified; neither are the basic assumptions which
underlie each of the general categories explicitly identified.

Thus, the confusion which has long surrounded the

subject of general categories of argument has apparently
not much been reduced by this proposed application of the
Toulmin model.
The field-invariant/field-dependent distinction may
be the source of some of the controversy about general
categories of argument; it is, perhaps, a false dichotomy.
It has been suggested that general categories of argument
are not absolute universals as implied by the term
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"field-invariant," they may instead be culturally-based
assumptions about justification.

Though they may be super-

ceded by more exacting criteria drawn from a specialized
field as Toulmin suggests, cultural assumptions may in many
circumstances provide the only available logical criteria
for an argument.

Therefore, Toulmin's view to the contrary,

general categories of argument conceived as cultural assumptions may be relevant to analysis.

Such a reconciliation

between the positions of Toulmin and proponents of the
application of the Toulmin model to general categories may
only be accomplished through a clarification of the fieldinvariant/field-dependent distinction and the development
of clear criteria--the identification of basic assumptions-for each general category or form of argument.

Overall,

there is a need for clarification of the epistemological
assumptions of the field of speech communication; this
might expedite attempts to resolve the issues regarding the
nature of field-invariant assumptions.
Specific Fields Relevant to Speech Communication.

In

textbooks and other publications, applications to theories
from relevant fields, special fields subject to speech communication research and various communication settings have
been proposed.

The Toulmin model has been related to rhe-

torical theory, psychological theories of attitude change,
and intercultural communication theory as well as to specific fields such as politics, law, science, and ethics
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among others.

Further, it has been associated with argu-

ments in nearly all of the commonly discussed communication

settings.
Field-specific applications represent the direction
of theoretical development Toulmin appears to have hoped
his approach would undergo.

At present, all of these appli-

cations are fairly young and their usefulness is undetermined.

It is possible that as each special field interprets

the Toulmin model any number of unique variations may be
developed, each suited to its field of application.

The

Toulmin model appears to have potential value in a number
of fields and communication settings.

How much of this

potential will be realized remains to be seen.
Rhetorical Discourse in General.

Most of the text-

books surveyed advocate the application of the Toulmin model
in the analysis and determination of soundness of the arguments of rhetorical discourse in general.
application are discussed:

Two kinds of

retrospective analysis as in

rhetorical criticism, and prospective analysis as in
inventio and dispositio, the construction and arrangement
of arguments in a message.

Some take the position that the

model may be used both retrospectively and prospectively as
a paradigm of rational argument.

The only clear disagree-

ment appears to be between those authors who explicitly
advocate the use of the Toulmin model in dispositio as a
plan of organization and those who argue specifically
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against such an application.

The differences between pro-

ponents of the retrospective and prospective applications
of the Toulmin model may result from differences between
the two kinds of textbooks surveyed--argumentation and
debate textbooks on the one hand and oral communication
textbooks on the other.

The point is that the model is

being utilized in both ways in speech communication textbooks.

Generally, writers who present the Toulmin model

appear to believe that it is superior to the syllogism as
a means of describing and testing the soundness of arguments.
In summary, a wide range of applications have been
suggested for the Toulmin model by speech communication
professionals, nearly all of them based on the assumption
that the Toulmin model is representative of the process of
reasoning.

Whether the Toulmin model will achieve the

optimistic potential applications suggested for it by
speech communication professionals depends upon the extent
to which presently unresolved issues are addressed in subsequent research.

Without attempts to examine and hope-

fully resolve issues surrounding the application of the
Toulmin model in speech communication, the current trend
towards increasingly diverse and competitive interpretations of the Toulmin model may continue, thus furthering
the general confusion apparently associated with the
Toulmin approach.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study represents an attempt to document the evolution and current state of theoretical development of
Toulmin's approach to the study of argument.

Through this

review and analysis of salient literature, many issues have
been identified which bear upon the potential applicability
of the Toulmin model in speech communication.

These issues

comprise the major findings presented in the preceding summary.

Further research appears to be justified in a number

of areas.
While areas for future investigation have been alluded
to throughout this study, for the benefit of subsequent
researchers they are here collected and presented in an
order which emphasizes their interrelatedness.
involve:

These issues

(1) an apparent conflict of theoretical perspec-

tives; (2) confusion regarding the nature of fields of argument; and (3) confusion regarding the nature of the Toulmin
model.

Several research questions related to each general

issue are suggested.
Conflict of Theoretical
Perspectives
One explanation for the vastly different positions
advocated by formal logicians and Toulmin is that they are
working within conflicting theoretical frames of reference.
It appears that formal logicians in general conform to the
aims and assumptions of a linear perspective and that
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Toulmin's views in general conform to the aims and assumptions of a systems perspective.

The significance of this

apparent conflict of theoretical perspectives is that it
provides a basis for answering questions about the relative
usefulness of formal logic and the Toulmin approach in
speech communication, such as "Which approach or combination of the two approaches best suits the goals and methods
of speech communication?

Moreover, what are the goals and

methods of speech communication in this context?

Because

speech communication is an eclectic field comprised of
theorists working within various theoretical perspectives,
it may be that both approaches to logical argument may have
a useful role to play in studying different aspects of discourse or interpersonal behavior.

Specifically, which

approach may be most useful for which purpose is a subject
for further investigation.
Another important consequence of the conflicting
theoretical perspectives is the determination of the relationship in speech communication of the syllogism and the
Toulmin model.

Currently, textbooks may present either,

both, or some combination of the two models; authors apparently do not agree as to which may be the more useful and
candid tool for the analysis of arguments.

Three possible

relationships appear to be possible between these two
models:

alternative, in which one or the other is deter-

mined to be superior in most important respects or for the
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greater number of applications; complementary, in which the
different values of each approach are identified and their
respective domains of application determined; or synthetic,
in which the most valuable elements of each approach are
combined in a new model which is superior to both.

Some of

the proposed truncated and extended diagrammatic models
which appear in textbooks imply different authors' preferences as to the most useful features of each approach.
However, there is almost no published empirical support for
any one of the above relationships.

Therefore, what is

needed, in addition to the clarification of underlying theoretical assumptions, is comparative testing of the two
models--preferably on real arguments drawn from discourse.
In this way relative values indicating degrees of reliability, precision, intelligibility, and applicability can
be determined.
Confusion Regarding the
Nature of Fields
Many aspects of the Toulmin approach appear to require
clarification and more precise definition.

One of these is

the nature of fields of argument and, consequently, the
field-invariant/field-dependent distinction.

Basically

there is confusion as to what may properly be considered a
field and how apparently similar, overlapping, or related
fields--such as psychology, sociology, social-psychology,
and speech communication--may be distinguished.

Some
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authors appear to believe that any human enterprise, no
matter how diffuse its activities, may be usefully conceived

as a field in Toulmin's terms.

Others suggest that some

human enterprises qualify as fields while others may not,
and still others may be somewhere in between.

Because the

criteria which the Toulmin model is designed to explicate
are field-dependent, what may or may not be usefully conceived as a field is of primary importance.

Indeed, the

very nature of what constitutes "justification," hence
backing, depends upon how fields are defined.
Some aspects of argument are field-dependent according
to Toulmin, while others are field-invariant.

How these two

types of aspect are to be distinguished is a matter of confusion.

Further, in this study it is suggested that the

distinction itself may be misleading--a false dichotomy.
The field-dependent half of the dichotomy is only as clear
as the concept of fields of argument may be; the fieldinvariant half may have obscured within it any number of
potentially useful distinctions such as culture-dependence,
group-dependence, dyad-dependence, person-dependence, or
even species-dependence.

Any one of these hypothetical

constructs may prove useful in describing a source of
justification resorted to by some arguer in some forum of
argument or another.

Unless the field-invariant/field-

dependent dichotomy can be more carefully defined, broken
down into other distinctions, or linked with deeper
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underlying theoretical differences, it will remain a source
of confusion in the analysis of arguments.
In this study it has been suggested that field-

invariant forms of argument may more easily yield to observation if viewed as culturally-dependent assumptions about
justification.

This view may provide a bridge between the

study of argument as an interpersonal or linguistic phenomenon to its epistemic role in intercultural communication.

Further, if culturally-dependent assumptions can be

more precisely defined, they may provide a more agreeable
basis for the classification of general categories of argument than any other thus far proposed.
Returning to the subject of field-dependence, the
extent to which justification procedures in various fields
actually differ from one another, as Toulmin has claimed,
has yet to be determined.

Perhaps because the boundaries

which separate one field from the next have been so resistant to definition, comparative analyses of arguments in
different fields have yet to be performed.

Yet this is

one of the primary purposes for which the Toulmin model was
intended:

the description and comparison of justification

procedures and their evolution in various fields of inquiry.
Finally, Toulmin's claim that field-invariant aspects
of an argument have no relevance to its soundness or
strength appears to be the source of some disagreement and
confusion among writers of speech communication textbooks.
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Apparently there are many who disregard this fundament of
Toulmin's approach.

On the basis of the conclusions sum-

marized earlier, it appears possible that Toulmin may have
overstated his case.

The extent to which analyses of field-

invariant aspects of argument are relevant and useful to a
determination of the soundness and strength of argument is
a matter for further investigation.

If it can be shown

that a failure to attend to field-invariant features such
as the basic assumptions according to which arguments may
be classified into general categories reduces the degree
to which an analysis is candid and complete, then some
revision in Toulmin's position is in order.

It would be

most helpful if comparative studies were made of both fieldinvariant and field-dependent analyses of a variety of arguments.
Confusion Regarding the Nature
of the Toulmin Model
Given a clarification of paradigmatic differences
discussed above then there is the need for clarification of
many of Toulmin's concepts, particularly the elements of
the Toulmin model.

Formal logicians have criticized Toul-

min's initial presentation of his concepts for their lack
of clarity; some critics have hinted that Toulmin failed
to be more precise because his concepts themselves are
ambiguous and self-contradictory.

While speech communica-

tion textbook writers appear to be untroubled by this
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alleged lack of clarity, neither have they presented any
more precise definitions.

Thus, there is confusion about

several concepts related to the Toulmin model which must
be reduced if the model is to be made reliably applicable.
One source of imprecision in definitions of the elements is ambiguity about the scope of applicability of the
Toulmin model.

The model is obviously applicable to micro-

arguments, the smallest and simplest units of argument.
However, there is disagreement about its suitability to the
analysis of more complex extended arguments as they might
appear in discourse.

As a result, some authors present

modified, extended diagrams based upon the Toulmin model
which adapt it to common complex forms.

Others suggest

that the model may be applied to longer, more complex arguments if only one specifies the acceptability of multiple
data, adds an element to indicate support for data, or links
several diagrams together indicating a chain of arguments
leading to a conclusion.

Each of these maneuvers is meant

to make the Toulmin model more easily applicable to macroarguments.

Whether any of them is necessary and, if so,

which is the most candid and least problematic is a matter
requiring clarification.
Of the elements of the Toulmin model it is suggested
that all could be more precisely defined, that is, described
in such a way that students can learn to reliably distinguish each element ·from the others without confusion or
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undue disagreement.

Judging from textbook definitions, the

procedures for performing such reliable analyses have yet
to be developed.

Questions regarding the nature of data

have been discussed as contingent upon the applicability of
the Toulmin model to macro-arguments.

About rebuttals,

there is confusion about their limits, conditions for use,
and relationship to other elements, in particular, qualifiers, and warrants.

This confusion has apparently led

some writers to omit this element entirely, and others to
include as rebuttals every conceivable counterargument that
can be listed.

Either interpretation of rebuttal seems to

restrict the ease with which the Toulmin model may be
applied.
Perhaps the element about which the greatest disagreement exists is backing.

Supposedly representative of the

rational criteria by which an argument is justified, the
definition of this element is uniquely dependent upon the
definition of the term "field," because according to Toulmin backings are field-dependent.

Consequently, confusion

over the nature of fields has apparently led some writers
to define backing in terms of the credulity of the immediate audience regarding the topic of argument.

Others have

omitted this element from their diagrammatic versions of
the Toulmin model, thus circumventing the difficulty of
arriving at a precise definition.

By doing so, they cause

their versions of the Toulmin model to be more syllogistic
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by making warrants, like major premises, dependent for support upon prior arguments.

The integrity of the Toulmin

approach is dependent upon the potential development of less
drastic solutions than omission to the problem of defining
elements of the Toulmin model.
Finally, there is some confusion as to the limits of
applicability of the Toulmin model.

Some writers follow

Toulmin's suggestion that his approach is restricted to
the retrospective analysis of justificatory arguments.
What kinds of arguments are not justificatory is not clear.
Neither is it clear whether the model has any prospective
applications, although some speech communication textbook
writers advocate such uses.
Further, there is disagreement among proponents of
prospective applications as to whether or not the Toulmin
model has any value as an organizational pattern.

Issues

such as these should be resolvable through the development
of more precise definitions which stand up to the practical
test of reliability in practice as well as comparing the
effectiveness of the Toulmin model in prospective applications with other approaches to inventio and dispositio.
LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Besides the practical limitations of availability of
resources and time, this study has been limited by its metatheoretical nature.

In other words, the data base from
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which conclusions have been drawn consists of the writings
of theorists about the writings of a theorist about theories of argumentation.

There has been relatively little

opportunity to move from the abstract to the concrete,
from concepts of practical argument to a consideration of
actual examples of arguments.

Thus, most of this study has

remained in the abstract--relating concepts to concepts and
seldom to that which the concepts represent.

This was nec-

essary because the author could not find in the literature
of the Toulmin approach any single source in which issues
concerning the applicability of the Toulmin model to speech
communication were formulated.

It was concluded that until

issues drawn from the history of theoretical development of
the Toulmin approach could be formulated, no concrete investigation of the model itself could proceed.

It is hoped

that this work may provide a foundation for more concrete
and focused investigations of the Toulmin model which may
follow.

While this meta-theoretical inquiry may serve as a

starting place, the issues raised here can only be resolved
by research which has as its data-base the intended concerns
of the Toulmin approach--practical arguments drawn from
various fields of argument.

However, this research must

proceed from a clear understanding of the possible epistemological differences underlying the traditional syllogistic approach and Toulmin's approach to argument.
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